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Abstract 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 ushered in a new era of globalisation and with it, intensified levels of 
global migration. The movement of people across increasingly fluid and penetrable boundaries has altered 
the demographic profile of European states and this cultural diversity has confronted contemporary 
Western liberal democracies with a unique set of challenges concerning the integration of diverse groups 
into society for the purpose of fostering cohesion and domestic stability. The effects of cultural diversity 
are not limited to demographics however, and this thesis focuses predominantly on the political and 
public responses that this phenomenon has evoked. The context of the Netherlands provides a particularly 
enlightening example of the way in which attempts to manage cultural diversity have stimulated intensive 
debate on immigration and integration topics, which have subsequently become firmly ensconced within 
public and political discourse. This ongoing debate in the Dutch context has brought to the fore wider 
questions pertaining to citizenship, national identity and culture. More importantly, these issues have 
exposed the limits of Dutch tolerance: increasingly restrictionist immigration and integration policy over 
the last two decades, and in the last 10 years in particular, has appeared incongruous with stereotypical 
perceptions of the Netherlands as an ultra-liberal and progressive paragon of multiculturalism.  
 
This thesis therefore seeks to rework this image of the Netherlands by observing possible shifts in public 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in the context of considerably less favourable material 
circumstances, occasioned by the current global financial crisis. Attitudes towards Muslims in Dutch 
society are of particular interest to this research given the particular cultural and symbolic threat that 
Islam is considered to pose to liberal values. Realistic Group Conflict Theory provides a useful 
framework for analysing inter-group competition and conflict stemming from both material and non-
material perceptions of threat. Whilst particular focus is accorded to the specific macro-economic 
conditions of the ongoing financial crisis for observing potentially shifting sentiments, this discussion is 
situated within a larger national debate about immigration and integration spanning two decades. Linking 
public perception data to analyses of Dutch integration and immigration policy, patterns of voting 
behaviour and the real effects of the financial crisis on the Dutch economy, the ultimate intention of this 
research, then, is to assess the prospects and overall “health” of liberal democracy in the Netherlands. The 
country‟s experiences in attempting to deal with cultural pluralism reveal that liberal democratic norms 
have not simply been entrenched as “givens” and they are subject to contestation and ambiguity. It is in 
attempts to address difference and “otherness” in society that the shortfalls of Dutch liberal democracy 
have been laid bare.   
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Opsomming 
 
Met die val van die Berlynse Muur in 1989 het „n nuwe tydperk van globalisasie aangebreek en daarmee 
saam, verskerpte vlakke van globale migrasie. Die beweging van mense oor meer toegangklike grense het 
die demografiese profiel van Europese state verander. Hierdie kulturele diversiteit het huidige Westerse 
liberale demokrasieë met „n unieke stel uitdagings gekonfronteer, aangaande die integrasie van diverse 
groepe in die samelewing met die doel om saamhorigheid te bevorder. Die effek van kulturele diversiteit 
is egter nie beperk tot demografie nie en hierdie tesis fokus hoofsaaklik op die politieke en openbare 
reaksies wat die verskynsel uitgelok het. Die Nederlandse konteks verskaf „n besondere insiggewende 
voorbeeld van die manier waarop pogings om kulturele diversiteit te hanteer, intensiewe debat oor 
immigrasie- en integrasie-onderwerpe gestimuleer het, wat sedertdien stewig in die openbare en politieke 
diskoers verskans is. Die voortdurende debat in die Nederlandse verband het wyer vrae aangaande 
burgerskap, nasionale identiteit en kultuur laat ontstaan. Selfs van groter belang is die feit dat hierdie 
vraagstukke die perke van Nederlandse verdraagsaamheid ontbloot het: toenemende inperkings op 
immigrasie- en integrasie-beleid oor die afgelope twee dekades en veral in die laaste 10 jaar, het 
teenstrydig voorgekom met die stereotipiese indruk van Nederland as „n ultra-liberale en progressiewe 
toonbeeld van multi-kulturalisme. 
 
Hierdie tesis be-oog derhalwe om hierdie beeld van Nederland te ondersoek deur moontlike veranderings 
in openbare houdings teenoor immigrante en immigrasie waar te neem, teen die agtergrond van aansienlik 
minder gunstige materiële omstandighede, veroorsaak deur die huidige globale finansiële krisis. Houdings 
teenoor Moslems in die Nederlandse samelewing is van besondere belang in hierdie ondersoek teen die 
agtergrond van die beweerde kulturele en simboliese bedreiging wat Islam vir liberale waardes inhou. 
Realistiese Groep-Konflikteorie voorsien „n nuttige raamwerk om inter-groep wedywering en konflik, wat 
spruit uit beide materiële en nie-materiële perspesies van bedreiging, te analiseer. Alhoewel besondere 
aandag geskenk word aan die spesifieke makro-ekonomiese omstandighede van die huidige finansiële 
krisis om moontlike veranderings in houdings waar te neem, is hierdie bespreking deel van „n groter 
nasionale debat oor immigrasie en integrasie oor die afgelope twee dekades. Deur inligting oor openbare 
persepsie te verbind met die Nederlandse integrasie-en immigrasie-beleid, stempatrone en die ware 
uitwerkings van die finansiële krisis op die Nederlandse kultuur, is die uiteindelike doel van hierdie 
navorsing om die vooruitsigte en algehele “gesondheid” van liberale demokrasie in Nederland te evalueer. 
Die land se ervaring van kulturele pluralisme bewys dat liberale demokratiese norme nie verskans is nie 
en dat hulle onderhewig is aan omstredenheid en dubbelsinnigheid. Die pogings om verskille en 
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“andersheid” in die samelewing aan te spreek, het die tekortkominge van die Nederlandse liberale 
demokrasie ontbloot. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION TO THE TOPIC 
 
1.1.1 Liberal Democracy and the Global Financial Crisis in the Netherlands 
In the wake of communism‟s demise and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, Francis Fukuyama‟s claim 
that liberal democracy had ultimately emerged victorious in the battle for ideological dominance was a 
widely endorsed one. His “End of History” (1989) argument claimed that fundamental ideological debate 
had ended with growing conformity around the world, particularly in Western Europe and the United 
States (US), to the set of ideas espoused by Western liberalism (Heywood, 2007: 335). Forward twenty 
years since the publication of his essay to the present, it is evident that the core values at the heart of 
liberal democratic ideology have not simply been accepted and entrenched as givens; instead, they are 
constantly subject to contestation. The subsequent emergence of new ideological forces, such as political 
Islam, has provided challenges to Fukuyama‟s conceptualisation of the “good society” and the supposedly 
“universal” values that underlie it (Heywood, 2007: 336). Liberal democracy‟s new ideological 
confrontations have stimulated critical examination of the foundational principles of liberalism in 
numerous ways and these processes of redefinition and re-evaluation are indicative of the dynamism and 
flexibility necessary for political ideologies to maintain relevance to ever-changing contemporary 
contexts and challenges. Liberal democracy‟s resilience and development as a political system in Western 
Europe and the US during the twentieth century, and farther afield in the post-Cold War era, is testimony 
to the ability of this particular set of ideas to adapt and progress. Disillusionment among both developing 
and developed parts of the world with the social injustices associated with capitalist market ideology, a 
core feature of liberal democratic regimes, has fanned the flames of future, lively ideological debate 
(Heywood, 2007: 337). One important example of the way in which these norms have been subject to 
critical reflection in contemporary European liberal democracies is in responses towards minority out-
groups in contexts of greater cultural diversity. 
 
1.1.2 Research Problem 
In the last decade especially, events such as the September 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on American soil, 
the War on Terror, the murder of Theo van Gogh and the rise and assassination of Dutch politician Pim 
Fortuyn, have focussed increasing attention on immigration and integration issues in the Netherlands and 
in Western Europe (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 295). Perhaps more significantly, these 
developments have had a profound influence on the tone of debate and the way in which these issues have 
been perceived by the Dutch public and framed in media and political arenas. Whilst much of the 
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literature on immigration in Europe has accorded focus to policy implications, there is a need for greater 
appreciation of public perceptions towards immigrants, which have potential implications far beyond the 
policy arena. As the Netherlands is among the most vocal countries in Europe concerning the sticky 
questions of contemporary immigration and cultural integration, an analysis of public attitudes in this 
country makes for a particularly intriguing discussion. 
 
Immigration is an issue of particular contemporary salience and consequence not only for the 
Netherlands, one of the pioneers of multiculturalism in Western Europe, but also for the European Union 
(EU) and indeed globally. The significance of this phenomenon is demonstrated by the view that “few 
issues have had a greater impact on the politics and society of contemporary Western Europe than 
immigration” (Hollifield in McLaren, 2003: 910). Immigration and questions of minorities‟ cultural 
integration into host societies have increasingly emerged as issues worthy of academic scholarship and 
are topics that have been much debated, to heated effect. Immigration issues in the Netherlands have 
increasingly been addressed by mainstream parties in response to the heightened prevalence of this topic 
in the media and in public and political discourse, and these concerns can therefore no longer be seen as 
the exclusive purview of the right-wing. The pertinence of this discussion derives from the fact that the 
Netherlands has traditionally been portrayed as a country synonymous with Enlightenment liberal ideas 
such as tolerance of individuality and equality. The way in which these almost taken-for-granted and oft-
touted “Dutch values” are critically examined in the midst of intensified reflection upon traditional 
integration strategies, reflects the fact that core liberal democratic ideas are open to constant deliberation 
and redefinition. In the context of a more visible Islamic presence in Europe, perceptions are rife that 
these core values may be under threat.  
 
Present-day Europe faces important demographic challenges in terms of rapidly ageing populations and 
declining fertility rates – the lowest in the world – and migration is now positioned as the principle source 
of European population growth. Van Nimwegen and van der Erf (2010: 1376) express the likelihood that 
competition for highly skilled migrants in Europe and globally will increase in response to the twin 
challenges of ageing populations and labour market shortages. It is predicted that from 2015, the 
European Union (EU) will be confronted with the reality of a natural population decline; from 2035, 
overall population decline (van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010: 1362). Furthermore, the changing face 
of the European demographic has broader economic and social implications and managing migration and 
integration is an ever-greater priority for EU states. It has been suggested that social relations between 
traditional nationals and immigrants in Europe today present challenges comparable to those that have 
confronted the United States for the greater part of its history involving relations between whites and 
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African Americans (McLaren, 2003: 910-911). It is against this contextual backdrop of growing 
population diversity in Europe, which in turn raises important questions concerning citizenship and civic 
rights, integration and the prevention of social exclusion, that contemporary responses towards 
immigration, and immigrants themselves, are being shaped and contested. 
 
In addition to the demographic challenges portended by immigration then, increasing cultural diversity 
across a variety of European contexts means that states are confronted with the challenges of 
accommodating diverse interests within a single society to a greater extent than ever before. Issues 
concerning citizenship, participation in society and politics, as well as the allocation of state resources 
gain heightened importance as governments seek to integrate communities of different ethnic, religious 
and cultural backgrounds into society and accommodate the various group-based claims made on the 
state. Coupled with these increasingly culturally-diverse national profiles are questions pertaining to the 
tenuous position and fate of Islam in Europe, and its perceived incompatibility with the pervasive 
secularism and postmodernism that is so defining a feature of European liberal democracies today. 
Perceptions about the innate “illiberalism” and conservatism of Islam have given rise to an unwillingness 
to extend the liberal norm of tolerance to those European Muslims who have “failed” to integrate and to 
assume the dominant values undergirding the societies in which they live. The central problem of this 
research, then, is that liberal democratic values have potentially come under threat in the context of 
confrontation with norms and ideas that are deemed decidedly illiberal and intolerant. Whether these 
potential threats to liberal democracy have the capacity to fan the flames of violence and civil unrest is 
naturally of huge consequence and the implication of this ideological confrontation for domestic peace is 
considered in subsequent chapters, as is the extent of this supposed cultural clash in the Netherlands. The 
volatility surrounding the issue of immigrant integration in the Dutch context has resulted in the remark 
from one columnist, that in these particularly “charged” times in the Netherlands, the “threat of murder 
hangs over the traditionally tolerant country” (The Economist, 2010: 78). 
 
1.1.3 Research Aim and Questions 
The purpose of this study is to examine the extent to which the changing economic context post-
September 2008 has been accompanied by shifting sentiments vis-à-vis immigration and immigrants. The 
implications of these potential attitudinal shifts for political culture in the Netherlands are of particular 
interest. The ideological implications of the Dutch immigration and integration debates will be assessed in 
terms of how public and political discussion of these issues has been framed in relation to liberal 
democratic ideas. Anti-immigration sentiments in the Netherlands will be identified via public opinion 
surveys and patterns of voting. Data on public opinion will make use of three consecutive surveys 
4 
 
conducted in 2008, 2009 and 2010 by the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) study. The analysis of 
voting behaviour will observe the electoral outcomes of successive Dutch general elections from 1989 – 
2010 in order to examine the trajectory of public support for particular parties and policies over the course 
of the last two decades. A current, historically-located description of the nature of the immigration debate 
in the Netherlands will ultimately be presented. The independent variable can therefore be identified as 
Dutch macro-economic circumstances, specifically the current context of the global financial crisis, with 
the dependent variables being the character of contemporary liberal democracy in the Netherlands, and 
Dutch political culture. It is important to stress that this study does not seek to assess the impact of the 
global financial crisis on attitudes towards immigration and immigrants; it is the possible shift in public 
sentiment towards these issues within less favourable economic circumstances that is of particular 
consequence to this research.  
 
Whilst Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown‟s (2011) study revealed a particularly strong relationship between the 
economy and attitudes towards immigration in the Canadian context, the strength and indeed existence of 
the association cannot be expected to be similar for countries elsewhere. The authors stress the necessity 
of identifying the context-specific explanations and circumstances for shifts in attitudes in other national 
circumstances. Particular attention will therefore be accorded to the role of the ongoing financial crisis in 
possibly (re)shaping the values and priorities of the Dutch public, reflected in public opinion surveys and 
political discourse. It is also not the intention of this discussion to suggest that economic-induced 
perceptions of threat are the most powerful explanations of shifts in anti-immigration sentiment in the 
Netherlands; the possible economic motivations of such perceptions and attitudes are merely considered 
to be of particular interest, given the context of the current global financial crisis. 
 
Although the chief interest of this study is economic-induced threat perceptions, as opposed to other 
potentially significant explanations for anti-immigration feeling, this thesis nevertheless considers 
alternative possible influences of attitudinal shifts. A discussion of the immigration and integration 
discourse in the Netherlands is incomprehensive if it does not acknowledge the very important cultural 
and symbolic dimension of this debate. The roles played by particular politicians, political parties and 
prominent personalities in shaping the Dutch anti-immigration debate will also be examined. The extent 
to which contemporary Islam is perceived as a threat to distinctly “European” or “Dutch” culture and 
“Enlightened” values by certain actors is also a central consideration for this study. In the process of 
accomplishing these intentions for this research, the goal is to answer a number of questions pertaining to 
some of the core values that undergird liberal democratic political culture, and which are central to the 
Dutch national “discussion” on immigration and integration. The focus is therefore on norms and 
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principles including tolerance, equality, religious freedom, state secularism, freedom of expression and 
anti-discrimination. The specific questions that this research aims to address are:  
 Is “equality” about embracing diversity and multiculturalism or does it instead involve efforts to 
entrench a dominant and homogenising status quo? 
 How tolerant is liberal democratic political culture in the Netherlands today, in the context of more 
restrictionist immigration strategies and integration policy‟s turn towards an assimilationist, rather 
than multicultural, approach? 
 How does the principle of a secular, neutral Dutch state and society conflict with an overtly religious 
and externalised Islamic presence? 
 To what extent does the cause for freedom of expression, advanced by the Dutch radical right, 
undermine the anti-discrimination pledge enshrined in the Dutch constitution?  
 
1.1.4 Rationale and Significance of the Study 
The Netherlands has attracted abundant academic attention regarding its integration policies and may very 
well be “one of the most over-studied cases in the international migration literature” (Vink, 2007: 337). 
Although traditionally considered a multicultural “ideal-type”, this stereotype has drawn increasing 
scepticism within the last decade especially as the country‟s restrictionist integration policies have come 
under heightened public and political scrutiny. The most recognised Dutch figurehead today is not likely 
to be recently-incumbent Prime Minister Mark Rutte, and perhaps not even the country‟s own Queen 
Beatrix; that person is arguably Geert Wilders, controversial leader of the Freedom Party (Partij voor de 
Vrijheid or PVV), identifiable just as much for his shock of peroxide hair as his outspoken views on 
immigration. His calls to restrict immigration and to adopt a more hard-line response to Islamism have 
resonated among the public in the Netherlands and further afield, if electoral results and media coverage 
are anything to go by. 
 
Immigration is an issue with far-reaching implications, which range from the political, demographic, 
civic, economic, cultural and social, to the ideological. The present-day context of the global financial 
crisis positions this enduring debate in the Netherlands and elsewhere in a particularly intriguing light 
given the re-evaluation of civic and political values that this context of enhanced economic and financial 
pressure could potentially produce. Shifts in priorities from upholding the inviolable principle of 
toleration, a cornerstone of liberal-democratic ideology and a value traditionally synonymous with the 
Netherlands, towards efforts to formally entrench a national, dominant status quo and thereby undermine 
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the country‟s minority cultures and multicultural flair – similarly vital features of liberal democratic 
societies – has important consequences for the future character of the country‟s political culture. 
 
This study hopes to contribute to the existing literature on the topic by using more recent sources of data. 
Limited scholarship exists at present focussing particularly on the ideological repercussions of the global 
financial crisis for established liberal democracies in Western societies. The concerted effort made to 
consult documents dating from 2008 onwards will render this analysis especially relevant to 
contemporary global conditions. This study will examine whether a changing macro-economic climate in 
the Netherlands has been accompanied by shifts in public perceptions towards immigration and certain 
immigrant groups. In order to draw possible causal associations however, this study would need to be 
complemented with further exploratory research. It is nevertheless hoped that this descriptive and 
exploratory research will have a foundational purpose in terms of contextualising the current Dutch 
immigration and integration debate and directing future research towards specific themes or points of 
interest.  
 
This study assumes a case study approach, using the Netherlands as the context of interest. Though it may 
be somewhat inappropriate for advancing generally-applicable conclusions, it is necessary to focus on the 
trajectory of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment within a single country in order that the 
complexities of these public attitudes may be appreciated. It is important to bear in mind however that the 
turn towards a more restrictionist direction is not a development peculiar to the Dutch experience and 
similar trends are observable across several contemporary European contexts. Where relevant, a 
comparative approach will highlight those Dutch developments and experiences that are similarly, or 
contrarily, observable in the contexts of other European states.  
 
1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In their study of changing trends in public opinion towards immigrants in Canada, a country also 
distinguished by its multicultural policies, Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown‟s (2011: 79) research revealed 
that the most influential factor in accounting for attitude change was a changing macro-economic climate. 
Other potential influences such as birth cohort succession and generational differences in perceptions 
proved to have either negligible attitudinal effects, in the instance of the former, or only a moderate effect 
in the latter case. Their study therefore points to the significance of “period effects” on opinions towards 
immigrants that impact the entire population, suggesting that individuals alter perceptions from one 
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period to the next, irrespective of age, in response to a singular event or because attitudes are reworked in 
response to changes in the broader socio-economic context (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011: 80).  
 
Other authors similarly highlight the role of context in contributing towards perceptions of threat and 
exclusionary sentiments (McLaren 2003; Coenders et al., 2008). Using Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown‟s 
findings to guide this analysis, albeit an alternative context, this thesis will assess whether the global 
financial crisis has been accompanied by shifts in public perceptions towards immigration and immigrants 
in the Netherlands. This study is therefore prompted by the works of other immigration scholars in 
making the assumption that group competition for resources, real or perceived, is a significant 
determinant of attitudes towards immigration (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998: 699-700). 
Heightened perceptions about an out-group threat to the interests of the dominant group are considered to 
result in higher levels of prejudice and less support for immigrants and immigration by the so-called “in-
group” (Quillian, 1995; Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011: 82). 
 
Smerbeck‟s (2007) research across 14 European countries found that perceived economic and 
demographic threat, theorised in terms of Realistic Group Conflict Theory, proved less powerful in 
explaining support for anti-immigration policies than in-group insularity, which is grounded in Social 
Identity Theory. The focus for this thesis, however, is centred more on understanding attitudinal shifts 
towards immigration and immigrants, irrespective of whether less favourable sentiments are subsequently 
translated into support for particular anti-immigration policies. The chief interest for this research is the 
economic shapers of perceived threat and negative out-group sentiment, as opposed to Smerbeck‟s 
simultaneous interest in looking at in-group insularity. This study will however similarly make use of the 
hypotheses put forward by Realistic Group Conflict Theory to undergird this research and structure the 
ensuing discussion. The thinking informing this analysis, that economic conditions may potentially 
induce shifts in public and political perceptions towards immigration, is a hypothesis neatly encapsulated 
by this theory.  
 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory seeks to explain how potential for group conflict and hostility is 
exacerbated in contexts of increased pressure for limited, shared group resources. As a result, a particular 
minority out-group is identified and perceived by the dominant group as representing a threat to the 
latter‟s access to these finite resources (Smerbeck, 2007). Group interests are thus seen as incompatible 
and access to resources is increasingly viewed in zero-sum terms: that is, one group‟s access to a resource 
is interpreted as being at the expense of another group (Coenders et al., 2008: 271; Esses, Jackson and 
Armstrong, 1998: 701, 704). In the context of European welfare states like the Netherlands, periods of 
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economic pressure often result in so-called “traditional nationals”, the autochthonous native Dutch, 
blaming immigrants for the latter group‟s perceived, and often actual, disproportionate claims on the 
national welfare pool (Smerbeck, 2007). The ongoing global financial crisis provides the ideal 
circumstances in which to analyse such group responses and attitudes vis-à-vis immigration and 
immigrants as the context of economic depression is likely to add impetus to the perception of there being 
limited access to resources, for particular groups especially (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998: 702). 
 
Realistic group conflict is traditionally regarded as a particular type of perceived threat distinct from 
symbolic or culturally-induced perceptions of threat. Chapter Five, which examines this theory in more 
detail and assesses its applicability to the Dutch context in the global financial crisis, extends the focus of 
the theory to include symbolic and cultural sources of group competition and conflict. The use of 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory does not require that a veritable competition over resources exists, 
merely that the perception of such competition is present (Esses, Jackson and Armstrong, 1998: 701; 
Coenders et al., 2008: 271). This theory applies specifically to threat and competition experienced at the 
group level, rather than individual level, where collective interests are perceived to be at stake (Esses, 
Jackson and Armstrong, 1998: 701). Whilst Chapter Four assesses the real effects of the global financial 
crisis and economic recession on the Dutch economy, it is not so much the extent of real competition over 
shared resources in the Netherlands that is of interest here, as the perception that such competition and 
economic threat exists. 
 
A changing socio-economic climate has not only been linked to changed public perceptions towards 
immigration. Chapters Three and Four show how growing electoral support for right-wing parties 
throughout Europe has also occurred within the context of less favourable macro-economic conditions. 
Sen (2010: 63) postulates that the recent global economic meltdown provides further impetus for 
adherence to right-wing values by rendering conditions ripe for authoritarian government and extremism. 
This study‟s decision to accord principle focus to the structural context in which threat perceptions are 
encouraged and fester is not to dismiss the significance of more ideological and culturally-induced threats 
to the nation: indeed, it has been argued that in favourable economic climates, concerns about identity are 
likely to overshadow financial or material anxieties (Coenders et al., 2008: 282). Consequently, sufficient 
attention will also be accorded to perceptions about the particular symbolic and cultural threat that Islam 
is considered to pose to liberal democratic values. 
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1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.3.1 Research Design 
This study is both descriptive and exploratory and the ensuing analysis employs a distinctively qualitative 
methodology. The intention for this thesis is to explore whether a changing economic context in the 
Netherlands has been accompanied by a concomitant shift in public attitudes towards immigration and 
minority groups, a scenario which would reflect the hypotheses posited by Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory. Public attitudes are considered important for their reflection of national civic culture and 
ultimately, the state of liberal democracy in the country. This exploratory and descriptive research should 
be seen as laying the foundation for future scholarship by hinting at whether possible causal links exist 
between economic climate – especially periods of financial strain – and the re-evaluation of liberal 
democratic values born of economic prosperity (Babbie, 2010: 92). Although this research will not serve 
to contribute new data to the field in the form of statistics and measurements, it is certainly hoped that 
offering a perspective on Dutch immigration sentiment that takes into account current macro-economic 
events, assessing their possible impact on the state of liberal democracy, will prove useful. This thesis 
will thus observe and describe some of the possible economic, political, attitudinal and ideological 
implications of the global financial crisis. The Dutch population will be described using a combination of 
census figures, data on public perceptions and statistics pertaining to voting behaviour and patterns. 
 
1.3.2 Units of Analysis 
This thesis will focus on several units of analysis. Description of public attitudes in terms of voting 
behaviours and attitudes towards immigration will necessarily take the perceptions of individual Dutch 
citizens as the point of departure. The combination of individual attitudes, measured by the TTI public 
perception surveys will provide an indication of larger Dutch in-group attitudes (Babbie, 2010: 99). 
 
This thesis will look at the Dutch context specifically and European context generally. Effort will be 
made to show how certain experiences of the Netherlands may likewise be seen in the context of other 
European countries faced with similar social demands and circumstances. Brief mention will be made at 
relevant intervals of possible similarities or differences between what has been observed in the 
Netherlands and in European countries elsewhere, in order that these developments in the Netherlands 
may be located within a larger European context.  
 
This study will also focus on particular political parties in the Netherlands, especially those with anti-
immigration agendas. Prominent personalities who have expressed outspoken views on immigration and 
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integration, such as Geert Wilders, Theo van Gogh, Pim Fortuyn and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, will be analysed 
for their role in leading and shaping the immigration debate. 
 
1.3.3 Levels of Analysis 
In terms of providing data reflective of the effects of the global financial crisis in the Netherlands, this 
study will make use of macro-level measures pertaining to the Dutch national economy. Examining 
specific policies relating to immigration, citizenship, multiculturalism and other efforts at fostering 
cultural integration, also look at strategies at the national level.  
 
A meso-level of analysis is relevant for observing the roles of certain political parties in the Netherlands 
with regards to their contribution to the anti-immigration debate. The policy proposals and party mandates 
of such organisations will also fall under this level of analysis. 
 
Individual-level data will also be used in the form of self-reported attitudes towards immigration and 
minority groups administered by public opinion surveys. A micro-level of analysis is similarly employed 
when looking at the role of certain prominent individuals in shaping the anti-immigration debate in the 
Netherlands over the course of the last 20 years. 
 
1.3.4 Time Dimension 
This thesis will look at perceptions towards immigrants and political responses within the last 20 years, 
since the fall of the Berlin Wall when the floodgates to an era of unprecedented globalisation ushered in a 
period of intensified migration across the entire European continent. The free movement of people across 
increasingly fluid and penetrable boundaries represents an important feature of this period of 
contemporary globalisation. The issues of immigration and integration are not specific to the Netherlands 
alone; such questions are of continental scope and the post-1989 period is thus a significant date in the 
histories of many European states in terms of their engagements with the rest of the world and 
experiences in accommodating foreigners within their borders. The thesis will look at events and 
perceptions from 1989 up until mid-2011. 
 
This research will take the form of a longitudinal study by looking at the evolution of Dutch public 
opinion and attitudes over the course of the global financial crisis. The rise and fall of political parties and 
varying patterns of voting behaviour will also be observed, from 1989 – 2010, as will the ongoing debate 
around immigration and integration over the course of this period. The various immigration policies and 
integration strategies pursued by successive Dutch governments over the last twenty years will similarly 
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be considered. The type of longitudinal study applicable to this analysis is a trend study, examining 
changes within the population over time in terms of specified characteristics. The evolutionary aspect of 
longitudinal trend studies renders this type of study especially relevant for describing the process of 
attitudinal adjustment towards immigration and immigrants, which will culminate in a description of the 
current climate. The development over time of the country‟s liberal democratic character similarly makes 
applicable the longue durée time dimension of this study. 
 
1.3.5 Data Collection and Analysis 
This research will make use of the findings from the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) study, 
carried out by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Three annual surveys, conducted in 2008, 
2009 and 2010, have sought to research attitudinal trends in several European countries, including the 
Netherlands, as well as in the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and Canada. The first survey was conducted 
just prior to the onset of the global financial crisis in early September 2008, thereby enabling comparison 
of attitudes before, and during, the crisis. The two subsequent surveys were conducted in 2009 and 2010. 
The longitudinal nature of these surveys makes them ideal for the purposes of this research and they 
purposely seek to gauge the impact of the global financial crisis on public attitudes towards immigrants 
and immigration. Data permitting, those attitudes towards Muslims and Islam will receive particular 
attention. It is important to bear in mind that the intention of consulting public perception data is not to 
examine the extent of public support for a particular statement or policy scenario: the objective of looking 
at this data is to observe variation in attitudes and shifts in levels of support or opposition from one year 
to the next, within the context of intensified economic and financial pressure. 
 
The findings of these public opinion surveys will be analysed in light of the most recent patterns of voting 
behaviour in the Netherlands, as well as against the backdrop of increased financial strain on Dutch 
households and the declining prospects of the Dutch economy. Journal articles on the topics of 
immigration, integration, the Dutch right-wing, and the position of Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands 
will form the bulk of the resources consulted for this research. Concerted effort has been made to employ 
the most recently-published works in order to enhance the salience of this discussion. Demographic 
statistics of the Netherlands will also be consulted, as will data pertaining to the Dutch economy before 
and after 2008, with the purpose of determining the extent of the impact of the global financial crisis on 
the country and of establishing the degree to which a real pressure on job availability and the provision of 
social services has been experienced, which might account for possible perceptions of economic threat 
posed by immigrant out-groups.  
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In order to evaluate the “resilience” or durability of liberal democratic values and institutions in the 
country, it will be necessary to look at instances where traditional liberal democratic principles have been 
compromised in attempts to “manage” the immigration question, for example, or where certain liberal 
principles have been prioritised at the expense of others. Even proposals to push forward a law to ban 
religious garb in public, for instance, may be taken as evidence of the fact that values pertaining to the 
liberty, religious freedom and individualism of all Dutch citizens may not be as established or inviolable 
as expected. In determining the quality and prospects for liberal democracy in the Netherlands then, this 
analysis will necessarily assume a more qualitative approach. Reference will also be made to the policies 
and campaign issues of Dutch political parties and how their mandates have been reassessed over the 
course of the last two decades in an attempt to reflect the concerns and interests of the Dutch public. 
Consideration of the rhetoric of high-profile politicians and members of society in the context of this 
national question on immigration and integration seeks to highlight the agenda-setting (which issues are 
on the agenda) and framing strategies of actors in both the political and media arenas, who strive to 
present salient immigration and integration questions in a particular light and disseminate a specific 
interpretation of the issues at stake (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 296). An interpretation of 
policies will therefore look at what Vliegenthart and Roggeband (2007: 297) define as 
institutional/substantial measures such as laws and budgetary spending, or more symbolic measures 
which focus on those agendas made visible via symbolic policies such as speeches or interviews. Use of 
several news sources is justified via the expectation that public opinion is influenced to a large extent by 
what is read or heard in the news (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008: 961). News sources are important 
framers of topical issues and have an influential role in setting the tone of debate around a particular 
subject. 
 
Patterns in voting behaviour, observed in Chapter 4, will be ascertained via consultation of election 
results. The electoral gains of political parties are influential in fostering legitimacy for a specific 
immigration or integration frame in parliament and in the media (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 
299). The share of electoral support gained by the major Dutch political parties in each general election 
from 1989 to 2010 will be observed. Fluctuating support for anti-immigration and far-right parties over 
the course of the last two decades will shed light on the extent to which they have been able to wield 
influence over (anti-)immigration and integration debates. One would expect that the heightened 
prevalence of right-wing parties in the Netherlands within the last decade since 9/11 would result in more 
frequent use of anti-immigration frames in the media and in parliament. Opposition to immigration and 
immigrants does not necessarily translate into more votes for anti-immigrant parties, as numerous factors 
are taken into account when choosing to support a particular political party. This thesis will not seek to 
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measure opposition to immigration and immigrants in the Netherlands, but by providing an analysis of 
voting patterns in the last 20 years in conjunction with analyses of public perceptions towards 
immigration and immigrants over the course of the global financial crisis, it is hoped that this study will 
be able to contribute a meaningful descriptive analysis of such attitudinal trends. Description of public 
attitudes in terms of voting behaviour and attitudes towards immigration and immigrants will necessarily 
take the perceptions of individual Dutch citizens as the point of departure. The attitudes of respondents in 
the TTI public perception surveys enable the formation of an aggregated picture of the larger group these 
individuals represent: that is, the Dutch population as a whole, giving an idea of group attitudes which is 
applicable to this study‟s use of Realistic Group Conflict Theory (Babbie, 2010: 99).  
 
1.4 CONCEPTUALISATION OF CORE TERMINOLOGY 
 
1.4.1 Liberal Democracy 
Liberal democracy is a type of democratic political rule founded upon the principles of limited 
government, popular consent and frequently-held competitive elections (Heywood, 2007: 40). Limited 
government is maintained by a series of checks and balances on governmental power, ensuring that 
citizens‟ rights, constitutionally enshrined, are inalienable and safeguarded from the encroachment of the 
state. Individual rights and civil liberties are considered paramount in liberal democratic regimes. What 
Heywood (2007: 41) terms the “ambivalence within liberalism towards democracy” is reflected in liberal 
democracy, where individual rights are often seen to be overridden in the name of “the people‟s” 
collective interest. Liberal democratic regimes have traditionally been criticised on the grounds of their 
majoritarian beliefs and hostility to individual and minority rights. This is an important critique of liberal 
democracy that is particularly relevant to the interests of this thesis. Since the twentieth century in 
particular, liberal theories of democracy have emphasised societal consensus, seen as vital for fostering 
stability in increasingly plural modern societies comprised of disparate groups with potentially conflicting 
interests (Heywood, 2007: 43). 
 
1.4.2 Human Rights (liberal) 
According to liberals, “natural” entitlements are applicable to all people by virtue of their common 
humanity and equality as individuals. These fundamental, inalienable “natural rights” are commonly 
spoken of as “human rights”, which emphasise the universal quality of these endowments. For John 
Locke, reference to human rights, the “essential conditions for leading a truly human existence”, usually 
designates three such conditions: the rights to life, liberty and property (Heywood, 2007: 46). The 
principle of respect for human rights is an underlying tenet of liberal thought and leads to the construction 
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of the so-called “social contract” between government and citizens: citizens relinquish a degree of 
individual freedom in order to receive protection from the state, at the same time agreeing to respect and 
abide by the laws of the (minimal) government (Heywood, 2007: 46). 
 
1.4.3 Equality 
A liberal interpretation of “equality” deems that all human beings share a common moral worth. Talk of 
“universal human rights” reflects this underlying conviction that all people deserve to be treated 
identically and are worthy of formal equality; that is, politically (“one person one vote”) and legally 
(equality before the law), in addition to being entitled to equality of opportunity (Heywood, 2007: 33, 34, 
107). Although classical liberals in particular oppose the notion of social equality (equality of outcome) 
and advocate that society be structured along meritocratic lines, rights are nevertheless to be enjoyed by 
any group, regardless of variables such as race, religion, gender or class (Heywood, 2007: 22, 107). 
 
1.4.4 Tolerance 
The willingness to respect and accept difference in others is associated with the principle of tolerance, a 
fundamental tenet of liberal ideology (Heywood, 2007: 34). Tolerance implies preparedness to put up 
with and accommodate something disliked, which might otherwise induce hostility were it not for the 
recognition that forbearance towards the object of aversion is ultimately for the greater good of society 
(Du Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 100). In some ways, this implies the perception of tolerance being a “necessary 
evil”, exercised in spite of the source of disapproval, since reversion to intolerance could potentially find 
expression through prejudice or even violence. The domestic pacification of liberal democratic societies is 
therefore very much driven by the acceptance that one‟s “enemies” have just as much right to participate 
in society on a similar political, economic and cultural level as everyone else. The liberal notion of 
tolerance is thus rooted in respect for individual autonomy and is linked to a wider space for personal 
freedom (Mahajan, 2007: 330). The object of disapproval or dislike might be a source of moral, cultural 
or political diversity entailing attitudinal, behavioural or religious differences (Heywood, 2007: 34). The 
principal interest of this research is the willingness to accept cultural diversity in others: that is, the rights 
of one‟s adversaries to pursue their own ideological or religious beliefs within the limits of what is legally 
permissible, as equal members within society. Whilst negative tolerance implies an indifference to 
diversity born of dislike, positive tolerance suggests that mutual forbearance is ultimately necessary (Du 
Toit and Kotzé, 2011: 101). 
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1.4.5 Multiculturalism 
Multiculturalism represents a concerted strategy to address growing cultural diversity and foster societal 
integration. It essentially represents attempts to nurture cultural difference whilst simultaneously 
promoting civic unity – “diversity within unity” (Heywood, 2007: 310). Societies that pursue 
multicultural policies strive to provide multiple groups the space in which to pursue and develop their 
distinctive cultural identities for the purposes of achieving self-worth and self-understanding within an 
environment that accords mutual respect for, and acknowledgement of difference (Heywood, 2002: 119). 
It is thus evident how endorsement of multicultural politics is closely tied in with the concept of 
toleration. The normative rationale for multiculturalism is that individual cultures deserve to be valued 
and protected, and that society ultimately stands to gain from the cultural enrichment afforded by such 
policies. Cultural diversity is thus deemed an asset to society and consensual politics is prioritised as a 
means to foster open dialogue and understanding between groups (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 
301).  It is a strategy that has attracted increasing scepticism in the last couple of years especially and this 
development will be looked at in greater detail in the following chapter. 
 
1.4.6 Political Culture 
Heywood (2002: 200, 429) defines this concept as a “pattern of (psychological) orientations” (political 
attitudes, beliefs, symbols or values) towards political entities in the form of political parties, government 
or the constitution. Political culture is the product of a long-term shaping of values and is not subject to 
change in response to the occurrence of a specific event, for instance, in the same way that public opinion 
and attitudes are renegotiated. 
 
1.4.7 Immigrants 
Reference to “immigrants” in the literature is often limited to those foreigners living in the Netherlands 
who were either born overseas in a non-Western country or have at least one foreign-born parent (born in 
a non-Western country) (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 119). This definition is the same as that used by 
Statistics Netherlands and allows for an inclusion of both first-and second-generation migrants into this 
category, the latter demographic representing a group of increasing research interest with respect to their 
ability to integrate into Dutch society (Coenders et al., 2008: 275). The principle focus of this thesis will 
be on perceptions towards Islamic immigrants – hailing from Turkey and Morocco specifically – as this 
group is almost always singled out when discussions about the compatibility of Dutch values and those of 
foreign cultures take place. However, because the concept of “immigrant” is not always confined to 
Islamic immigrants in the literature, it is not possible to limit the conceptualisation of immigrants strictly 
to Muslims here, although this would be the most appropriate conceptualisation for the purposes of this 
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analysis. Given the European context of this study, the terms “immigrants” and “minority groups” may be 
used somewhat interchangeably. In the Netherlands, the two labels are likely to refer to the same groups 
of people; however, every effort will be made to clarify who, or what groups specifically are being 
referred to throughout the ensuing discussion (McLaren, 2003: 919). 
 
This study‟s predominant focus on immigrants that are Muslims is not to suggest that Islamic culture and 
values represent the greatest source of “threat” to liberal democratic tenets in the Netherlands. Particular 
focus upon public sentiments towards Muslim immigrants and Islamic immigration specifically, where 
possible, is motivated by the fact that public and political discourse around immigration and integration in 
Europe has increasingly come to reflect a distinctively “Clash of Civilisations” discourse. The allegedly 
inherent incompatibility of Western and Islamic civilisation to which Huntington‟s thesis refers is readily 
employed by anti-immigration and right-wing groups as a paradigm for structuring debate on relations 
between these supposedly distinct cultural and ideological groups. The anti-immigration debate in the 
Netherlands focuses almost exclusively on Islamic groups, considered more “problematic” and 
threatening to Dutch identity than their non-Islamic counterparts (Coenders et al., 2008: 272). 
 
1.4.8 Anti-Immigration Sentiments 
Negative attitudes towards immigrants by virtue of their perceived membership to a culturally or 
religiously defined group will be identified by a combination of voters‟ support for political parties that 
campaign on an expressly anti-immigration platform, as well as via reference to public opinion surveys. 
Of course, not all anti-immigration sentiments translate into party and policy support, so surveys that 
publish the results of self-reported anti-immigration attitudes will be used. Those with anti-immigration 
views frame immigration as a problem and seek to restrict the inflow of immigrants, particularly 
economically-dependent “marriage migrants”, who are generally presented as “traditional”, “non-
emancipated” and “female” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 301).  
 
1.4.9 Threat perceptions 
McLaren (2003: 918, 925) distinguishes between resource-based (or economic) threats and those more 
symbolic and culturally-perceived threats to the nation. A similar distinction is made between the 
different levels at which perceptions of threat occur, namely at the individual and group levels. This study 
will focus more on group-level perceptions of threat: the use of Realistic Group Conflict Theory to inform 
this analysis naturally accords focus to group-level attitudes as opposed to those that occur at the 
individual level. Experience of group threat extends to resources as well as national symbols which 
include values or the perception that the culture of a society is being denigrated. McLaren‟s (2003: 925) 
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research leads to the conclusion that perceptions of threat to the group as a whole are more powerful in 
predicting hostility towards immigrants. 
 
1.5 LIMITATIONS AND DELIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
An important limitation of this research concerns questions of conceptualisation. Key concepts in this 
discussion may be defined differently from the classifications used by other sources in the literature. 
Whilst this analysis has chosen to focus the conceptualisation of “immigrants” on Islamic immigrants 
hailing from Morocco and Turkey, other articles may define the term in such a way as to include settlers 
from the former Dutch colonies Suriname and the Dutch Antilles, for instance. This is a concern 
especially with regards to data related to public perceptions towards immigrants where in certain cases the 
attitudes reflected will refer to all immigrants in the Netherlands generally and not necessarily to attitudes 
towards Islamic Moroccan and Turkish immigrants specifically. In order to remedy somewhat the pitfalls 
associated with inconsistent conceptualisations of key terminology, every effort will be made to be as 
concise and descriptive as possible regarding who and what type of immigration is being referred to. 
Inconsistent definitions of concepts are a problem encountered by numerous authors regarding the profile 
of foreign immigrants (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 131; McLaren, 2003: 921). However, this drawback need 
not be as problematic as those studies seeking to operationalise key definitions for the sake of concise 
measurement, as the concern of this research is not to draw causal relations between economic 
environment and public attitudes. 
 
In addition to problems of conceptual inconsistency, limitations concerning data also exist with regard to 
availability and quality. Discrepancies also occur in terms of the various methodologies and data-
gathering techniques employed by researchers. Difficulties regarding documentation give rise to 
sometimes unreliable sources and the realities of illegal and undocumented immigration to the 
Netherlands means that statistics can only be considered a vague description of real-life phenomena at 
best. Where possible, all reported figures will be verified against several data sources in an effort to 
enhance the reliability of each statistic presented in this thesis. 
 
This study will be delimited to the use of English sources. Although not a significant shortcoming 
considering that much of the literature, including scholarship by Dutch authors, is published in English, it 
is necessary to bear in mind that reference will not be made to Arabic or Dutch sources. The focus of this 
thesis is also on anti-immigration and anti-immigrant attitudes in the Netherlands and not on pro-
immigration or pro-multiculturalism perspectives, although these are of course important to the overall 
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immigration and integration debate and will necessarily receive mention. Therefore, principle focus is 
accorded to analysing one particular side of this ongoing debate. Likewise, most research interest will be 
focussed on proponents of restrictive immigration policy, such as those political parties campaigning on 
an anti-immigration platform. The same applies to other spearheading forces behind the Dutch 
immigration and integration debates, be they political parties or individuals. 
 
1.6 STRUCTURE AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
Following on from this introduction to the topic and intentions for the research, Chapter Two will focus 
on Dutch immigration in the last 20 years, providing an overview of immigration policy and integration 
strategies. The profile of Dutch immigrants will also be described in more detail. Chapter Three will look 
at the ambiguous position of Islam in Dutch society and the socio-economic marginalisation of Muslims 
generally. This chapter focuses particularly on the cultural aspect of the immigration and integration 
debates and considers the possibility of a veritable “Clash of Civilisations” in the Dutch context. Dutch 
political parties and prominent figures will also be introduced, and their contribution to public and 
political debate in the country considered. The second section of Chapter Three looks at the rise of the 
populist radical right in the Netherlands and the extent to which this development may be deemed 
compatible with liberal and democratic values. Chapter Four provides a brief outline of the real effects of 
the global financial crisis and subsequent economic recession on the Dutch economy. This section is 
followed by an analysis of voting behaviour in the Netherlands from 1989 to 2010. Chapter Five then 
proceeds to distinguish shifts in attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in the Netherlands over the 
global financial crisis years. The discussion of this chapter is informed by Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory which is employed in order to assess the possible impact of both economically- and culturally-
induced threat perceptions in shifting public attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. Concluding 
this study with Chapter Six, which draws from the discussions of the previous chapters, an assessment of 
the prospects for Dutch liberal democratic political culture is made. The conclusion ultimately locates the 
discussion of the Netherlands within wider global developments relating to growing levels of cultural 
diversity in contemporary liberal democracies. Certain inherent contradictions within liberalism are 
highlighted and the research questions pertaining to particular core liberal democratic values that were 
posed earlier in this chapter will be addressed. Ultimately, the prospects for liberal democracy and 
multiculturalism in the Netherlands will be considered, in addition to whether a re-evaluation of essential 
societal values has been witnessed.  
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1.7 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to provide a clear outline of the intentions for this thesis, as well as introduce the 
structure, methodology and theory that will be used to inform this analysis. Effort has been made to 
incorporate relevant literature into the opening chapter in an attempt to contextualise this introduction 
both in terms of the existing scholarship on the topic as well as with regards to applicable contemporary 
developments. The subsequent chapter will provide an historical overview of Dutch immigration and 
integration policies over the course of the last 20 years, since 1989 to the present. 
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Chapter 2. Restrictive Immigration and Assimilative Integration: Two Decades of Policy 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Netherlands has traditionally been portrayed as one of the most liberally progressive and tolerant 
regimes in connection with its politics of accommodation. Conventional accounts of the country‟s 
attempts to manage cultural diversity regularly offer up a tidy historical explanation that locates the 
Netherlands‟ distinctive approach to multicultural policy-making within the context of its past 
experiences in coping with religious pluralism. It would appear that today however, the country has 
undergone a fundamental turn-around from the days of being a multicultural ideal-type: increasingly 
restrictionist immigration policy has made the acquisition of Dutch citizenship by immigrants more 
difficult in recent years and ethnic minorities have been confronted with greater demands to assimilate 
“Dutch” culture and values. In light of these seemingly drastic policy changes, the ensuing discussion will 
explore the veritable extent and nature of this alleged “transformation”. Another noteworthy shift that has 
also been witnessed over the last 25 years sees less debate on the topic of general immigration as such, 
and more deliberation on the position and fate of Islam in the country, particularly the externalised and 
visible symbols of this religious ideology (Roy, 2010: 67). Dutch integration policy‟s more symbolic turn 
of late therefore reflects a lesser focus on the formal integration of migrants into society and greater 
concern for protecting a distinctively “Dutch” national identity. 
 
Given these developments, this chapter will offer a descriptive account of both migration flows into the 
Netherlands as well as the policy developments pertaining to integration, immigration and citizenship that 
have characterised the post-1989 period in particular. This discussion is motivated by the intention to 
rework both the earlier image of the Netherlands as a paragon of multiculturalism as well as more current 
(though similarly misleading and one-sided) fixations on the country‟s recent crackdown on terrorism and 
adoption of a more hardline, less tolerant attitude towards religious and cultural diversity. As Maas (2010: 
229) notes, neither “caricature” encapsulates sufficiently the true evolution of the Netherlands‟ citizenship 
and integration policies. This chapter therefore seeks to demystify these two misleading stereotypes about 
“one of the most over-studied cases in the international migration literature”, proffering a more realistic, 
though perhaps less simplistically neat, interpretation (Vink, 2007: 337). 
 
For liberal democracies today, especially culturally diverse ones, the politics surrounding the 
accommodation of different groups – ethnic, religious or otherwise – within a single society is of 
particular salience. In Europe, cultural diversity is not only an attribute of federal states like Germany and 
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can prove as much a defining feature of unitary states such as the Netherlands. Whilst citizenship-related 
issues were for a significant time quite decentralised, with provinces and cities assuming chief 
responsibility for upholding the rights of citizens, the unitary Dutch state that came into existence in 1813 
with the retreat of Napoleon‟s forces witnessed the increasing centralisation of authority. Questions of 
citizenship have consequently become the purview of central government (Maas, 2010: 231). Along with 
countries including Switzerland, Belgium and Canada, the Netherlands has historically been regarded as a 
model of consociationalism, thanks to its legacy of pillarisation and institutional structures promoting the 
integration of societal groups sharing nationality but differentiated along ethnic, religious, ideological or 
other lines (Maas, 2010: 233; Lijphart 1968). Consociationalism encourages political appeals to specific 
groups and elites are obliged to work together in a spirit of mutual cooperation and pragmatism to 
accomplish political ends (Maas, 2010: 233; Lijphart, 1968: 59). This strategy of group-based autonomy 
in conjunction with elite compromise was previously identified as the key to securing the domestic 
pacification of Dutch society (Vink, 2007: 342).  
 
Western liberal democracies confronted with the challenges of coping with immigration and the cultural 
diversity this implies often look to citizenship policies as a means to tackle the issue, questions of 
citizenship and immigration being closely connected (Maas, 2010: 227). The politics of citizenship is 
therefore a theme that features prominently in the ensuing discussion. The granting of citizenship or 
“naturalisation”, entails an individual‟s full legal inclusion into a sovereign state and is often used as an 
instrument of integration for established native groups and newcomers alike (Maas, 2010: 227). The 
Netherlands provides a particularly interesting case study for observing continuity and change with 
respect to citizenship laws and policies, given the country‟s history of political and cultural 
accommodation within its borders and the rapid social and political change experienced in recent decades 
(Maas, 2010: 227). Although it is not the intention of this chapter to explain why these changes in policy 
occur – that is, whether they are the result of political changes, cultural preferences, institutional or 
structural factors – this discussion will nevertheless be situated within a larger analysis of fluctuating 
migration flows, transformations in attitudes towards cultural integration, as well as the influence of 
political parties and politicians on the integration debate. 
 
2.2 OVERVIEW OF IMMIGRATION FLOWS 
 
Numerically, the difference between the numbers of people emigrating from, and immigrating into, the 
country appears negligible. Regardless of whether the Netherlands is officially an “emigration” or 
“immigration” country – in 2007 the Netherlands was reportedly the only old EU member state that 
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experienced a negative net migration balance, albeit a slight one – it is sufficient to say that debates 
surrounding immigration and integration policy feature prominently in the country, to heated effect (Van 
Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010: 1362). Perceptions of an immigrant “threat” have the potential to prove 
politically disruptive and to reconfigure Europe‟s political landscape: the steady growth of right-wing 
movements across a variety of European contexts in recent decades is evidence in this regard. And 
whereas promoting an anti-immigration agenda was traditionally confined to being a feature of right-wing 
party policy, this priority is garnering heightened interest within mainstream public and political 
discourse. The political salience of movements against immigration – “the most volatile” of demographic 
processes – is looked at in greater detail in Chapter Three (van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010: 1367). 
 
This section offers a brief overview of immigration flows into the Netherlands, followed by a description 
of the basic demographic characteristics of minority immigrant populations (recall that the first chapter 
stated that the terms “minority” and “immigrant” tend to be used interchangeably, the one group generally 
corresponding to the other in contexts such as the Dutch one). Although intra-European migration is an 
important phenomenon that deserves scholarly attention, especially since the enlargement of the EU in 
2004 and 2007 has stimulated labour migration flows from the new into the old member-states, the focus 
of this chapter, and the rest of this thesis, is on (non-Western) immigration from outside the EU, from so-
called “Third Countries” (Van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010: 1369). Although this research has 
chosen to focus upon the longer-term implications of migration to the Netherlands, it recognises that 
immigration is a dynamic process and is characterised as much by permanence as the temporary in-and-
out movement of people. This chapter does not accord focus to the temporality of this phenomenon to the 
same extent as some authors (see Bijwaard 2010), but is nevertheless mindful not to treat immigration as 
a “once-and-for-all event” (Bijwaard, 2010: 1242).  
 
2.2.1 Historical Waves of Dutch Immigration 
The Netherlands‟ early immigration narrative corresponds to general European trends in a post-World 
War Two and post-colonial era. Along with Germany, the United Kingdom and Denmark, the 
Netherlands is characterised as an “old” West European immigrant-receiving country, in contrast to those 
new immigration countries such as Italy and Spain which became targeted migrant destinations at a later 
period (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011: 33). The country‟s colonial forays resulted in immigration from the 
former Dutch colonies of Indonesia, Suriname and the Dutch Antilles. In the immediate aftermath of 
decolonisation in the Dutch East Indies (modern-day Indonesia) in 1949, the Netherlands experienced a 
series of significant immigration flows in 1949 – 1951, 1952 – 1957 and in the early days of the 1960s, 
despite efforts on the part of the Dutch government to minimise these influxes which reached an 
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approximate total of 300 000 Dutch citizens (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 117; Bijwaard, 2010: 1216; Vink, 
2007: 339). Immigrants with two Dutch parents were automatically accorded Dutch citizenship and in the 
case of one Dutch parent, citizenship was optional. Those with Dutch citizenship generally experienced a 
smooth economic transition to the Netherlands. Because many migrants in the Netherlands originally hail 
from former colonies, they usually hold Dutch citizenship and may consequently not be represented in 
statistics of foreign citizenship (van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010: 1373).  As a result, data pertaining 
to the overall number of foreigners in the country is often somewhat more conservative than anticipated. 
The focus of this thesis is primarily on the immigration and integration patterns of non-Dutch citizens 
hailing from countries that were not former colonies, especially Islamic immigrants from Turkey and 
Morocco. 
 
In response to national labour market shortages in the 1960s, Dutch industry, like many other firms and 
agencies elsewhere in Europe during this “golden age”, began to import low-skilled migrant labourers 
from Mediterranean countries, mainly Turkish and Moroccan men, to work in the growing construction 
and manufacturing sectors (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011: 32, 44; Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 117). The intention 
was that these invited gastarbeiders or “guest workers” would remain in the Netherlands for as long as 
their labour was required; the presence of these foreign workers in the country was therefore considered 
temporary and it was expected that they would ultimately return to their countries of origin whence they 
had been contracted (Coenders et al., 2008: 269; Bijwaard, 2010: 1214). In light of such expectations and 
despite the large-scale nature of such labour recruitment strategies, little was done to incorporate these 
foreign workers into society and invest in their training or integration and migrants were encouraged to 
retain social-cultural identities (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011: 34). Scholten (2011: 81) notes that this “phase 
of denial” was founded upon the normative conviction that the Netherlands was not, and should not be, an 
immigration country. The idea that this migration was temporary was supported by “powerful 
institutional interests”: from a social-economic perspective, it was necessary to sustain the purpose of 
these migrants as a temporary pool of labour and political actors were also keen to prevent the 
politicisation of this sensitive issue for fear that it would benefit the cause of anti-immigrant parties 
(Scholten, 2011: 83).  In the 1970s, the total influx of immigrants was in the region of 235 000; once the 
first oil crisis in 1973 had hit, the Netherlands, along with many other countries during this period, 
discontinued its labour recruitment policy. Many of these single migrants did not return home upon the 
termination of employment contracts, however, and the mid-1970s saw the increasing influx of non-
workers in the form of family reunification migration, whereby Turkish and Moroccan “guest” migrants 
were accompanied by the arrival of their spouses and children in their newly-adopted countries of 
residence (Coenders et al., 2008: 270; Bijwaard, 2010: 1216; Vink, 2007: 339).  
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As national economies slumped, foreign guest workers all over Europe were perceived to be responsible 
for the social and economic challenges confronting host countries (McLaren, 2003: 910). Mclaren (2003: 
910) writes that this period was simultaneously characterised by the electoral gains of extreme right-wing 
parties throughout Europe, as well as violence against non-natives, signalling widespread discontent with 
governments‟ prevailing strategies in addressing immigration. These developments illustrate the potential 
correlation between periods of economic pressure and intensified anti-immigration sentiment in Western 
liberal democratic societies, a theme that corresponds to Realistic Group Conflict Theory hypotheses. 
This period also saw the increasing settlement of people from the former Dutch colony of Suriname, 
themselves Dutch nationals, and this second wave of around 180 000 Surinamese colonial immigrants 
occurred after decolonisation in 1975 as well as between 1979 – 1980 (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 117; 
Vink, 2007: 340). The late 1970s also witnessed the eruption of racial tensions in the Dutch cities of 
Rotterdam and Schiedam in addition to a bout of terrorist activities perpetrated by Moluccan migrants. 
These events served to focus greater attention on the question of immigrant integration (Scholten, 2011: 
83). 
 
Since the 1980s, immigration from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba also advanced; in contrast to their earlier 
Indonesian counterparts, however, immigrants from Suriname and the Dutch Antilles have experienced a 
less straightforward process of integration and are still the intended targets of specific economic policies 
today. The inflow of Moroccan and Turkish family migrants also continued during this period. Several 
sources report that in around 2006, over 10% of the Dutch population was either a first or second-
generation immigrant with Turks, Moroccans, Surinamese and Antilleans comprising approximately 1.15 
million immigrants – some 7% of the total population living in the Netherlands (Vink, 2007: 340; 
Coenders et al., 2008: 270; Carle, 2006: 69). 
 
The 1990s was a period of increasing numbers of asylum seekers and political refugees in the 
Netherlands, from about 1000 in the early years of the 1980s to over 50 000 in 1994 (Vink, 2007: 340). 
Annual applications for asylum have however subsequently seen a dramatic decrease. Many asylum-
seekers hailed from former East European countries, from states further afield in Africa such as Sudan, 
Ghana, Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as from Iran and Iraq (Coenders et al., 2008: 270). The period 
between 1992 and 2001 saw the Netherlands become, together with Sweden and Switzerland, one of the 
most popular destinations for asylum-seekers in the world per capita and the country ranked third in 
Europe behind Germany and the United Kingdom in terms of asylum applications (Maas, 2010: 232). In 
the last decade, the most popular motivation listed for immigration has been family formation (26%), 
followed by the migration of labour (23%) and refugees (17%) (Bijwaard, 2010: 1220). There are usually 
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a lot more asylum seekers in the country than reported at any given time, due to the fact that the presence 
of most is only registered in the Municipal Register of Population once living permission is granted, a 
process which can take up to 8 years (Bijwaard, 2010: 1221).  
 
In the year 2000, approximately 130 000 people arrived in the Netherlands with the intention of settling 
(Coenders et al., 2008: 270). Between 1995 and 2001, the number of newcomers entering the Netherlands 
each year increased, but from 2001 to 2003 the inflow of non-Dutch immigrants of working age (between 
18 and 64 years) decreased from 69 000 to 57 000 (Bijwaard, 2010: 1220). Bijwaard (2010: 1220) 
attributes this decline to both the Dutch government‟s more restrictive asylum measures, reducing the 
number of new refugees entering the country from 15 000 in 2000 and 2001 to 5000 in 2003, as well as to 
the impact of a slowdown in the world economy. The Dutch economy‟s deterioration also reduced labour 
migrant numbers. In 2004, Turks represented the single largest immigrant group in the country with 358 
000 people, followed by Surinamese (328 000), Moroccans (315 000) and Antilleans (135 000) (Coenders 
et al., 2008: 270). Because even second-generation Turks and Moroccans opt to select spouses from their 
countries of origin, the process of integration into Dutch society is extended by yet another generation 
(Carle, 2006: 69; Bijwaard, 2010: 1223). Today, immigration to the Netherlands is dominated by more 
political refugees and higher skilled immigrants than before and along with Denmark, the country is 
reported to experience the greatest number of asylum seekers in West Europe at present (Reyneri and 
Fullin, 2011: 41 and Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 136).  
 
2.2.2 Profile of Immigrants and Position in Dutch Society 
The Centraal Register Vreemdelingen (Central Register Foreigners) documents all legal immigration to 
the Netherlands by foreigners without Dutch nationality, working in conjunction with the Vreemdelingen 
Politie (Immigration Police) and the Immigratie- en Naturalisatie Dienst (Immigration and Naturalisation 
Service) (Bijwaard, 2010: 1219). The Central Bureau of Statistics in the Netherlands (CBS) is therefore 
able to publish data, linked to the Gemeentelijke Basisadminstratie (Municipal Register of Population), on 
non-Dutch immigrants concerning general demographic statistics and the timing of immigration. In terms 
of the profiling and categorisation of immigrants, the CBS distinguishes between labour migrants, family 
reunification migrants, family-formation migrants, student immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees, and 
“other” immigrants (a heterogeneous group making up 7% of all immigrants for reasons such as medical 
treatment, Au Pairing etc), all naturally necessitating different types of visas requiring the fulfilment of 
different criteria (Bijwaard, 2010: 1219, 1220, 1222). The motivation of the significant number of 
immigrants exiting the country in the same year they enter is however unknown. 
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Owing to labour laws stipulating that employers may only contract labour from outside the EU upon the 
submission of proof that the type of labour needed is not available nationally or in Europe, Morocco and 
Turkey have become less important sources of labour migrants but are still significant in terms of the 
family reunion migration that takes place from them (Bijwaard, 2010: 1220, 1223). A high percentage of 
family reunion migrants hail from states such as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and certain Asian countries due to 
the reunification of asylum seekers in the Netherlands (Bijwaard, 2010: 1223). Recent restrictions on 
family reunion migration by increasing the minimum age of the migrant, who is subject to proficiency 
tests, and raising the minimum income of the partner in the Netherlands, will lessen the inflow of (non-
Western) family migrants and ultimately decrease their presence in the Netherlands (Bijwaard, 2010: 
1243). Restricting the flow of family reunification has been identified as the most efficient way in 
ensuring that education levels among Turks and Moroccans improve; the continued migration of low-
educated spouses will otherwise continue to consign these ethnic groups to the ranks of the least educated 
and most unemployed in the Netherlands (Vink, 2007: 347). Labour migrants, today generally from 
within the EU, have the highest mobility rate of all migrants, whereas family migrants (the majority 
coming from rural areas within Turkey or Morocco) are most prone to staying on in the Netherlands 
(Bijwaard, 2010: 1243).  
 
Moroccan youths are often singled out as the source of much of the petty crime that occurs in the 
Netherlands and Turkish immigrants are notorious for being a tight-knit community, establishing their 
own businesses and effectively forming a “society within a society” (The Economist in Carle, 2006: 69). 
Carle‟s 2006 article states that “very soon”, the country‟s largest cities including Amsterdam, Rotterdam, 
Utrecht and The Hague will have a “majority minority” population (Carle, 2006: 69). From 1998 – 2008, 
the number of legal Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in the Netherlands without Dutch nationality is 
actually reported to have decreased markedly from over 250 000 (about 37% of all foreigners) to under 
170 000 (under 25% of all foreigners) (Maas, 2010: 237, 238). This is most likely the result of the 
attainment of Dutch citizenship by Turks and Moroccans which would naturally exclude them from such 
statistics (Maas, 2010: 238). In contrast, the numbers and proportions of the largest EU nationalities 
resident (legally) in the Netherlands are either stable or on a steady increase (Maas, 2010: 238). 
 
Immigrants from the former Dutch colonies Suriname, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba, whilst making up a 
significant percentage of the overall immigrant population in the Netherlands and despite their apparently 
incomplete and inconsistent incorporation into Dutch society to date, tend not to be confronted to the 
same degree with demands to integrate as their Islamic counterparts from Morocco and Turkey. 
Immigrants educated in the former group of countries are the products of an education system established 
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by the earlier Dutch colonial power; Antilleans, for example, have education levels comparable to that of 
the ethnic Dutch population, whilst immigrants from Morocco and Turkey generally possess a “very low” 
level of education (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 134; Bijwaard, 2010: 1219; Vink, 2007: 347). Immigrants 
from the ex-colonies also usually have sufficient background of the Dutch language which further 
contributes to the perception of their being more predisposed to a smoother cultural transition upon 
migration to the Netherlands (Zorlu and Hartog, 2005: 115, 117). 
 
Nevertheless, all immigrant groups in the Netherlands experience, on average, a far more tenuous position 
within society than their ethnic Dutch counterparts. Minority groups are typically subject to lesser quality 
lifestyles in terms of housing, education and employment. Although Reyneri and Fullin (2011: 42) report 
that today, the share of highly-educated immigrants in West Europe is much larger than it was before, 
studies have consistently shown that ethnic minority students perform more poorly in schools and that 
higher unemployment rates are prevalent for minority groups in the Netherlands. This is especially the 
case among Turks and Moroccans who are reportedly three or four times more likely to be unemployed 
than ethnic Dutch nationals (Coenders et al., 2008: 207; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011: 42). Newer immigrants 
are also at a greater disadvantage than older immigrant groups in this regard, the latter having arrived 
during a period when the Dutch economy was booming and the huge labour shortages that existed 
ensured ample employment opportunity. The high unemployment problem of these “new entries” 
therefore presents a new challenge socially and economically for European states, a situation not 
experienced previously with older migrant populations (Reyneri and Fullin, 2011: 44). In many European 
states, demographic diversity corresponds to socio-cultural diversity, the latest newcomers usually 
characterised by social deficits vis-à-vis the local population (van Nimwegen and van der Erf, 2010: 
1373). The persistence of such social discrepancies over generations, however, is indicative of the failure 
of strategies to integrate such minorities and may result in a change of policy, as evidenced in the 
Netherlands by the apparent turn away from multiculturalism.  
 
Unlike the situation in the UK however, the occupational status of immigrants in the Netherlands does 
tend to improve in accordance with the amount of time spent there. This is certainly the case for 
admission to intermediate positions if not more specialised, managerial ones as the Netherlands is very 
much biased towards high skilled jobs and there is a veritable need for more highly skilled workers 
(Reyneri and Fullin, 2011: 47, 49, 50). Coupled with the generosity of the Dutch welfare state, 
immigrants are more able to wait until a job appropriate to their skill level is found; the labour market 
penalties need therefore not be as high as in the case of countries such as Spain or Italy. Bijwaard (2010: 
1233) remarks upon the correlation between skill level and duration of stay in the Netherlands. Whereas 
28 
 
high-skilled immigrants face numerous work opportunities in a competitive international job market and 
exhibit less attachment (also dependence) to the Netherlands, those with lower skill endowments remain 
longer in the country. Ties to ethnic networks play a significant role in reinforcing the attachment of 
migrants from Morocco and Turkey to the Netherlands, despite perceptions of difference between 
“Islamic” and “Dutch” cultures and the low “assimilation rates” of these groups in terms of weak fluency 
in Dutch and high unemployment rates (Bijwaard, 2010: 1233, 1240). 
 
2.3 CORRESPONDING RESPONSES TO IMMIGRATION: INTEGRATION STRATEGIES 
 
This section looks at the importance of “framing” integration issues for policy. That Dutch immigrant 
integration policy is characterised by “discontinuity” implies the emergence of various, and sometimes 
seemingly conflicting, frames every so often – approximately once a decade, according to Scholten (2011: 
75). Therefore, whilst the Minorities Policy of the 1980s had distinctive multiculturalist undertones, the 
Integration Policy of the following decade was more “universalist” in character and the 2000s witnessed a 
decidedly more assimilationist emphasis with the “Integration Policy New Style” (Scholten, 2011: 76). 
Despite the abundant literature spanning decades on the topic of immigrant integration in the Netherlands, 
it remains a subject that continues to “defy definition” (Scholten, 2011: 75). Disagreement over the type 
of emancipation or participation integration should involve (whether economic, political or cultural), or 
about the specific groups of people integration should target, becomes apparent when observing the 
policy priorities of a particular period in the country‟s history of attempting to deal with and 
accommodate diversity (Scholten, 2011: 75). 
 
2.3.1 The Genesis of Accommodation: Pillarisation 
Although this thesis concentrates on the period from 1989 to March 2011, it is necessary to mention 
briefly the Dutch tradition of verzuiling, or pillarisation. Pre-existing group structures as well as 
transformations regarding institutionalised group rights help one to appreciate more fully current reactions 
against multiculturalism in many Western contexts (Winter, 2010: 186). With its origins in the nineteenth 
century, pillarisation was the country‟s first formal effort to institutionalise pluralism and foster stability 
among potentially conflicting societal groups. Dutch pillarisation entailed the vertical segmentation of 
society into separate social “pillars” each endowed with their own publicly funded social, cultural and 
political institutions such as community newspapers, clubs, trade unions and other civic organisations 
(Carle, 2006: 71 and Maas, 2010: 227, 228). These historically-established segments of society were 
defined in religious-ideological terms: Catholics, Protestants, socialists and liberals consequently 
coexisted largely autonomously from one another and were referred to as the “four pillars” of Dutch 
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society (Winter, 2010: 183). The “pillar” metaphor evokes the idea of a Greek temple supported by these 
denominational and ideological pillars. Affording potentially conflicting societal groups the space to 
pursue group needs and identities within a relatively autonomous cultural sphere was a strategy to 
facilitate social stability. Institutionalised harmony was made possible by effectively minimising 
interaction between these groups and this arrangement was deemed viable for maintaining the values of 
each group. 
 
In light of the country‟s history of pillarisation therefore, it was taken as a given that Islamic immigrants 
would be accorded their own “Muslim” pillar to realise an Islamic cultural identity within Dutch society 
(Carle, 2006: 71). Muslim schools, mosques and other Islamic institutions were therefore established by 
the Dutch government in the 1980s. The thinking that accompanied these developments was that a 
Muslim pillar would gradually collapse in much the same way that its Protestant and Catholic 
predecessors had done amidst an increasingly secularised Dutch society characterised by postmodern 
individualism (Carle, 2006: 71). Despite such expectations, and notwithstanding the highly secular nature 
of the public sphere, this “fifth pillar” has been perceived to be a particularly resilient one, given what is 
deemed the incomplete cultural integration of Muslims. The Netherlands, and the larger European 
context, has today become a major immigration destination for fundamentalist Muslims. The role of Islam 
in the Dutch immigration debate will be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, and the 
prospect of there being a veritable “Clash of Civilisations” in the Netherlands today will be considered.  
 
Although the pillarisation tradition has effectively become redundant with the rising tide of secularisation 
and individualism since the 1960s which has removed the religious motivation for this arrangement, it is 
commonly argued that the legacy of pillarisation is indeed still apparent today, particularly from an 
institutional point of view (Carle, 2006: 71; Vink, 2007: 342; Maas, 2010: 233). Whilst the real extent of 
this “legacy” is debatable, these inherited institutional structures are indeed reflected in the continued 
existence of “community” broadcasting networks and the establishment of state-subsidised 
denominational schools. Despite the structural reflections of this legacy however, the context within 
which group claims are articulated today has changed and Winter (2010: 176, 177) writes that there is 
limited opportunity for non-European and non-Christian allochtonen (people of foreign origin) to voice 
their claims in a context where group power relations favour the largely homogenous society of 
autochtonen, or ethnic Dutch.  
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2.3.2 The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? 
 
2.3.2.1 Minorities Policy 1978 – 1994 
For most of the post-war era, no official government policy towards the temporary “guestworkers” or 
newcomers from the ex-colonies existed and attempts to deal with an increasing foreign presence were 
somewhat ad hoc (Vink, 2007: 340). The publication of a 1979 report on ethnic minority groups by the 
independent advisory body, the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), criticised both 
government‟s expectations that these minority groups‟ presence would be temporary as well as the 
informal, laissez-faire approach that was taken. The Netherlands was recognised as a de facto 
immigration country and the Council warned that failure to draft a comprehensive integration policy for 
immigrant groups would result in their social dislocation and cultural exclusion (Vink, 2007: 340). This 
shift in the framing of integration saw the designing of a Draft Minorities Memorandum for what would 
eventually become the country‟s 1983 Minderhedennota or Minorities Policy. Laying the foundation for 
Dutch multiculturalism and reflecting the belief that this approach would enhance tolerance and cultural 
diversity, this development marked a decisive break from prior resistance towards the construction of 
such policy (Scholten, 2011: 84; Carle, 2006: 71; Winter, 2010: 173). The technocratic model of the 
Minorities Policy which involved input from researchers and policy-makers alike was important for the 
development of the multiculturalist approach to integration and was also indicative of a strong scientific 
dominance in the way that research informed the structure of policy-making at the time (Scholten, 2011: 
84). 
 
The thinking advising the Minorities Policy, which the country was comparatively early in drafting, was 
that government should strive towards nurturing the equal opportunity and value of the Netherlands‟ 
majority and minority groups and combat discrimination in all guises (Vink, 2007: 340, 341). It was 
informed by the idea that improving the social-cultural position of migrants would improve social-
economic circumstances (Scholten, 2011: 81). The Minorities Policy reflected an acceptance of the 
country‟s multi-ethnic profile and the underlying objectives of the policy – to foster multicultural 
liberation and socio-cultural emancipation via the preservation of identity, ensure juridical equality and 
promote equal opportunity for all citizens – were recognised as efforts to promote “integration with the 
retention of identity”, a strategy deemed complimentary to the country‟s tradition of pillarisation (Carle, 
2006: 71; Vink, 2007: 341; Winter, 2010: 173). The establishment of denominational schools, community 
newspapers, broadcasting networks and other social organisations for minority groups thus proceeded; a 
publicly sponsored Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Service has been in existence since 1985 in addition to a 
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Hindu equivalent since 1995 (Vink, 2007: 341). Islamic and Hindu primary schools have been around 
since 1988 and to date there are around 40 Islamic junior schools in the country (Vink, 2007: 341). 
 
With the multicultural approach to integration, the Dutch government actively supported the principle of 
cultural diversity and the right of various groups to practice and realise distinctive social identities free 
from government interference (Vink, 2007: 338, 341). The Dutch welfare state sponsored the cultural 
diversity profile it sought to realise by offering generous benefits and strategies to achieve a more 
proportionate representation of ethnic minorities in the labour market, such as the 1998 Act for 
Stimulation of Labour Market Participation (Maas, 2010: 228; Reyneri and Fullin, 2011: 43; Vink, 2010: 
341). Despite the prospect of economic recession and higher unemployment in the 1980s, the Minorities 
Policy was not affected by the process of welfare state cutbacks that was implemented: it was recognised 
that strategies to enhance the position of minorities should not be compromised in the context of an 
economic slump (Scholten, 2011: 85).  
 
In an effort to enhance the political participation and decision-making power of minority groups, policy as 
it exists today also makes provisions for several minority organisations and an “institution of consultative 
bodies”, where government is able to discuss matters of policy relevance with representatives of ethnic 
minority groups (Vink, 2007: 341). Under the 1997 Law on the Consultation of Minority Policy and the 
National Minorities Consultation, the Dutch government convenes thrice annually at the very least with 
eight “official” subsidised minority groups on issues concerning integration policy. Represented are 
Chinese, Turkish, Moluccan, Southern European, Carribbean Dutch, Surinamese and Moroccan interests, 
in addition to the concerns of refugees (Vink, 2007: 342). The extent to which such a provision represents 
more than mere symbolic political inclusion and actually amounts to real practical significance is a matter 
not discussed here. “Multicultural” and “emancipation” frames thus dominated parliamentary framing of 
integration in the mid-1990s, the latter frame reflecting the perspective of immigrants as “backwards in 
participation, customs and beliefs”, requiring their more active participation in decision-making and the 
labour market to achieve “emancipation” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 301, 307). 
 
The Minorities Policy positioned the Netherlands as a pioneer of multicultural politics in Western Europe 
with regards to the inclusion of immigrants into society. The 1985 permission of local voting rights to 
non-nationals after 5 years‟ residence was a direct consequence of the Minorities Policy and a 1998 study 
of minority rights in France, Germany and the Netherlands revealed that the Netherlands was the most 
progressive and “immigrant-friendly” in terms of rights endowed to foreigners, thanks to this policy 
(Maas, 2010: 229; Vink, 2007: 340). Along with the 1984 Equal Treatment Act was the 1986 Nationality 
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Act that ushered in a relatively straightforward process of naturalisation; these measures, along with the 
acceptance of dual citizenship at one stage, have for certain observers been taken as evidence of efforts to 
entrench the “permanent multicultural character” of Dutch society (Winter, 2010: 174). 
 
2.3.2.2 Integration Policy 1994 - 2003  
It is common to see the “fall” of multiculturalism in the Netherlands being attributed to the rise of right-
wing politician Pim Fortuyn in Dutch politics or to the series of “shock events” that occurred around the 
turn of the millennium and which will be elaborated upon further on in this chapter. Although these 
incidents had a decided impact on both discourse and in practice, it is necessary to be wary of ascribing 
too much significance to them, as they tend to be too easily credited for affecting a paradigm shift (Vink, 
2007: 337). Adopting a more historical perspective on the origins of multicultural discontentment, Vink 
(2007: 338) traces processes of reassessing state-newcomer relations back to the end of the 1980s already, 
to a 1989 observation by the prominent WRR that Dutch integration strategies had failed to thwart 
immigrants‟ economic marginalisation (Winter, 2010: 174). It was this new WRR report entitled 
“Immigrant Policy”, commissioned by the Minister of Home Affairs, which stimulated for the first time 
wide public debate surrounding immigrant integration. Although not automatically resulting in policy 
change, it did ultimately contribute to the Integration Policy (Scholten, 2011: 85, 86).  
 
This WRR report situated immigrants‟ obligation to participate in society within the broader context of 
welfare state cutbacks and emphasised the need for a new approach deviating from current policy 
dialogue by advancing a stricter social-economic attitude to integration. Reference to “integration” as 
opposed to “emancipation” and to “allochthonous” rather than “minorities” represented a discursive effort 
to steer away from dominant discourse that signalled out minority groups; emphasis was instead on 
minorities‟ communality with other “citizens” (Scholten, 2011: 85). These paradigmatic or problem 
framing changes during the 1990s became increasingly evident from a policy perspective. The period 
between 1992 and 1997 during which dual nationality was permitted, did however represent a divergence 
from the general trend of this period: during this phase, the view of the political left that naturalisation 
would succeed in promoting integration and a spirit of civic duty dominated that of the right (Vink, 2007: 
346; Maas, 2010: 226). The left considered nationality to be more a manifestation of one‟s affiliation with 
a particular country as opposed to an expression of undivided loyalty; affiliation with more than one state 
was therefore permissible (Maas, 2010: 230). Political parties on the right, however, maintained that 
tolerating dual nationality and granting citizenship too easily would not succeed in fostering a sense of 
national loyalty among immigrants; full legal inclusion should occur only once the intended recipient 
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exhibit complete integration with the host society (Maas, 2010: 226). During this period, then, 
naturalisations peaked in 1996 at over 80 000 (Maas, 2010: 226; Vink, 2007: 340). 
 
At the time of writing, however, an almost complete reversal of policy has been witnessed, making Dutch 
nationality far more difficult to come by and more easily stripped from those individuals who abuse it. 
The return to single nationality in 1997 and the subsequent series of laws which include the 1998 Law on 
Civic Integration of Newcomers targeting immigrants‟ capacity for self-sufficiency, the Law on Benefit 
Entitlements or “Linkage Act” which more closely associated legal status with access to public services, 
and the 2000 Immigration Law which hardened asylum policy, are all indicative of increasingly 
restrictionist policy and a changing climate pre-2001 when Fortuyn arrived on the scene (Vink, 2007: 
346). It is however important not to look at citizenship policy in the Netherlands as an entirely rigid 
indicator of levels of tolerance. Examples of restrictionist policy are not confined to the last decade with 
the onset of efforts to formally integrate immigrants, and this period is similarly not characterised by 
restrictionist policy alone. An example of more open policy and willingness to tolerate the continued 
presence of unauthorised residents was when the Dutch government provided amnesty to thousands of 
illegal residents in mid-2007. Local councils and mayors were called upon to pass on the names of all 
applicants satisfying conditions for a residence permit (Maas, 2010: 233).   
 
From the beginning of the 1990s then, it had already become apparent that official policy towards ethnic 
minorities would need to be re-evaluated in light of significant shifts in public attitudes since the days of 
the Minorities Policy of 1983. Despite measures to improve the socio-economic circumstances of Dutch 
Muslims, unemployment among this group still remained high (by 1990, half of all Turkish and 
Moroccan men over the age of 40 years were unemployed) and a disproportionate number of Islamic 
migrants were recipients of some form of public welfare (Carle, 2006: 71). The migration of spouses from 
these migrants‟ countries of origin, termed “marriage migration”, in addition to family reunification 
strategies, only served to heighten the dependence of this group upon the Dutch welfare system (Carle, 
2006: 71). Efforts to address these socio-economic discrepancies, such as offering employment training 
programmes to Dutch Muslims, were therefore seen as having proven unsuccessful, yielding few intended 
results.  
 
It was in such a context of social and economic marginalisation that opinions about the alleged 
incompatibility between “Dutch” or “Western values” and those of Islam became more apparent. Talk of 
such cultural incompatibility was therefore already being made prior to 9/11, an event which catapulted 
religious extremism into Western foreign policies as an issue of central relevance. Before 2001, then, 
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criticism of Dutch multiculturalism was already being made in light of perceived cultural clashes; the 
September attacks re-introduced the topic of cultural incompatibility into mainstream political debate 
(Vink, 2007: 338). Ten years before 9/11, however, claims of cultural incongruence seem to have been 
motivated more by socio-economic discrepancies between Muslim groups and the native Dutch 
population, rather than arising from threats posed by “Islamic culture” and religious fundamentalism per 
se.  
 
In 1991, Frits Bolkestein, then-parliamentary leader for the main opposition party, the conservative-
liberal People‟s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD), delivered a speech expressing the 
“irreconcilability” of “Islamic” and “Western values” and called for immigrants to adapt to the dominant 
status quo and subscribe to “Dutch values” (Carle, 2006: 71; Vink, 2007: 338; Winter, 2010: 174). The 
way that the Islamic debate in the Netherlands has reflected “Clash of Civilisations” rhetoric demands 
greater attention in Chapter 3. It is however necessary to note here that this appeal marked a distinctive 
break from the multicultural approach in attempting to deal with cultural diversity, revealing a shift in 
emphasis towards cultural integration. Although the speech was subject to fierce criticism from staunch 
multiculturalists, the subsequent growth in electoral support for Bolkestein was testimony to the 
resonance of his message among the Dutch public. Bolkestein‟s success was illustrative of the will of a 
so-called “silent majority” in the country previously restricted from articulating their true wishes vis-à-vis 
traditionally contentious and “taboo” topics pertaining to cultural diversity, multiculturalism and 
integration (Carle, 2006: 71; Winter, 2010: 174). The 1994 parliamentary elections saw the defeat of the 
Christian Democrats (CDA), the party traditionally in support of the pillarised system, and the formation 
of a new coalition government comprising of the Labour Party (PvdA), the liberal VVD and the 
Democrats (D66). This new government marked a shift in the emphasis of integration policy: from esteem 
for cultural diversity to the participation and integration of immigrants (Winter, 2010: 174). The 1997 
Newcomers‟ Integration Act obliging new immigrants to participate in civic integration courses is seen as 
indicative of this policy shift. 
 
Frits Bolkestein‟s somewhat unanticipated success led to a review of the country‟s ethnic minorities‟ 
policy and in 1994 the Dutch government released a new policy entitled Contourennota integratiebeleid 
etnische minderheden (Ethnic Minorities Integration Policy Outline) that was intended to replace the 1983 
Minorities Policy (Carle, 2006: 71). Integration was identified as a process by which to foster the full and 
equal participation of all citizens within society, “mutual respect” and “identity” being at the core of such 
civic involvement (Carle, 2006: 71). A new element of this approach was the expectation that all ethnic 
minorities develop a fluency in the Dutch language. The publication of this document represented a 
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decisive departure from the Dutch culture of pillarisation, shifting emphasis from multiculturalism to 
integration. The aforementioned controversy traditionally surrounding the topic of integration was due to 
perceptions that integrationist attitudes effectively amounted to racism, rendering criticism of 
multiculturalism messy and difficult. The Minorities Policy with its multiculturalist paradigm was thus 
“reframed” into an Integration Policy that saw a reversal of the causal relation between socio-economic 
participation and cultural emancipation: the Integration Policy now posited the alternative reasoning that 
social-economic improvement would prove conducive to social-cultural enhancement and not the other 
way round as suggested in the Minorities Policy (Scholten, 2011: 81). The normative thinking about 
being a multicultural society that undergirded the Minorities Policy was far less influential in informing 
this new policy and more emphasis was accorded to the association between integrating immigrants and 
maintaining a functional Dutch welfare state (Scholten, 2011: 81).  
 
This new ethnic minorities‟ policy was also distinctive in terms of the “monocultural nationalism” it 
conveyed, demonstrating a break from earlier policymaking (Carle, 2006: 72; Winter, 2010: 175). 
Mention of the existence of a “true” and typically “Dutch” culture distinct from the customs of minority 
groups was more common; minorities were now expected to respect and live within the parameters of this 
national identity. Politician Pim Fortuyn was particularly critical of multiculturalism‟s perceived failure in 
forging a sense of civic nationalism, national identity and pride, a shortcoming he alleged would result in 
the denigration of Dutch culture (Coenders et al., 2008: 273). It is interesting to note how this nationalist 
rhetoric and policymaking comes into confrontation with the values of the European Union, which rejects 
the idea of a coherent national identity for any of its sovereign member states (Carle, 2006: 72). This new 
nationalist spirit in the Netherlands was what led to the petition against dual citizenship in 1997 by the 
ruling government, the VVD and the Christian Democrats, resulting in its eventual discontinuation. 
Reflecting now the perspective of the political right on the matter, it was argued that immigrants valued 
Dutch passports more for practical purposes than for the reason of symbolically demonstrating national 
loyalty and pride. 
 
2.3.3 Towards Assimilation and the Preservation of National Identity 
Carle (2006: 68) discusses how multiculturalism and secularism in the Netherlands initially proved 
mutually reinforcing, both being compatible with declining support for religious doctrine and the 
expansion of cultural expression. Whilst secularists hold that modernity and religion are inherently 
incompatible, multiculturalists are of the opinion that it is possible for a variety of worldviews and value 
systems to coexist within a single society (Carle, 2006: 73). Carle (2006: 68) argues that this symbiotic 
relationship between multiculturalism and secularism changed after a “series of shocks” that took place 
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during the particularly tumultuous decade that was the 2000s, events that served to shake previously-held 
assumptions about the country‟s supposedly intrinsic “liberalism” (Maas, 2010: 228). Key among these 
events is 9/11, which resulted in growing endorsement of the liberal state and, according to Joppke in 
Vink (2007: 338), a heightened disinclination to tolerate cultural diversity under the guise of 
multiculturalism. The political advent of Pim Fortuyn and the posthumous electoral success of his anti-
immigration party Lijst Pim Fortuyn after his assassination at the hands of an environmental activist, as 
well as the anti-Islamism vendetta of politician Geert Wilders, are similarly identified as key watershed 
developments in the country‟s grapplings with multiculturalism. The 2004 murder of controversial 
filmmaker Theo van Gogh, great grandnephew of Vincent van Gogh, at the hands of a second-generation 
Dutch Muslim extremist of Moroccan origin was a similarly crucial watershed in the story of the 
Netherlands‟ multicultural experiment. Although van Gogh was himself subject to much censure in the 
Netherlands as a result of his outspoken views and deliberately offensive comments about all religions in 
general, his death was met with an outburst of public anger and sense of vulnerability (Carle, 2006: 69). 
The murder, which took place in full public view in a quiet street one morning in Amsterdam, was an 
unthinkable occurrence for a country whose politics was often denounced as “boring”. 
 
“The Multicultural Tragedy”, a 2000 article by the well-known Dutch historian and Labour Party (PvdA) 
member Paul Scheffer, aroused significant public attention over claims that the values of the Dutch elite 
were responsible for preventing the adoption of a tough stance towards the “illiberal” ideas of the growing 
Muslim population (Winter, 2010: 174). Cultural relativism and a cosmopolitan ideal were blamed for 
dissuading demands on immigrants to conform and adapt to Dutch political culture in accordance with the 
principles of liberal democracy (Carle, 2006: 72). The price of living in an open, tolerant society was 
therefore the erosion of Dutch language and culture. Scheffer charged multiculturalism with exacerbating 
socio-economic discrepancies and creating marginalised groups – an “ethnic underclass” – who, as a 
result of the insularity afforded to them by policies encouraging cultural distinctiveness, had been left 
excluded from Dutch society (Carle, 2006: 72; Vink, 2007: 339). These so-called “outgroups” were 
consequently either disinclined or unwilling to integrate, merely perpetuating their marginal positions 
(Carle, 2006: 72). Whilst Vink finds this article significant for its fearless and open critique of 
multiculturalism, Winter (2010: 174) accords even greater importance to the article by virtue of its 
indication of a prevailing “paradigm shift” in Dutch public opinion and policy-making. Scholten (2011: 
81) similarly talks about a third framing shift in Dutch integration policy around this time, with emphasis 
being placed on the question of social-cultural adaptation as opposed to social-economic participation. 
Rather than stressing action and involvement on the part of immigrants as was the case of the Integration 
Policy of the 1990s, this so-called Integration Policy “New Style” sought to emphasise migrants‟ common 
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citizenship with the wider Dutch citizenry (Scholten, 2011: 81). Continuing cultural differences were 
regarded as an obstacle to both immigrant integration and efforts to preserve a national Dutch identity; the 
unification of citizens under a common language and common set of values was thus seen as the key to 
achieving social harmony (Scholten, 2011: 81).  
 
Whereas a climate of political correctness was typical of debate on immigration, Islamism and 
multiculturalism prior to the arrival of Fortuyn on the political scene and the murder of van Gogh, these 
events inspired greater confidence among the public and in academia to voice opposition to previously 
sensitive topics. More people began to feel comfortable in identifying with the growing belief that the 
country‟s attempts at nurturing tolerance and cultural diversity via multiculturalism had in fact resulted in 
the avoidance of frank confrontation with the challenges involved in incorporating conservative Muslim 
immigrants into society (Carle, 2006: 69). The end of the 1990s thus saw a higher prevalence of the so-
called “restriction” frame in official parliamentary documents, emphasising the insufficient integration of 
certain groups within society, particularly Moroccans and Antilleans, and resulting in greater critique of 
existing policies and integration efforts (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 307). Some are more critical 
of recent restrictionist policies indirectly targeting particular groups of immigrants, such as family 
reunification migrants, claiming that these strategies normalise discrimination and make xenophobia 
“socially acceptable” to Dutch citizens previously able to resist resorting to racism (Vink, 2007: 347). 
Whereas Fortuyn is often credited with pioneering the multicultural debate, Vink (2007: 339) asserts that 
he was rather responsible for radicalising a discourse of “new realism” that had in reality been evolving 
over the last decade. 
  
Fortuyn‟s unapologetic denouncement of multiculturalism began to strike a chord not only with the Dutch 
public but also among other political parties, many of whom began to accept the ever-pervasive view that 
multiculturalism had served to divide rather than unite ethnic groups in the country. Fortuyn singled out 
Islam in particular for its purported “backwardness” and inability to adapt, compromise and ultimately 
encourage social cohesion, reflecting a noteworthy divergence from the Dutch tradition of religious 
tolerance. Islam became symbolically synonymous with many of the social problems associated with 
immigration and cultural integration, and Moroccans and Turks were almost exclusively targeted in 
public debate to assimilate. Their purported disinclination to integrate and participate in society 
positioned these two Islamic groups in particular as a worrying threat to Dutch culture and society in the 
eyes of Fortuyn and those of an increasing segment of the population (Coenders et al., 2008: 274).  
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2.3.3.1 Integration Policy “New Style” 2003 -  
It is not surprising then that in an era which saw the publication of Scheffer‟s article, terrorist attacks in 
2001 and various public figures drawing attention to the limits of multiculturalism, immigrant integration 
would emerge as one of the most important social and political issues of the new millennium in the 
Netherlands (Scholten, 2011: 87). The policy characterising this period of the Dutch integration narrative 
is the assimilationist “Integration Policy New Style” which was adopted from 2003 onwards and reflected 
the increasing desire to preserve national “Dutch” identity and culture (Scholten, 2011: 82, 87). The early 
years of the 2000s was a period of heightened sensitivity towards issues pertaining to immigrant 
allochtonen; that is, immigrants and their descendents, particularly Muslims (Winter, 2010: 175). The 
centre-right coalition government of Christian Democrats, Liberals and the right-wing List Pim Fortuyn 
(LPF) that came into power after the volatile May 2002 general elections and was headed by Jan Peter 
Balkenende of the Christian Democrats, was at lengths to dissociate itself from the multicultural project in 
the Netherlands and led the formulation of the “Integration Policy New Style”. An analysis of why 
integration policy had proved unsuccessful up until this point was commissioned by a provisional 
parliamentary investigative committee for integration policy and the subsequent finding that integration 
had been “relatively successful”, particularly in the education and labour domains, was widely rejected as 
naïve (Scholten, 2011: 87). The previous publication of the WRR‟s third report on immigrant integration 
in 2001 entitled “The Netherlands as Immigration Society” had also previously been dismissed for its 
suggestion that minorities would develop mixed identities, which was at odds with dominant discourse at 
the time and with policy‟s growing national focus (Scholten, 2011: 87).  
 
Similarly, the Minorities Reports that had been issued by the Social and Cultural Planning Office since 
the 1990s and had previously accorded primary focus to minorities‟ social-economic participation, 
gradually began publishing data pertaining to social-cultural integration from 2001 onwards (Scholten, 
2011: 88). This research was better suited to public and political discourse‟s renewed national focus. 
Research that legitimised the new assimilationist policy discourse was therefore embraced whilst studies 
and reports that continued to announce the possibilities for realising multicultural ideals were rejected 
(Scholten, 2011: 88). Successive Dutch governments over the last decade have therefore been at pains to 
distance themselves from the “overly accommodating” tones of several reports published in recent years, 
such as one parliamentary committee‟s “Building Bridges” report and the equally ill-timed WRR‟s 
document on “Dynamism in Islamic Activism” (Vink, 2007: 346). From a rhetorical point of view, 
governments have increasingly emphasised the value of individual responsibility to integrate, belong and 
participate rather than making condescending pleas to “accommodate” and “uplift” ethnic minorities 
(Vink, 2007: 346). 
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In an effort to re-establish a sense of confidence in Dutch politics after Fortuyn‟s provocations, the centre-
right governments that were in power from 2002 to 2007 sought to identify more closely with popular 
concerns. Particularly in harsh economic times, identification with the economic-related woes of the 
electorate is politically advisable. Scholten (2011: 88) writes that where once problem framing was 
shaped by a “logic of minorities” in the 1980s and a “logic of equity” in the 1990s, it was now founded 
upon a “majorities logic”, and the continuing debate over integration in the Netherlands has increasingly 
come to revolve around “re-imagining the Dutch community” rather than migrant integration. Immigrant 
integration in the Netherlands has become a question of symbolic politics and increasingly takes into 
account broader societal interests (Scholten, 2011: 90).  
 
From 1998 - 2007, the Law of Civic Integration for Newcomers came into existence, making classes on 
Dutch culture, language and society compulsory for all new immigrant hopefuls from outside the 
European Union (Carle, 2006: 72). Upon the successful outcome of an interview testing language skills 
and educational level, applicants are then obliged to participate in a series of language courses and 
training in “social and civic skills and job preparation” (Carle, 2006: 72). March 2006 saw the 
establishment of a new Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet Inburgering Buitenland) geared towards 
restricting family reunion immigration and making compulsory a civic integration exam for all foreigners 
applying for a residence permit. The exam assesses command of the Dutch language and knowledge of 
Dutch society and obliges participants to watch the film Coming to the Netherlands which features 
images of women sunbathing topless and makes overt references to homosexuality; the point is to convey 
the message that in the Netherlands, these are all considered “quite ordinary and acceptable” elements of 
Dutch life (Vink, 2007: 346; Winter, 2010: 175).  
 
The new 2006 Civic Integration Act (Wet Inburgering) replaced its 1998 predecessor, the aforementioned 
“Civic Integration for Newcomers Act” (Vink, 2007: 347). In light of several shortcomings associated 
with the old Act, involving administrative complexities and long waiting lists for civic integration 
courses, the new one now requires both new and old-comers to embark on the course and sit the 
accompanying exam (Vink, 2007: 347). This law is applicable to all non-Dutch and non-EU residents 
between 16 and 65 years old, longer residents that have neither been products of the Dutch educational 
system nor passed a “naturalisation exam”, and even certain Dutch citizens that are recipients of welfare 
benefits and those of particular religious professions (Vink, 2007: 347). The Civic Integration Act reflects 
the point of view that non-EU immigrants have a duty to integrate (inburgerinsplicht) (Winter, 2010: 
175). The onus is put on individuals to select the organisation through which they will participate in the 
course and the responsibility of seeing the process through, and financing it, is theirs to bear; those 
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applicants who complete the exam within a period of three years may however qualify for reimbursement 
(Vink, 2007: 347). 
 
The Islamic focus of these integration measures is evident via the requirement that all imams receive a 
Dutch education. Similarly, the establishment of theological departments at universities for the purpose of 
training Islamic prayer leaders has been encouraged by offering subsidies to the institutions concerned 
(Carle, 2006: 72). A prerequisite for the opening of all new schools is that they pledge to convey “the 
values of Dutch society” to their learners and Carle (2006: 72) notes that although this policy does not 
explicitly single out Muslim schools, it is almost certainly geared towards them. The turn of the 
millennium has thus witnessed a distinctive turn away from valuing diversity, towards a broader 
recognition that cultural difference is not always an asset to society (Scholten, 2011: 83). In the aftermath 
of 9/11 and the “War on Terror”, the “Islam-as-threat” frame has therefore become especially central to 
portrayals of the integration debate, with the restriction and multicultural frames consequently waning in 
the context of prioritising efforts to tackle Islamic extremism (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 308). 
 
2.4 DUTCH INTEGRATION POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE 
 
The above descriptions of Dutch policy indicate that there has been no single model of immigrant 
integration. The strategies undertaken were indeed characterised by a “pattern of punctuated equilibrium” 
comprising various shifting problem frames that gave rise to very different comprehensions and 
interpretations of immigrant integration (Scholten, 2011: 81). Scholten (2011: 75) also acknowledges how 
structural changes have been influential in the growth of a more assimilationist immigrant policy frame: 
whilst scientific research was central to the construction of policy with the technocratic and depoliticised 
style that prevailed “well into the 1980s”, a more “engineering-like” policy structure has prevailed since 
the early 1990s favouring political control over the policy-making process and involving the more 
selective use of scientific expertise to legitimise prevailing policy discourse (Scholten, 2011: 75, 90). 
Growing perceptions about threats to liberal democratic culture and to Dutch national identity in the form 
of illiberal social elements seem to have shifted the belief that the solution to securing domestic peace lies 
in the promotion of group autonomy; instead, social harmony is increasingly deemed attainable via 
adaptation to Dutch society and via the assimilation of dominant cultural norms. This proclivity to exhibit 
a lower tolerance threshold for culturally diverse social elements considered contradictory to liberal 
political culture, has important implications for the country‟s overall liberal democratic profile. 
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Although it is generally accepted that what legacies there are from pillarisation are largely institutional, 
Vink (2007) is sceptical of how big an institutional influence there is in reality. A comprehensive set of 
institutions for Muslims encompassing “maternity clinics, hospitals, care homes, swimming clubs, trade 
unions, pressure groups, housing associations” and the like was not developed, as would have been 
expected of the pillarisation model and as was indeed the case for Catholic and Protestant communities 
(Rath et al. in Vink, 2007: 344). In terms of the existence of a comparable Islamic “fifth pillar” in the 
Netherlands, therefore, it is arguable whether there ever really was one and it is purportedly this still-
fashionable “pillarisation myth” that is to blame for presumptions that Dutch accommodation policies 
were an extension of pillarisation (see Winter, 2010: 173). Such “comfortable” and “stereotypical” lines 
of reasoning about how the country‟s multicultural forays drew heavily from its previous pillarisation 
tradition are seen to fit in very well with “naïve” notions about the Netherlands‟ lenient accommodation 
policies and clichéd image as an immigrant-welcoming, multicultural haven (Vink, 2007: 343). It is in 
light of these conventional, idealistic interpretations then that the discordance between the country‟s 
traditional politics of accommodation and its more restrictive, current outlook on immigration and 
integration appears all the more out of sync. Scholten (2011: 77) maintains that although the extent of 
pillarisation‟s institutional “path dependency” may be debated, there is little doubt that from a policy 
perspective the Netherlands did not draw from its past experiences with religious-ideological 
accommodation, if evidence of problem framing is anything to go by. The fact that the country has chosen 
to pursue such different trajectories in terms of integration models over the past thirty to forty years 
suggests that policy-making and research is indeed marked by discontinuity (Scholten, 2011: 77 – 79).  
 
Whilst many authors are also prone to talking freely about the “retreat” or “demise” of multiculturalism 
(see Coenders et al., 2008: 273; Carle 2006), it has been argued that this so-called decline perhaps marks 
more a discursive break with the past than any real change (Vink, 2007: 337). The shift to a more 
restrictive, less openly-accommodating integration policy has often been attributed to the “rightist” turn in 
Dutch politics as a result of personalities such as Fortuyn, Verdonk and Wilders, resulting in a creeping 
“repressive liberalism” (Joppke in Vink, 2007: 343). Tracing political dissension with multiculturalism to 
long before the advent of Fortuyn on the political scene, Vink (2007: 344) is sceptical of this argument 
and argues that the term “multiculturalism” was originally used in a purely descriptive sense in reference 
to growing cultural and ethnic diversity as opposed to suggesting any normative ideal. It is this 
inconsistent use of the “multicultural” concept that is secondly credited with giving rise to the 
pillarisation myth (Vink, 2007: 344). A 1970 government report stating that foreign workers were entitled 
to the preservation of their own identities was therefore an effort in pragmatism as opposed to the pursuit 
of multicultural ideology: it was only in 1979 that the WRR recognised that the “guestworkers” were 
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officially “here to stay” and up until this point minimal integration into the temporary host society was 
deemed conducive to a smoother return home (Vink, 2007: 344, 345). Up until this point, the idea of 
constructing new pillars for minorities was explicitly rejected on the basis that it would provide an excuse 
for government inaction in managing immigration flows. More “active encouragement” of these 
newcomers‟ participation in society was needed, requiring a more assertive integration policy than that 
which was offered by pillarisation (Vink, 2007: 344). Referring to government‟s aforementioned practice 
of consulting with minority group representatives within the scope of a specially designated council – 
charged with reinforcing the “minorisation of minorities” – it is arguable whether the emphasis of Dutch 
integration policy towards minorities was on “integration” as opposed to the “preservation of own 
identity” all along (Vink, 2007: 345). Even since the days of the 1983 Minorities Memorandum therefore, 
policy appears to have emphasised the asymmetrical cultural insertion of migrants into the dominant, 
overarching culture entrenched in Dutch society rather than prioritising the inclusion of such groups on 
culturally equal terms. Recent changes, then, might represent much less a break with the past than is 
popularly claimed by stereotypical accounts of integration policy in the Netherlands (Vink, 2007: 337).  
 
Observing evidence of continuity in integration policy is not to suggest that there has been no significant 
change towards managing immigration over the past two to three decades. The fact that right-wing 
politician Hans Janmaat was found guilty in 1997 for similar anti-multiculturalism rhetoric when Fortuyn 
was not, is indicative of the different political and social atmospheres in which he and Fortuyn 
campaigned (Vink, 2007: 345). In the space of 5 years between 1996 and 2001, it would certainly seem 
that enough had changed regarding immigration and integration discourse to allow Fortuyn to escape 
similar conviction for his provocations. Geert Wilders was similarly acquitted of hate speech and 
discrimination charges on 23 June 2011 following his comparison of Islam with Nazism. Whilst Wilders‟ 
statements were indeed acknowledged by Judge Marcel van Oosten to be “crude and denigrating”, the 
grounds for his acquittal were that his comments formed part of a larger national debate on 
multiculturalism and immigration policy (Sterling 2011). Despite Wilders‟ remarks admittedly causing 
offense to many Muslims, they were considered to lie within the realm of legitimate political deliberation. 
Hailed as a “victory” for free speech by Wilders‟ supporters, the acquittal naturally came as a blow to 
groups fearful that the ruling would set a dangerous precedent for other right-wing parties and populist 
politicians in Europe (Sterling 2011). Despite the “inciting character” of Wilders‟ statements, his remarks 
were not seen to incite hatred, as Wilders has never condoned or called for violence against Muslims and 
has said he has no problem with Muslims that integrate and accept Dutch values. Reference to the Qu‟ran 
as the Islamic Mein Kampf, whilst derogatory, was considered to amount to religious critique. The trials 
of Fortuyn, and now Wilders, for inflammatory speech may well have produced different results had they 
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taken place 15 years ago. The transformed climate in which integration debates take place currently 
means that Janmaat‟s conviction for comparable “offences” – statements that are now quite commonplace 
– would be a surprising verdict today. Anti-immigration and more assimilationist perspectives have 
therefore found their way into the political mainstream and into a political space that was “previously 
suppressed”, becoming a more accepted and tolerated feature of the debate (van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 
2008: 404). This suggests that the parameters for what is appropriate in the context of public and political 
debate have widened significantly and the political legroom of the right has increased. The next chapter 
delves more deeply into this “national debate” in the Netherlands, emphasising in particular the 
contribution of the Dutch right-wing to this dialogue.  
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has looked at processes of both continuity and change with respect to Dutch integration 
policy. The influence of various forces and motivations on these policy and framing shifts has been 
considered and the intention has been to show that although distinctive approaches to integration enable 
discernment among policy models from one period to the next, the trajectory from pillarisation to 
multiculturalism, to integration and finally assimilation, is not as clear-cut or stereotypical as is often 
suggested. These policy shifts are significant beyond the realm of strategy and are ultimately revealing of 
the way in which perceptions towards the position of foreigners in the country and towards immigrant 
groups themselves are in constant flux. The constant redefinition of Dutch integration policy also reflects 
on a wider level something of the state of liberal democracy in the country in the way that 
multiculturalism, not as an ideology or policy strategy but as a descriptive fact of society‟s cultural 
diversity, is approached and welcomed. Although the increasing shift away from multiculturalism as an 
official tactic in managing pluralism is not in itself telling of the state of liberal democracy in the country, 
the extent to which certain multicultural values continue to be reflected in the political culture of the 
Netherlands is certainly an important consideration when it comes down to assessing the country‟s liberal 
democratic balance sheet. The degree to which norms such as tolerance of societal diversity and respect 
for the right of all to pursue individual (or collective) identity are realised in conjunction with increased 
efforts to promote a distinctively Dutch culture, will serve as an important indicator of the “health” of 
liberal democracy in the Netherlands. The following chapter delves more deeply into this central concern 
of the research by looking at the anti-immigration movement in the Netherlands as well as the position of 
Islam in the country, subsequently assessing what these two forces bode for Dutch liberal democracy. 
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Chapter 3. The Islamic Integration Debate: Ideology and National Identity 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Increasing electoral support for far-right parties in national contexts throughout Europe reflects public 
disenchantment with mainstream parties in catering for popular concerns. Perceptions about traditional 
parties‟ remoteness from the concerns of voters have eroded the credibility of conventional, middle-of-
the-road politics as citizens increasingly look to right-wing parties to represent their interests. This “new 
wave” of radical right populism is enjoying heightened representation in both national and regional arenas 
in Europe and the durability and electoral performances of some of these parties suggest that the impact 
of their political programmes on policy requires serious consideration. This chapter is particularly 
interested in what the Dutch populist radical right means for liberal political culture in the Netherlands. 
There is some disagreement about what the populist project bodes for liberal democracy and the ensuing 
discussion attempts to provide a balanced impression of contending arguments about the extent to which 
the Dutch populist right-wing can be seen to reflect liberal and democratic principles. 
 
The radical right has been instrumental in fostering intensified public and political debate on the 
“foreigner‟s issue”, a question traditionally “owned” by the far-right. Islam‟s centrality to the political 
motivations of the right implies that discussion of the populist right-wing that fails to address Islam‟s role 
in this agenda would lack context and comprehensiveness. To this end, this chapter is as much a 
discussion of Islam‟s position in contemporary Dutch society and discourse as it is about the aspirations 
and implications of the radical right. Particular focus is given to the cultural and religious dimensions of a 
debate which has come to reflect less concern for the socio-economic deficits of Dutch Muslims vis-à-vis 
the majority population. Although the ultimate interest of this thesis is economic and demographic-
induced perceptions of threat, this chapter discusses more symbolic and cultural sources of negative 
immigration sentiment that centres on how Islamic minority culture in secular Dutch society is 
represented as an antithesis to liberal democratic values. It is not the intention, however, to analyse 
religious fundamentalism and terrorism in the Netherlands, nor to evaluate the degree of Islam and liberal 
democracy‟s (in)compatibility: rather, it is to observe the content of the arguments put forward by the 
radical right and how these themes have come to permeate popular and political discourse. 
 
As the ultimate interest of this thesis is the possible influence of macro-economic climate in shaping 
perceptions towards immigrants, due attention is paid to the contextual peculiarities in which Europe, and 
the Netherlands specifically, have witnessed a populist resurgence. This discussion is thus peppered with 
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examples of the right-wing and Islamic experiences of other European states. The somewhat more 
comparative approach of this chapter is not to give a diluted account of developments in the Netherlands; 
rather, it is considered beneficial to the discussion‟s principal focus on the Dutch situation to 
contextualise these developments within wider European processes. It is hoped that a better understanding 
of the Dutch scenario will be gleaned via appreciation of the similarities with, and departures from, 
general European trends. 
 
This chapter is essentially divided into one section that looks at Islam in the Netherlands and another that 
focuses on the Dutch populist right-wing. There is however a large degree of “thematic” overlap and 
reference to Islam and the populist radical right permeates this discussion throughout. The description of 
Islam‟s position in contemporary Dutch and European society looks at the socio-economic circumstances 
of Muslims and the cultural dimension of the “Islam debate” with regards to how ideological discourse is 
reflected. The section on the Dutch right-wing looks at both general and specific characteristics of this 
movement with reference to the Freedom Party and List Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands in particular and 
to populist parties elsewhere in Europe. The influence of the current macro-economic climate on these 
parties‟ electoral appeal is considered, and the discussion concludes with a reflection of radical right 
populism‟s relationship to liberal and democratic precepts. To begin, a brief introduction to the key 
political parties is given, including those that have been influential in the Dutch immigration debate. 
 
3.2 KEY DUTCH POLITICAL PARTIES IN IMMIGRATION DEBATE 
 
The latest general elections in the Netherlands were held in June 2010 following the collapse of the 
Christian Democratic Appeal-led government in February 2010. This resulted in the current coalition 
government between the People‟s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) and the Christian 
Democratic Appeal (CDA). VVD leader Mark Rutte is the incumbent Prime Minister. This minority 
government was sworn in on 14 October 2010, controlling only 52 of 150 parliamentary seats; 
parliamentary support from Geert Wilders‟ anti-immigration Freedom Party (PVV) guaranteed an 
electoral majority however, increasing the Rutte government‟s share of seats to 76 which is the minimum 
required for approving legislation (US Dept of State, 2010; Ghitis 2011). Not openly included in the new 
government on account of Wilders‟ controversial views, the PVV does not hold any cabinet positions and 
its unofficial yet de facto presence is considered a “necessary evil”. In the Dutch spirit of compromise 
however, the PVV‟s support of 24 votes and of the strict budget cuts favoured by the VVD has been made 
in exchange for several new anti-immigration concessions in the government‟s policy statement. These 
include reducing family migration, removing financial support for integration classes, possibly 
46 
 
withdrawing residence permits upon the failing of integration exams, banning face-concealing garments 
and more money for elderly care (Freedom House, 2011; Sterling 2011; The Economist, 2010: 78). 
Despite all evidence pointing to the crumbling of this unlikely partnership, the coalition has held out 
against the odds (Ghitis 2011). Wilders and Rutte have been at loggerheads over several potentially 
destabilising issues including immigration policy, support for North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO) operations in Libya and Afghanistan, and the prospect of a bailout for Greece which Wilders 
firmly rejected along with two-thirds of the Dutch public, affirming his image as the “people‟s politician” 
(Ghitis 2011). When unable to rely on the PVV for support on certain issues, the VVD has often looked to 
labour (PvdA) on the opposition. Ghitis (2011) writes that the real test of this alliance will come when the 
proposed austerity plan is devised, whereby the government intends to slash $25 billion from the national 
budget. Certain cutbacks will inevitably spark fierce opposition and the government will require support 
from the PVV more than ever. 
 
3.2.1 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)  
The most recent general elections saw the conservative-liberal Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie 
(VVD) narrowly emerge as the largest political party with 31 parliamentary seats, leading the government 
for the first time since 1918 and heading the country‟s first conservative government in over 100 years 
(Ghitis, 2011; Wolin, 2011: 61). The most conservative of the main contenders, this centre-right party‟s 
classical liberalism, promoting individual freedom from the government in all spheres, is especially 
reflected in its economic focus on private enterprise and fiscal conservatism (US Dept of State, 2010; 
Ghitis 2011). The PVV‟s positions on integration, security and anti-immigration were largely shaped by 
former members Geert Wilders and Ayaan Hirsi Ali, as well as by the former LPF‟s electoral success 
(Akkerman, 2005: 344).  
 
3.2.2 Labour Party (PvdA) 
The largest opposition party, the Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), achieved second place in the June 2010 
elections with 30 parliamentary seats – only 1 seat less than the VVD. A social democratic, left-of-centre 
party, the PvdA emphasises economic equality for all citizens although the role of central government in 
this regard is subject to debate (US Dept of State, 2010). 
 
3.2.3 Freedom Party (PVV) 
The Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) was founded in 2005 by present-day party leader, the populist 
politician Geert Wilders. The PVV was formed after Wilders broke from the centre-right liberal VVD in 
2004 due to his diverging views concerning the question of Turkey‟s ascension to the EU (Bos and van 
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der Brug, 2010: 782). The June 2010 elections saw the PVV gain 24 parliamentary seats and 15% of the 
vote; almost triple its previous total of nine seats in 2006, and thus making it the third-largest party in the 
Netherlands. The chief priorities of the PVV are anti-immigration, anti-Islam and a nationalist agenda. 
Campaign slogans such as “Henk and Ingrid are paying for Ali and Fatima”, highlight the party‟s position 
on the failure of the Netherlands‟ Muslim communities to integrate (Raymunt, 2011). Economically, the 
party is seen as “conservatively” left-of-centre (US Dept of State, 2010). 
 
3.2.4 Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA) 
The conservative centre-right Christen-Democratisch Appèl (CDA), a “once-dominant” political force, 
came in at 4
th
 position in the most recent general elections with 21 seats, down from 41 in 2006 (van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 398). A proponent of free enterprise, the CDA sees the role of 
government as supporting but not displacing collective civic action. Politically, the party positions itself 
between liberal “individualism” and labour‟s “statism” (US Dept of State, 2010). 
 
3.2.5 Pim Fortuyn List (LPF) 
Founded in February 2002 by the Dutch populist politician Pim Fortuyn, the Lijst Pim Fortuyn (LPF) 
campaigned on an anti-immigration and anti-Muslim platform in the run-up to the 15 May 2002 general 
elections. The LPF was established after Fortuyn‟s failure to find a niche within any existing political 
party. After announcing his intentions to run for office in 2001, Fortuyn joined the ranks of Leefbaar 
Nederland (Liveable Netherlands), but was forced to resign as party leader in early 2002 after accusing 
Islam of “backwardness” (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 651). Two days after stepping down, Fortuyn 
founded the LPF with himself as leader. Just 9 days prior to the elections, he was murdered in the 
country‟s first political assassination in 400 years by an animal rights extremist resentful of Fortuyn‟s 
scapegoating of Dutch Muslims and the politician‟s intentions to remove restrictions on fur farming 
(Carle, 2006: 72). The LPF went on to achieve astounding electoral success in the May 2002 elections. 
After campaigning under the name of List Five Fortuyn in the 2006 general elections, the party was 
dissolved on 1 January 2008. Several breakaway parties of the LPF exist, each claiming to continue its 
legacy. The Party for the Netherlands and EenNL are most influenced by the Pim Fortuyn movement, but 
most former LPF supporters have turned to the PVV (Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 782). 
 
3.3 ISLAM AND THE NETHERLANDS 
 
It has been suggested that Islam will have a deeper influence on twenty-first century Europe than the 
United States, Russia or perhaps even the European Union (Savage in Schori Liang, 2007: 22). In 2011, 
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Muslims comprised 6% of the total European population, up from 4% in 1990. With declining fertility 
rates and restrictions on immigration, Europe‟s Muslim population will continue to expand, albeit at a 
slower rate (European Report, 2011). The Balkans and Russia have large Muslim populations, but they 
are relatively long-established in comparison to Muslims in Western Europe. Europe‟s Muslims are 
comparatively young: 49% of the Muslim population is under 30 years, in contrast to 34% of non-
Muslims (European Report, 2011). 
 
European anxieties about immigration before and after the Cold War focussed on immigrants from 
developing countries that were accused of exploiting Europe‟s generous welfare systems. Whilst the 
previous chapter traced the origins of Dutch debate surrounding Islam‟s ideological (in)compatibility to a 
1991 speech delivered by Bolkestein, a more general shift in threat perceptions towards Muslim 
immigrants in particular was witnessed in Europe after 9/11 and today, the terms “Muslim” and 
“immigrant” are almost synonymous (Schori Liang, 2007: 20, 23). The populist radical right has 
portrayed Islam as one of the foremost menaces to contemporary European lifestyles and political, 
cultural and economic security. It is for this reason that Schori Liang (2007: 21) contends that though the 
“Islamic question” is essentially a subsection of the overall immigration debate, the flurry of frenzied 
discussion accompanying this topic suggests that it has come to surpass the immigration issue. The 
example of Kosovo is often used as a warning of what may happen should Muslim immigration into 
Europe continue unfettered. The struggle between Christian Serbs in defence of their culture and values 
on the one hand, and Muslim Albanians demanding independence for Kosovo on the other, was dubbed 
an outrageous attack on Serbian sovereignty and identity by Heinz-Christian Strache, leader of Austria‟s 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) (Betz and Meret, 2009: 329, 320). 
 
Whilst immigration restrictions continue to feature prominently in populist radical right campaigns, this 
topic no longer defines the populist right-wing which, as of the “cultural turn” of the 1990s, has come to 
reflect more of an identitarian movement, pitting those in favour of cultural preservation against those 
who favour globalised, “culture-less” societies (Schori Liang, 2007: 21, 22). Moreover, whereas anti-
immigration and anti-Islam sentiments used to be strongly associated with the conservative right of the 
political spectrum, the Islam debate in Europe today is increasingly the purview of both right and left 
interests. Rightist perspectives hold that Islam should be tolerated in Christian Europe in accordance with 
liberal values such as freedom of religion, but outward manifestations of Islamic faith are to be limited or 
relegated to the private sphere. Leftist persuasions deem fundamentalism incongruent with European 
secularism and women‟s rights: this argument is not so much against Islam as against its alleged 
undermining of the principle of gender equality (Roy, 2010: 67). Roy (2010: 67) stresses how the 
49 
 
“Islamic question” revolves not only around religion, but is inextricably linked to similarly complex and 
contentious issues of identity. He remarks upon how the rise of new populist movements has obfuscated 
the left-right divide on such topics; these movements, Geert Wilders‟ Freedom Party for example, have 
relied upon arguments posited by both sides to advance their agenda. 
 
The “differences” between Islamic immigrant populations in the United States and those that have come 
to settle in Europe have received ample focus: Europe‟s Muslims are less ethnically diverse than their 
American counterparts who traditionally hail from different geographical areas. American Muslims are 
also relatively well-off economically and are better educated. Europe‟s Islamic population represents a 
more cohesive, insular group considered more inclined to retaining ties to tradition and ethnic heritage: 
today, Europe is a top destination for a number of Islamic fundamentalist movements (Carle, 2006: 70, 
71). European countries also tend to be dominated by specific Islamic ethnic groups: Turks in Germany, 
Moroccans in the Netherlands, North Africans in France and South Asian Muslims in the United 
Kingdom (European Report, 2011). A single religious identity is often seen to override all other 
individual affiliations or differences and whether or not Europe‟s Muslims are more conspicuous for their 
homogeneity than heterogeneity, blanket references to all followers of Islam in Europe and to the position 
of “Muslims” in Dutch society naturally overlook the huge variety of individual experience in terms of 
linguistic, ethnic or cultural backgrounds (Fekete, 2008: 78). A degree of generalisation is however 
necessary to present an aggregate picture of Islam‟s place in Dutch society. 
 
The position of Islam in modern-day Europe is a tenuous and ambivalent one and there are numerous 
examples of recent confrontations between European and Islamic interests. Germany and secular non-EU 
member Switzerland are but two recent examples that reflect strong sentiments about Islam‟s European 
presence (Biondo 2010). In 2009 the Deutsche Bundesbank‟s Thilo Sarrazin claimed that Berlin‟s 
economic woes were attributed to the large number of Turks and Arabs in the city with no productive 
capacity; his 2010 book Germany Does Away With Itself argued that that Muslim immigrants were having 
a degenerative effect by making the country “more stupid” (The Economist, 2010: 78). An opinion poll 
revealed that 60% of participants concurred with his central argument (Wolin, 2011: 61). In 2009, 57.5% 
of Swiss voters supported constitutionally outlawing the construction of minarets following a successful 
campaign by the Swiss People‟s Party (SVP) in 2007 (Biondo 2010; Betz and Meret, 2009: 325). Similar 
campaigns in Norway, Denmark and Italy and opposition elsewhere to the construction of mosques and 
Islamic centres have been justified by claims that they contribute to terrorism by proliferating radical 
literature and extremist ideas (Betz and Meret, 2009: 327).  
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Despite Switzerland‟s advanced secularism, minarets were deemed fundamentally threatening to national 
and cultural identity due to their alleged symbolic representation of Islamic invasion and victory; banning 
them was almost a reassertion of the country‟s Christian and Western values (Betz and Meret, 2009: 313). 
In the face of an apparent “erosion” of liberal democratic values, far-right and nativist parties in other 
highly secular countries such as Denmark and Norway have similarly promoted a return to Christian 
precepts by invoking “Europe‟s culture of reference” in speeches and party documents; endorsing both 
secular liberal values and traditional Judeo-Christian principles has enabled these parties to appeal to a 
wide social base (Betz and Meret, 2009: 327, 328, 333). This illustrates the ambiguity of contemporary 
“European” culture, where secularists deem the Enlightenment (encompassing human rights, freedom and 
democracy) to be the true heritage of Europe, whilst more Christian-oriented groups regard the 
Enlightenment as the portent to communism, atheism and even Nazism (Roy, 2010: 69). A supposed 
Islamic “invasion” or “colonisation” is commonly referred to by nativist, radical right groups who cast 
Islam as a religion of conquest and single out Muslims in particular as the greatest threat to Western 
lifestyles and cultural identity (Betz and Meret, 2009: 319). Islam‟s “green totalitarianism” is interpreted 
as a fundamental menace to everything Western liberal democracies uphold and intentions to construct 
minarets have even been interpreted as proof of Muslims‟ mounting “self-confidence” and goals to 
externalise their presence with “aggressive symbols of Islamic power” (Betz, 2005: 35; Betz and Meret, 
2009: 325, 326).  
 
Negative sentiments towards Muslims in many Western societies have been the subject of heightened 
research interest in recent years. “Islamophobia” denotes a specific type of xenophobia towards Muslims 
arising from fear and prejudice, and has been blamed as the principle barrier to integration and 
constructive debate (Sivanandan in Fekete, 2009: 1). One such feature of these negative perceptions is 
that Islam is often dismissed in its entirety for being “extremist” with no distinction made between Islam 
and radical Islamism (Lee et al., 2009: 92, 93; Betz and Meret, 2009: 319). Post-9/11, there has been a 
greater tendency to confound the two and treating anti-terrorism measures as part and parcel of 
integration policy suggests that one cannot be both a follower of Islam and European (Fekete, 2008: 19). 
In this way, unhelpful debates that resort to stigmatisation reinforce the majority‟s stereotypes – 
especially about Islamic women that, for instance, surrender to patriarchal culture, are economically 
inactive and are unable to speak the language of the majority (Fekete, 2008: 17, 18). It is however not 
only the extreme right that is responsible for the unfortunate linking of Islam to terrorism and mainstream 
politicians have similarly contributed to the manipulation of public anxieties for electoral ends. 
Integration is also used a smokescreen for discussing wider social problems that have become associated 
with immigration like unemployment, crime and poor academic performance, which enhance fears of an 
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immigrant “other”. Fekete (2008: 25 – 27) blames the media for reinforcing majority “collective hysteria” 
about an immigrant “other” by focussing disproportionately on minority violence and “ethnic-specific” 
crimes – thereby creating myths and a cultural-religious paradigm for discussing issues that are essentially 
socio-economic.  
 
Europe‟s tradition of secular liberalism where the strict separation of church and state upholds 
government‟s religious neutrality, ill-equips European states somewhat to deal with religious pluralism. 
Unlike the United States, the fact that Western Europe‟s so-called “civilizational order” is not religiously 
affiliated is seen to affect a different response towards Islam: a 2007 World Economic Forum report 
revealed that whilst 70% of Americans welcomed greater interaction between the Western and Muslim 
worlds, an average of 75% of Western Europeans reported a mounting immigration-induced fear of an 
“Islamic threat” (Betz and Meret, 2009: 317). This allegedly fundamental peril to Western values and 
cultural identity makes integration efforts both futile and dangerous from a European nativist perspective 
(Betz and Meret, 2009: 318). The lack of “formal” recognition of Islam is often cited as one contributing 
factor to its ambivalent position in contemporary Europe and despite the extreme right‟s frequent claims 
about Europe‟s “Islamisation”, in many countries Muslims are deprived of a formal religious 
infrastructure (Fekete, 2008: 63). When proposals are put forward to construct mosques or erect minarets, 
it is rare that they receive no public opposition. The “partial secularisation” of the Netherlands, Norway 
and the United Kingdom may be a factor in the larger prevalence of formal Islamic infrastructure in these 
countries in contrast to France or Germany (Fekete, 2008: 65). In none of the former group of countries is 
there an official ban on the headscarf as yet, although the Netherlands has embarked upon discussions to 
prohibit total covering of the face (Fekete, 2008: 69). Thanks to the Netherlands‟ pillarisation tradition 
therefore, the country has progressed further in terms of the institutionalisation of Islam than some of its 
neighbours, though the incomplete actualisation of a veritable “Islamic pillar” means that provisions for 
Muslims are still lacking. One challenge in reconciling the Islam-Europe relationship lies with Europeans‟ 
reluctance to deviate from following a “status quo” approach, demanding assimilation without willingly 
engaging themselves to redefine the relationship (Schori Liang, 2007: 22, 23). 
 
3.3.1 Muslims in the Netherlands 
In terms of real religious power measured by strength of belief and prevalence in public debate, Islam is 
now ranked first with regards to religious presence in the Netherlands (Carle, 2006: 70). Along with the 
denunciation of Calvinism in favour of sexual and cultural liberation, the influx of “mostly illiterate” 
Muslim workers is said to have “shaken the foundations of Dutch society” during the last four decades 
(de Winter in Carle, 2006: 68). The Netherlands has the fourth largest share of Muslims in Europe in 
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numerical terms after France, Germany and the United Kingdom, with approximately one million 
Muslims (Fekete, 2008: 4; Vink, 2007: 348). Out of a total population of 16.5 million then, 6% is Muslim 
and of the approximately 1.8 million “non-Western foreign” people living in the Netherlands, around 44% 
were of Turkish or Moroccan origin at the start of 2010  (European Report 2011; Sterling 2010; Wolin, 
2011: 60; Raymunt, 2011). Forty-four percent of the entire ethnic minority population in the Netherlands 
live in the four largest cities of Rotterdam, Amsterdam, the Hague and Utrecht and most Muslims 
acquired Dutch citizenship during earlier naturalisation processes (Fekete, 2008: 14; Maas, 2010: 234). 
 
Religious freedom is guaranteed by the Dutch constitution, although members of the country‟s Muslim 
community have reportedly experienced increasing levels of hostility in recent years, ranging from 
harassment and verbal abuse to targeted vandalism and arson attacks on mosques (Freedom House, 2011). 
Despite comprising approximately 6% of the total Dutch population, as well as the fact that the 
Netherlands has a purely proportional electoral system with a 0.67% (1/150 seats in the lower house) 
threshold, there is no Muslim political party (Maas, 2010: 234). Considering the relative size of the 
Muslim population in the country and the simplicity with which votes are translated into seats, this is 
somewhat surprising – especially in view of the fact that the country even has a Party for the Animals 
(PvdD) (Maas, 2010: 234). There also appears to be no “common ground of struggle” between older 
minorities and those arriving later. In light of suggestions that a comparable set of Islamic institutions was 
never realised as for Protestants and Catholics, immigrant groups arriving in the aftermath of the pillars‟ 
deconstruction have not had the structures through which to make cultural-religious claims (Winter, 2010: 
176). This lack of a distinctive Islamic political consciousness could also explain the weak distinctively 
“Dutch” Islamic identity. Historically autonomous groups have meanwhile come to identify with one 
another in mutual recognition that each is an established part of the nation-state (Winter, 2010: 177). 
 
In Europe generally, the integration of immigrants from Islamic countries and regions such as North 
Africa, Turkey and other parts of the developing world is seen as more problematic than the integration of 
immigrants from Catholic countries like Italy, Spain or Poland, given supposedly more marked ethnic and 
religious differences (Betz and Meret, 2009: 314). In the Netherlands, it has been suggested that the 
“adherence” of Turks and Moroccans to Islamic beliefs and identity makes them more “alien” than other 
immigrant groups (Lucassen in Vink, 2007: 347). Writing on the psychological impact of economic 
exclusion, educational underachievement and social marginalisation on the younger generation of 
Muslims, Fekete (2008: 82) warns that the sense of helplessness created may lead to a kind of “counter-
culture” and total disengagement from society. Perceptions about the relative underperformance of 
Islamic schools are commonly mentioned in public discourse and Muslim youth may seek to reaffirm 
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religious identity in defence against the perceived hostility and closed nature of a society that breeds a 
lack of self-esteem, the erosion of dignity and alienation (Fekete, 2008: 66, 82, 83). Carle (2006: 74) 
ascribes this supposed general disinclination among Dutch Muslims to integrate culturally to a sense of 
needing to cling to a distinctive, “rigid” Islamic identity as a result of social upheavals endured during 
immigration and resettlement. The importance of ethnic networks for Turkish and Moroccan immigrants 
in particular is reflected in tendencies – even among the second generation – to select spouses from the 
origin country (Bijwaard, 2010: 1218). Indeed, the percentage that does so may be as high as 60% among 
first and second-generation Turks and Moroccans and this has been accused of being a major obstacle to 
integration, dooming communities to continual underperformance and deprivation (Fekete, 2008: 51). 
This maintenance of historical ties is thought to influence the decisions of Islamic migrants to stay longer 
in the Netherlands (Vink, 2007: 347; Bijwaard, 2010: 1218).  
 
The disaffection of Muslim communities from dominant “European” culture and lifestyles has resulted in 
perceptions about inherited “internal colonies” that conjure up ghetto-like images (Carle, 2006: 70). One 
Annual Report on Integration published by Statistics Netherlands revealed that 25% of Turks and 25% of 
Moroccans live in areas where at least half their neighbours are of non-Western origin (Raymunt 2011). 
Marginalisation and the prevalence of Islamic “parallel societies” tends to be attributed more to cultural 
factors, seen to be of Islamic origin in particular, than to the role of structural, “objective” factors 
pertaining to the country‟s history of migration. Problems never adequately addressed by Dutch 
governments include the generally low skill levels of guestworkers, expectations of their temporary 
presence and the upheavals associated with transition from rural, to urban and Westernised, areas (Fekete, 
2008: 52; Betz and Meret, 2009: 326). This internal cohesiveness and seclusion of Europe‟s Muslim 
diaspora is frequently blamed for breeding radical sentiment and aiding the recruitment of young 
extremists. Questions of minorities‟ poverty and social exclusion have been understood less as a social-
economic problem and the increase in perceptions that cast “failure” to integrate in a cultural light 
coincide with the turn to assimilationist discourse over the last decade. Fekete (2008: 20) writes that 
misdiagnosis of immigrants‟ social deficits vis-à-vis majority populations reflects the hypocrisy of “host” 
countries that require labour but are unwilling to take responsibility for the associated social costs. 
Decline in the manufacturing sector has sorer implications for less-educated, lower skilled workers where 
Muslims‟ over-representation suggests they will be hardest hit and the first to be laid off (Fekete, 2009: 
77; Raymunt 2011). The welfare state is also commonly seen to have a “segregating” effect on 
immigrants by consigning them to a socio-economic underclass (van der Veer, 2006: 122). Fekete (2008: 
77) sees “Muslim” disadvantage more as a class than religio-cultural issue and suggests that material 
deficits be addressed and that integration assume the socio-economic framework it once did.  
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Of course, this is not to say that there are no internal factors peculiar to Islamic communities that may 
contribute towards the integration barrier. Specific attitudes and customs towards women and children in 
particular may hinder full inclusion or participation in society. Older community members with more 
patriarchal and clientelist leadership styles may also resist change and stifle the potential for younger 
generations to realise chances for deeper integration. Poor community leadership may therefore obstruct 
significantly the efforts of Muslim youth and women to assume leadership roles (Fekete, 2008: 87). 
Evidence of deeper participation among younger Muslims in civil society, politics and economics in the 
Netherlands than ever before and advancement into higher education, does however shed light on the 
positive opportunities and potential for overcoming internal barriers (Fekete, 2008: 52). 
 
3.3.2 Debate Surrounding Position of Islam 
In March 2008, Wilders released his short film Fitna (Arabic for “ordeal”) online, failing to heed 
warnings from the Prime Minister and others concerned about its public response. The film unsubtly 
inferred the “link” between Islam and terrorism by contrasting Qur‟an verses against images of violence 
(Sterling 2011). Within 24 hours of its release, the film had attracted six million views and despite 
protests staged in Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan and several other countries, Dutch Muslims reacted calmly 
(Lucardie, 2009: 1130). Objections to the release of the movie and to Wilders‟ statements against Islam 
were brought forward, though in June 2008 it was decided that charges would not be pressed (Lucardie, 
2009: 1130, 1131). Wilders‟ denouncement of Islam in ideological terms as totalitarian, and radical 
Islamism as the “fascism of the twenty-first century”, reinforces the idea of Islam‟s utter incongruence 
with ideology that is liberal, democratic and just – everything that totalitarianism and fascism are not 
(Betz and Meret, 2009: 320). In addition to calling for a ban on all Muslim immigrants in the Netherlands, 
Geert Wilders has demanded the Qur‟an be outlawed on the grounds of its “sick” and “fascist” ideology 
that promotes the “killing” of everything for which modern Western democracy strives (Betz and Meret, 
2009: 320). Whilst targeting violent Islamism is a legitimate task, attacks on Islam and the Qu‟ran have 
been denounced as “dangerous stupidity” that only “weaken(s) the civilisation Mr Wilders claims to 
defend” (The Economist, 2010: 78). This comparison of Islam with Nazism and reference to the Qur‟an 
as the “Mein Kampf of a religion that intends to eliminate others”, resulted in Wilders being put on trial 
for hate speech by the Amsterdam Court in 2009; although prosecutors were initially hesitant to pursue 
the matter, the hearing proceeded after it was deemed in society‟s interest for general “public confusion” 
over free speech laws to be clarified (Sterling 2011; The Economist 2010: 78). Wilders was subsequently 
acquitted in June 2011, with the judge ruling that his anti-Islam statements, whilst admittedly offensive, 
should be regarded as part of a wider, national debate around immigration policy. 
 
55 
 
Like Wilders, Ayaan Hirsi Ali was a former member of the VVD and a fierce critic of Dutch 
multiculturalism and Islam. Despite, or indeed as a result of her own Islamic upbringing in Somalia, she 
was at the forefront of opposition to radical Islam in the Netherlands, particularly with respect to its 
treatment of women. Her outspokenness had made her the target of numerous death threats, as did her 
collaboration with filmmaker Theo van Gogh in the 2004 movie Submission, a 14-minute film featuring 
the fictional accounts of four Muslim women victims of male abuse. Clad in see-through burqas, the 
women‟s bodies are inked with texts from the Qu‟ran, suggesting religious justification for ill-treatment. 
The movie was criticised for resorting to Orientalism and effectively amounting to a call to “white men to 
save Muslim women from Muslim men” (Moors in Fekete, 2008: 30). Hirsi Ali dismissed the country‟s 
thirty-year dabble with multiculturalism as a “disastrous error” and of being little more than a case of 
“misplaced guilt” (Carle, 2006: 68). A proponent of assimilation on the grounds that Islam was 
“reactionary”, “pre-modern” and a “backward, 12th-century religion...a medieval, misogynist cult 
incapable of self-criticism and blind to modern science”, she demanded an end to the Netherlands‟ habit 
of accommodating, and thereby unwittingly nurturing, “illiberal” societal elements in the name of respect 
for cultural diversity (Fekete, 2008: 30; Carle, 2006: 68). She accused Muslim immigrants of exploiting 
the openness and liberalism of Dutch society to achieve “illiberal ends”, an argument frequently used by 
members of the European right: Ulrich Schlüer of the Swiss SVP, for example, argued that Muslims 
exploit religious freedom to deny others fundamental rights such as gender equality (Betz and Meret, 
2009: 323; Carle, 2006: 69). How states ought to go about responding to illiberal elements within their 
societies is therefore an important challenge for liberal democracies generally. Hirsi Ali was especially 
vocal about patriarchal customs that denigrated women, but despite her advocacy for the rights of Muslim 
women and children, she was criticised by feminist groups that sought to oppose domestic violence 
without resorting to attacking Islam (Carle, 2006: 68). It has however been suggested that it was precisely 
Hirsi Ali‟s framing of domestic violence as a cultural issue that enabled her to acquire such “celebrity” 
status (Fekete, 2008: 31; Ackerman, 2005: 345).  
 
In 2006, Hirsi Ali left Dutch parliament for the American Enterprise Institute in Washington after it 
emerged that she had lied in her 1992 application for asylum to the Netherlands at the age of twenty, in 
which she stated her father had arranged for her to be married (Freedom House, 2011; van der Veer, 
2006: 121; Carle, 2006: 68; Vink, 2007: 338). Fellow VVD member, so-called “Iron” Rita Verdonk, was 
former integration minister of the Netherlands under the Balkenende II and III governments (2003 – 
2007) and sought to withdraw Hirsi Ali‟s citizenship. Verdonk was notorious for her hard-line stance on 
immigration and integration and was responsible for introducing Dutch language and culture tests for 
“marriage migrants” (Vink, 2007: 338; van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 406). She also made several 
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policy suggestions which ultimately never made it into official policy, including a proposal to prohibit the 
use of any other language but Dutch in public spaces (Vink, 2007: 346). Verdonk broke away from the 
conservative VVD in October 2007, founding the Trots op Nederland (“Proud of the Netherlands”) 
movement which became an official political party in 2009. 
 
The media is often seen to favour only one side of the integration debate and Islamic voices tend to be 
underrepresented; those that are featured prominently, are usually in support of an assimilationist agenda, 
confirm the view of immigrant culture as regressive, and promote a homogenised European identity 
instead (Fekete, 2008: 28). In the Dutch context, Ayaan Hirsi Ali appeared to fill the role of “martyr for 
the majority” with her domination of the integration debate in the media (Qureshi in Fekete, 2008: 29). As 
the product of an Islamic upbringing, Hirsi Ali was afforded a “privileged” position in the debate: her 
background as an asylum-seeker lent an air of legitimacy and political correctness to her attacks on Islam 
and its treatment of women in particular, considering she was “part” of the community she was attacking 
(van der Veer, 2006: 121). 
 
Fekete (2008: 34) talks about the almost “celebrity status” enjoyed by such critics of integration in the 
Netherlands. If there was ever a star performer among them however, Pim Fortuyn was certainly that: 
hitherto a former sociology professor, TV chat show personality, political columnist and gay-rights 
activist, Fortuyn was well-known for his outspokenness and sense of the extravagant (he owned a Ferrari, 
a Bentley and was driven around by a chauffeur), even before announcing his intentions to run for the 
2002 parliamentary elections (Carle, 2006: 72). A charismatic and flamboyant personality, Fortuyn was as 
much a politician as an entertainer and coupled with a flair for oratory, he was the ultimate embodiment 
of the classic populist. His openly gay identity chimed well with the content of his political agenda which 
included the defence of liberal Dutch sexual freedom against conservative Islamic customs (van der Veer, 
2006: 115). Of course, Fortuyn was not unanimously lauded as a defender of Dutch values and the extent 
of his public condemnation was such that Fortuyn‟s supporters often spoke of his “demonisation” (Vink, 
2007: 345). His attack of the anti-discrimination clause of article one of the Dutch constitution – the 
“Holy Cow” provision – represented the most direct challenge to multiculturalism in the country, 
according to Vink (2007: 345). 
 
Fortuyn was pro-lower taxation, minimal government, abortion rights and euthanasia, but his 
confrontational stance on immigration won him the most support and media coverage. Fortuyn‟s attitude 
towards Islam in particular brought him much attention and he dismissed it as a threat to homosexual 
rights and gender equality, ill-disposing its followers to assimilation (Carle, 2006: 72; Schori Liang, 2007: 
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20). Such claims about Islam‟s “backwardness”, “pre-modernism” and divorce from the experiences of 
the Enlightenment and Renaissance – instrumental in moulding Christianity and European cultures – are 
considered grievous misunderstandings by Biondo (2010), who highlights how European contact with 
Islam in medieval Spain and during the Crusades was in fact influential in stimulating the Renaissance. 
Modelling himself as a “Dutch Samuel Huntington”, Fortuyn warned in his 1997 book Against the 
Islamization of our Culture, that the Dutch indifference to their own cultural identity due to their 
“advanced individualisation” and tendency to take for granted the rights they enjoyed, made traditional 
Dutch values vulnerable to attack by Muslims (Maas, 2010: 232). Many have similarly blamed the Dutch 
culture of tolerance for discouraging necessary frank confrontation with the question of integrating 
conservative Muslims. Fortuyn also called for stronger assimilation and an end to all economic, Muslim 
and asylum migration, arguing that immigrants had proved hostile to integration efforts and that “Holland 
is full” (Carle, 2006: 72; Schori Liang, 2007: 21). Fortuyn‟s liberal nationalism was militant, especially 
with regards to his position on Islam where he claimed that Western culture was liberal at heart and this 
liberalism was only defendable against Islam in the context of a “cultural war” (Akkerman, 2005: 348). 
The perceived anti-liberalism of Islam necessitated the total rejection of the religion as even liberal 
Muslims would not accept the separation of church and state, liberalism‟s founding principle. Fortuyn, 
Wilders and Hirsi Ali‟s support of a radically rationalist concept of integration – assimilation – was 
termed Muslims‟ “shortcut to Enlightenment” by Hirsi Ali (Akkerman, 2005: 348).  
 
Wilders appears to have moulded himself on the late Pim Fortuyn: this is certainly true of his current 
position at the forefront of the Dutch anti-immigration movement, his maverick-style bluntness and hard-
line attitude towards Islamism. With the establishment of his own political party, Wilders proposed to 
prevent non-Western immigrants from entering the country for five years; to deport criminally-convicted 
dual nationals; and to introduce the pre-emptive, “preventative detention” of Islamists where mere 
suspicion would suffice (Carle, 2006: 73). Wilders also denies the existence of a “moderate Islam” in 
Europe and his support for the cultural integration and assimilation of Dutch Muslims reflects an 
unapologetic belief in the supremacy of Western values: Islam and democracy, he has claimed, are 
incompatible (Carle, 2006: 73). Wilders‟ candour has however come at a price: numerous threats on his 
life have necessitated the donning of a bulletproof vest for all public appearances and he lives a virtually 
imprisoned, privacy-free life under extreme protection (Carle, 2006: 73; Wolin 2011: 59). 
 
3.3.3 Death of Theo van Gogh: More than a Murder, but a Clash of Civilisations? 
The brutal murder of filmmaker van Gogh on 3 November 2004 by Mohammad Bouyeri, a Dutch Muslim 
of Moroccan descent, was the catalyst for a nationwide state of alarm surrounding a supposed “Clash of 
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Civilisations” in the country and had an even greater effect on public and political discourse than 
September 2001. Van Gogh‟s murder was arguably one of the most significant “shock events” occurring 
at the turn of the millennium and nurtured the idea of a veritable cultural clash occurring on Dutch soil. In 
the immediate aftermath of the murder, the LPF announced that “we” are at war with Islamic extremism 
and mosques across the country were targeted by arsonists. It was feared that the situation could have 
spun out of control were it not for more “responsible elements” of the state (van der Veer, 2006: 112).  
Both Wilders and Hirsi Ali, whilst denouncing the violence of extreme Muslims, were also at pains to 
emphasise their condemnation of attacks on mosques and Islamic schools (Akkerman, 2005: 349). 
 
Van Gogh‟s death was significant beyond signalling a supposedly mounting Islamic terrorist threat in the 
country, however; for some, the event represents the final days of the era of Dutch “cultural 
transformation” (van der Veer, 2006: 112). Both the murder and the public reaction it stimulated were 
incongruent with prevailing images of the Netherlands as an ultra-liberal, tolerant society and discourse 
began focussing on questions of Islam‟s inherent incompatibility with fundamental “Dutch” values and 
culture, not to mention the “lack of humour” on the part of Muslims unable to take van Gogh‟s 
outrageous provocations and wicked satire with a pinch of salt like everybody else (van der Veer, 2006: 
112). Van Gogh was infamous for his crude comments towards all religions in general and he referred to 
Islamists as “Nazis who wear kaftans and hide behind beards” (Carle, 2006: 68). Much focus was 
accorded to questions of freedom of speech and the Muslim antipathy to satire was considered a sign of 
“deep cultural backwardness” (van der Veer, 2006: 112). In light of van Gogh and Hirsi Ali‟s 
collaborative project Submission (released 3 months before van Gogh‟s murder) not being “an especially 
funny film” however, van der Veer (2006: 112) remarks that the issue that requires greater explanation 
than the Muslim humour deficit is the disproportionate aggression exhibited towards the socially and 
culturally marginalised Islamic minority in the Netherlands.  
 
Carle (2006: 69) talks about the public alarm upon the revelation that van Gogh‟s murderer was a second 
generation immigrant, born and raised in the Netherlands and a product of the Dutch education system. 
The disclosure focussed greater attention on the position of second-generation immigrants in society as a 
demographic group worthy of greater understanding. Bouyeri‟s trajectory from capable student to Islamic 
militant mirrored the scenarios of other young Muslims in Europe, raising questions about the integration 
patterns and challenges confronting this particular segment of the population and the unsettling 
phenomenon of Europe‟s “home-grown” jihadists (Carle, 2006: 69). Bouyeri was an Islamic extremist 
who articulated his religious motivations for the killing in a handwritten five-page letter that he pinned to 
van Gogh‟s chest after slitting his throat (Carle, 2006: 68). Calling for a “holy war” against the “infidels”, 
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Bouyeri‟s letter, addressed to Hirsi Ali, warned her that she would be “smashed against the hard diamond 
of Islam” (Carle, 2006: 68). Bouyeri had previously been a member of the Hofstad group, an organisation 
comprised of second-generation Islamic militants who had planned inter alia a series of political 
assassinations, an attack on the country‟s only nuclear reactor and other terror actions in Europe (Carle, 
2006: 69). In January 2008, the seven members of the group were acquitted of participation in a terrorist 
organisation given the conclusion that there was “no question of a lasting and structured form of 
cooperation, nor of a commonly shared ideology” (US Dept of State, 2010). This verdict was however 
subsequently annulled in February 2010 by the Supreme Court and the case was set for retrial in 
Amsterdam (US Dept of State, 2010). 
 
Questions of religious garb and the position of Muslim women have become closely tied in with frames 
presenting Islam and Muslims as a threat to liberal values and democracy and which complement 
dominant negative portrayals of Islam. “Victimisation” and “Islam-as-threat” frames have become central 
to the debate surrounding the position of Muslims in the Netherlands. The first frame portrays Muslim 
women as “victims” of a patriarchal culture that requires their submission and obedience and the 
headscarf has come to symbolise female subordination to a religion that “promotes” gender inequality. In 
addition to focussing on religious dress, this frame emphasises themes of “cultural violence” such as 
female circumcision or “genital mutilation”, honour killings and domestic abuse (Vliegenthart and 
Roggeband, 2007: 301, 302). The “Islam-as-threat” frame prioritises Islam‟s alleged incompatibility with 
Western civilisation and values including state neutrality, freedom of expression, gender equality and 
tolerance of sexual freedom. Reference to the “Islamisation” of Dutch or European society is common, 
the external expression of which is considered to be the wearing of Islamic garb in public spaces. In 
response to Islam‟s “conquest mentality”, proposals include reinforcing state neutrality and relegating 
religious dress to the private sphere, as well as emphasising assimilation of “Dutch” norms and culture 
(Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 302). The authors write that the Islam-as-threat frame became 
dominant in both parliamentary and media arenas in the aftermath of 9/11 and the ensuing “War on 
Terror” (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 308).  
 
A 2007 study revealed that a “deep conflict of values” existed between the majority ethnic Dutch and 
minority Islamic population in the Netherlands (Vink, 2007: 348). Requirements that immigrants shed 
their identities, assimilate Dutch values and culture, provide “proof” of loyalty via citizenship and 
distance themselves from Islam, certainly do not reflect the EU‟s conceptualisation of accommodation as 
a mutual, two-way process (van Bruinessen in Vink, 2007: 343). The risk of a “culture clash” stemming 
from the general marginalisation and poor integration patterns of Muslims is thought to be greatest in 
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countries with large Muslim communities such as France, Germany and the Netherlands, giving rise to 
fears about a domestic security threat in these states (Schori Liang, 2007: 22). Van der Veer (2006: 119) 
talks about the “politics of enjoyment” that came to characterise Dutch culture with the collapse of the 
religious-ideological pillars in the 1960s. With a general Western shift towards a materialist culture, the 
“ingrained frugality” of the Netherlands as a result of its Calvinist heritage made this transition to 
unfettered consumerism all the more pronounced (van der Veer, 2006: 119). In the 1990s, this enjoyment 
was perceived to be threatened by globalisation and the Islamic immigration it brought about, where 
Muslims came to represent an almost “anti-enjoyment” with their strict moral system concerning 
sexuality and dress. The secularisation and assimilation of Muslims, as opposed to accommodating Islam, 
is thus widely perceived as necessary for the unity and security of a nation whose ideological foundation 
is “the shared and recently developed ideas of liberty of choice in consumption” (Van der Veer, 2006: 
124). In this light, the Islamic debate in the Dutch context “reflects not so much a perceived challenge to 
the secularism of the state as a perceived rejection of sexual liberty and consumer values” (Van der Veer, 
2006: 124). 
 
It has been argued that radical right identification with liberal values is a “liberalism turned inward, 
driven by fear” and it appears that attempts to ban religious apparel are informed by a threat logic (Betz 
and Meret, 2009: 323; Fekete, 2008: 6). The subscription of the far-right to a “Clash of Civilisations” 
discourse reflects an intrinsic belief in cultural hierarchy, where one culture is deemed superior to another 
in terms of the values that nurture “democratic governance, social justice and prosperity” (Betz and 
Meret, 2009: 332). Cultural relativism is portrayed as the “disease” that will rot the foundations of 
Europe‟s liberal democracy and Wilders has warned that unless Islamisation is combated head-on, “we 
will lose everything; our cultural identity, our democracy, our rule of law, our liberties, our freedom” 
(Wilders in Betz and Meret, 2009: 333). This turn to more inward-looking discourse emphasises 
Muslims‟ (in)ability and (un)willingness assimilate (Betz and Meret, 2009: 316, 318).  
 
Scheffer‟s 2001 article entitled The Multicultural Tragedy, discusses tolerance in liberal democracies, 
which can only exist within distinct boundaries. Cultivating common values is seen as essential for 
allowing differences in opinion to exist side by side and he writes that immigrants need to accept the 
“price” of living in an open society, which is that individuals have the right to individual choice and to 
distance themselves from their “communities” if so desired (Carle, 2006: 72). Arguments about symbols 
of religious affiliation having no place in the public sphere are informed by the secular division of church 
and state. Religious garb is thus seen to compromise state neutrality and to represent an outward defiance 
of integration. Efforts to ban religious paraphernalia in public are justified via reference to incompatibility 
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with integration, gender equality values or principles of secularism. Van der Veer (2006: 123) writes that 
the only way for justification of religious dress to be seen as legitimate and to hold weight is for defence 
of the headscarf to be “phrased in…[the]…secular language of autonomy and freedom” as opposed to 
resorting to religious and moral reasoning. Many parties have couched attacks on Islam, or the promotion 
of assimilation, under claims of emancipating Muslim women; the hijab or headscarf, niqab and burqa 
being the external symbols of such oppression. Targeting Islamic garb in public spaces is however far 
more than just a symbolic strategy to “free” young women from an “archaic” and “oppressive” religious 
practice: it is a challenge to Islam‟s “external” rejection of the norms and social values of the West (Betz 
and Meret, 2009: 324, 325).  Fekete (2008: 67, 68) argues that “fixations” upon religious clothing in the 
media and political discourse only stoke the flames of majority intolerance whilst concomitantly 
heightening minority fears. Instead of promoting social cohesion and stability, social exclusion is the 
inevitable by-product of measures to clamp down on Islam‟s visibility. Fekete (2008: 6) therefore 
recommends that concerns about analysing whether a veritable “clash” between Islamic and Western 
civilization exists in Europe today should rather focus on conflict between individuals that support, and 
those that oppose, a “civil rights framework” for discussing integration. 
 
Nativists‟ belief in the essential incompatibility of different cultures has resulted in efforts to discourage 
policies and programmes aiding the integration of Muslims into Western European societies. Van der 
Veer (2006: 123) writes that “the real clash comes with the power of the state to enforce equality against 
the wishes of the Muslim minority”: outlawing head garb is a result of majoritarian democratic politics 
and “has everything to do with governmentality and little with emancipation”. Protests against the 
construction of mosques, cultural centres and minarets, highlighted earlier, represent similar efforts to 
discourage Islam‟s integration and render it “invisible” (Betz and Meret, 2009: 325). Attempts to integrate 
Muslims via accommodation and the institutional provision of mosques, cultural centres and schools, 
enhance both Islam‟s presence and visibility within Dutch society and, quite likely, feelings of threat 
among Dutch autochthones. It could be that heightened Islamic perceptibility (increasing numbers of 
immigrants over the last three to four decades and attempts at fostering “multiculturalism”) has 
contributed to demands for a diminished “external” Muslim presence, the heatedness of public debate and 
the PVV‟s electoral success. Though it would seem that anti-immigration and anti-Islam feelings have 
been on the rise in the Netherlands, Chapter Four‟s focus upon public perception data will hopefully 
clarify whether these expressions of cultural intolerance are indeed reflective of a veritable increase in 
anti-immigration sentiment. 
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3.4 RADICAL RIGHT-WING POPULISM AND THE NETHERLANDS 
 
Populism is a political leadership strategy or style of rhetoric that both provokes and feeds off prevailing 
popular resentments. Established structures of power such as political and cultural elites are commonly 
the sources of such public disenchantment, as are foreigners, asylum seekers and insecurities surrounding 
material and personal wellbeing (Betz, 2005: 25, 28). Whilst these types of grievances can, to a greater or 
lesser degree, be relatively permanent features of contemporary Western liberal democracies, the global 
financial crisis provides an especially exploitable climate of common resentment for populists. The 
mobilisation of resentment is a powerful political strategy as bitterness induces a need for action or even 
radical change (Betz, 2005: 28). By targeting the political establishment as a whole, populist parties are 
able to tap into general cynicism and an array of different sources of discontent amongst a broad segment 
of the population. Voters become increasingly attracted to the “politics of exclusion” rather than seeking 
liberal answers to societal challenges (Schori Liang, 2007: 5). In the Netherlands, the “latent” xenophobia 
of the Dutch electorate, revealed by attacks on “political correctness”, has been exploited by the PVV, 
and LPF previously, to glean support for immigration restrictions and an assimilationist agenda (Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 404). These parties are often defined by their anti-immigration image 
though their stances in this regard are part of a wider radical right-wing programme. General 
characteristics of populist right parties in Western Europe will be described, in conjunction with how 
these right-wing populist characteristics are manifested in the Dutch case. A brief discussion is made of 
the contemporary economic context in which many of these parties have achieved recent electoral gains 
and ultimately the relationship of this movement to democratic and liberal norms is considered. 
 
The current Dutch coalition propped up by the PVV was inspired by the Danish example where the right-
wing populist Danish People‟s Party has supported the minority government of liberal and conservative 
parties since 2001. In Sweden in 2010, the far-right, nationalist Swedish Democrats won parliamentary 
seats for the first time. Though all these parties differ in important ways and are quite distinct from older 
far-right movements such as France‟s National Front and Italy‟s Northern league – not to mention more 
“thuggish” eastern European variants – they are united in their stances on anti-immigration and opposition 
to Islam in particular (The Economist, 2010: 78). One of the only few “encouraging” examples of 
political stability in Europe is Germany, where the country‟s two highest-profile far-right parties, the 
Republikaner and the Deutsche Volksunion, have had largely inconsequential influence (Wolin, 2011: 
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In terms of the political strategy, style, ideas and agenda of the contemporary right in Europe, Betz (2005: 
27) writes that there appears to be a general convergence towards the populist model. Adaption and 
dissociation from “traditional” images of the radical right as a proponent of biological racism or 
authoritarian-style governance has meant that the radical right today has transformed into an attractive 
voting option for segments of the electorate that would otherwise never have considered throwing support 
behind a right-wing party. This “winning formula”, adopted in the 1990s, enables a populist discourse 
that promotes broad political support against the political and cultural classes whilst simultaneously 
advancing a nationalist agenda (Betz, 2005: 27, 28, 34). The cult of personality typical of the populist 
project promotes the image of a leader that is “one” with the people and who “think[s] with the head of 
the citizens”, defending the interests of the common man deserted by the elite (Akkerman, 2005: 338; 
Betz in Schori Liang, 2007: 5). Building upon popular resentment, Wilders – a “consummate demagogue” 
– has made appeals that sit well with middle-class Dutch disillusioned with the efforts of previous 
governments to mollify those Muslim immigrants that allegedly thrive off state generosity whilst 
exhibiting zero inclination to integrate (Wolin, 2011: 59). Anti-Islamism American scholar Daniel Pipes 
has even hailed Wilders as the “most important European alive today” but, like Fortuyn, he has had his 
share of “demonisation” in the media: in addition to receiving ardent international criticism, Wilders has 
been accused of revelling in a “siege mentality” and being a “political embarrassment” for the 
Netherlands (The Economist, 2010: 78; Wolin, 2011: 59). 
 
3.4.1 Characteristics of the Populist Radical Right in the Netherlands 
 
3.4.1.1 Ideology 
A range of terminological categorisations has been employed in reference to politics on the ideological 
right of the political spectrum. “Extreme right” parties may for instance be characterised as neo-Nazi, 
neo-fascist, new right, far right, authoritarian xenophobic, neo-liberal xenophobic and neo-liberal 
populist, all of which refer to different features and have been shown to be influential in explaining 
differences in electoral outcome amongst these parties (Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 779; Schori Liang, 
2007: 3). Whilst each of these definitions may be analytically succinct in its own way, general 
characteristics include opposition to established or mainstream political parties and the structures that 
support political elitism; ethnocentric and xenophobic attitudes; a willingness to tackle sensitive, 
“politically correct” topics in the name of free speech; support for a Euro-sceptic, and possibly nativist 
and ethno-nationalist agenda that nurtures national cultural identity; and the promotion of restrictions on 
immigration and assimilationist integration strategy (Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 778). This chapter 
makes predominant use of the term “populist radical right”, developed by Mudde in his book entitled 
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Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, which encapsulates all those parties that contain elements of 
nationalism, nativism, authoritarianism and populism (Schori Liang, 2007: 3-5). Each of the 
abovementioned general features is looked at in turn in this section. 
 
Naturally, not all such parties follow the same trajectory in accumulating votes and whilst some reject any 
association with neo-fascism, others are openly racist and anti-Semitic, in the cases of the British National 
Party that restricts membership to the “indigenous British” and Hungary‟s Jobbik, for instance. The PVV 
campaigns in the “interests” of liberal democracy against a “totalitarian” Islam that threatens the political 
system. Its stances towards certain issues – immigrants, integration and Islam particularly – are however 
decidedly anti-liberal. Concerning certain issues, the rhetoric of the PVV does not depart substantially 
from that of mainstream parties, however “illiberal” these themes: public and political discourse on 
multiculturalism, integration, immigrants and Islam in the Netherlands has transcended the traditional 
left-right ideological divide, reflecting a debate that has taken on a more general, national scope. Ghitis 
(2011) writes that though the incumbent Dutch government may look right-wing, there is deeper 
ideological debate between the coalition partners. Wilders is commonly referred to as a member of the 
far-right, but he comes across as more of a populist whose stance is founded on the country‟s very liberal, 
progressive policies. The centre-right VVD, defending individuals‟ choice to gay marriage, euthanasia 
and abortion, also has far less in common with its “right-wing” peers in the rest of Europe and is perhaps 
more aptly described as a “socially progressive party” (Ghitis 2011). 
 
Despite Wilders‟ “occasional flirtation” with certain extremist positions then, much of his political 
success is due to the maintenance of an acceptable “façade”, whereby an anti-Islam agenda is 
accompanied by more “respectable” appeals in support of liberal values (Wolin, 2011: 60). Wilders has 
been compared to other European populists such as the late Jorg Haider in Austria and France‟s Jean-
Marie Le Pen, but whereas Le Pen was strongly opposed to euthanasia, homosexual rights and abortion, 
(he proposed illegalising abortion, providing stay-at-home mothers with an income and promoting local, 
traditional culture), the so-called Dutch “far right” is a fierce proponent of the liberal ideal in which the 
rights to euthanasia, abortion, and gay rights are tolerated (Sterling 2011; Kulinska, 2010: 55). Wilders 
thus personally sees himself more in the image of fellow “Toquevillian conservative” Margaret Thatcher 
than that of the French right-wing politician (Carle, 2006: 73). Wilders‟ defence of Western freedoms 
perhaps positions him more as a “radical liberal” targeting “Islam” (not Muslims, he claims), than as a 
member of the extreme far-right, in the traditional sense at least (The Economist, 2010: 78). Whilst 
Austria‟s Freedom Party 2010 presidential candidate, Barbara Rosenkrantz, positioned herself as a 
defender of traditional norms and criticised feminism‟s impact upon the family unit and in fostering 
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“sexless human beings”, the principle of gender equality for the Dutch radical right is the very platform 
from which attacks against Islam are launched (Kulinska, 2010: 56). Although Wilders supports anti-
immigration measures like Le Pen, it is in light of a perceived Islamic threat to liberal values, seen as so 
defining of Dutch political culture, that Wilders‟ anti-immigration arguments are shaped. Some see this 
identification of an “Islamic” and not “foreign” enemy as a strategic move by politicians to shape agendas 
in the language of “freedom” and not “race”, a rhetorical slant thereby affording a degree of protection 
from accusations of racism or neo-Nazism (The Economist, 2010: 78). 
 
3.4.1.2 Political Establishment 
Populism emerges in response to perceptions of growing distance between political elites in liberal 
democracies and the will of the people they are supposed to represent. Populist rhetoric thus also typically 
extends to questions about enhancing the decision-making power of “the people”. The populist nature of 
radical right parties sees the will of the people as paramount – prioritised even above human rights or 
constitutional guarantees – and the so-called “pure people” are pitted against the corrupt, self-seeking 
elite (Schori Liang, 2007: 5). The introduction of direct democracy is frequently proposed as an 
alternative to the liberal tradition of elite representative democracy in an effort, to translate Jean-Marie Le 
Pen, to “return the word to the people” (Betz, 2005: 31). Radical right-wing populist discourse seeks to 
discredit the abilities of the political and cultural classes and substitute them with a “genuine elite” of 
responsible citizens (Betz, 2005: 31). Discrepancies in terms of what politicians offer and what voters 
demand are interpreted as elite self-service, moral corruption and incapability in identifying with societal 
problems; as public frustrations and bitterness intensify, so populism thrives (Akkerman, 2005: 338). In 
the Netherlands, Fortuyn strongly rebuked mainstream Dutch politicians for having lost touch with the 
common man on the street and his proposals to diminish the vertical distance between the populace and 
elected representatives included the direct election of the most important administrative positions such as 
prime minister and mayor and more contact between politicians and citizens (Scholten, 2011: 86). 
Established parties were regarded with mistrust and Fortuyn regularly referred to the closed, “incestuous” 
nature of the political elite in The Hague (Akkerman, 2005: 338, 339; van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 
2008: 404). In the Dutch context, populism has attacked the consociational political culture and proclivity 
towards elite compromise (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 404). The successes of right-wing 
populist parties in Europe over the past decade and in the context of an economic downturn especially, are 
therefore essentially a reflection of political representation gone awry (Betz, 2005: 27). 
 
This anti-establishment programme is advanced by parties seeking to “set the tone” of political and public 
debate by promoting issues that are traditionally “owned” by the populist right-wing. This political anti-
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conformism is manifested in efforts to promote classic Dutch values and traditions, challenge deeper 
European integration and in efforts to attack prevailing policies towards managing diversity, which are 
cast as a failure. The desire to steer clear of unnecessary involvement in international affairs stems from 
perceptions that typically “Dutch” cultural peculiarities are being eroded and sovereignty lost as a result 
of immersion into European affairs. Contact with foreign, “alien” culture via immigration is also seen to 
denigrate culture and associated grievances typically include rising crime rates, the unfettered influx of 
“asylum tourists” or “bogus refugees”, and abuse of the welfare system at the expense of taxpayers (Betz, 
2005: 36). These issues are seen as the responsibility of the political classes who have allowed for an 
environment in which the country‟s liberal order is exploited and who have failed to protect the interests 
of citizens who bear the brunt of government‟s failed integration policies.  
 
Radical right populists also often oppose pluralist democracy as the fragmented politics of competition 
between diverse interest groups is similarly seen to undermine popular interpretations of democracy that 
emphasise cultural and political unity (Akkerman, 2005: 339). Necessary “rejuvenation” of the 
democratic system is achievable via the introduction of reform to salvage the sovereignty of the people 
from elite corruption, encroaching constitutionalism and dominance by interest groups (Akkerman, 2005: 
340). Schori Liang (2007: 5) considers intentions to change the democratic system and shift conceptions 
of democratic values, albeit democratically, to evince an authoritarian nature and to be essentially what 
makes these parties radical (not necessarily extreme). It is important to distinguish between parties 
dissatisfied with democratic government and those whose radical stance towards liberalism is informed 
by their anti-immigration policies; Akkerman (2005: 340) suggests that the latter group, into which the 
LPF and PVV would belong, should rather be defined as “anti-immigration” than “populist”. 
 
In this regard, the ideology of the right-wing party in question is important. For some, questions of 
national identity politics are at the core of their ideology, emerging in response to perceptions of an 
eroding dominant “national” identity and culture in the context of immigration flows over the course of 
the last four to five decades (Akkerman, 2005: 341). For these parties, questions of immigration and 
national identity dominate their agenda, rather than a general dissatisfaction with representative 
democracy. This nationalist focus of anti-immigration parties has been deemed intrinsically anti-liberal as 
a result of the implied rejection both of universal rights and of the notion that ethnically and culturally 
diverse communities can coexist. Justifying calls for ethnic exclusion via reference to protecting Western 
liberal values is deemed a curious and contradictory feature of such parties that often position themselves 
as the ultimate defenders of the Europe‟s liberal Enlightenment heritage (Akkerman, 2005: 341). 
Akkerman (2005: 341) notes that the “paradoxical defence of liberalism” is associated with anti-
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immigration policy in particular and with those parties that are more “liberal nationalist” than populist 
and campaign in the name of democracy, free speech, the separation of church and state and the equality 
of the sexes, all against the threat of a boding “Islamisation” of Western European culture. 
 
3.4.1.3 Free Speech and a Hierarchy of Principles 
Populist right parties tend to see themselves as the defenders of free speech and the enemies of the 
political correctness so favoured by the political establishment, viewed as an “assault on truth” and mere 
“self-deception” (Peters in Betz, 2005: 29). These parties‟ characteristic willingness to bring sensitive or 
“unpalatable” issues onto the agenda is something that risk-conscious mainstream parties are usually 
averse to doing out of a concern for inciting controversy and supposedly “upsetting the(ir) cosy little 
agenda” (Peters in Betz, 2005: 29). Radical right populist parties operate on the farthest outskirts of what 
is legally permissible in terms of discriminatory language. As so-called defenders of free speech and 
breakers of political taboos, the populist right is cast as the voice of the people, incorruptible by elite self-
service. In the event that hate speech trials are pursued, the political establishment is usually accused of 
hostility to free speech, meaning that the radical right rarely assumes responsibility for incendiary politics 
and discourse, according to Schori Liang (2007: 6).  
 
Fortuyn‟s politics was deemed radical by Akkerman (2005: 34) by virtue of the disregard shown for the 
“careful and balanced assessment of liberal principles”. A hierarchy of principles saw the opportunistic 
prioritisation of certain constitutional principles over others. Fortuyn for instance claimed that he would 
be in favour of abolishing the anti-discrimination “Holy Cow” provision of article 1 of the Dutch 
Constitution, claiming it was abused in order to restrict freedom of expression, another constitutionally-
enshrined right (Akkerman, 2005: 349). He maintained that the only restriction on the freedom of 
expression was that people should not be incited to violence. Support for freedom of expression stemmed 
from his belief that political correctness and juridical strictness surrounding ability to discriminate had 
resulted in important immigration questions being swept under the carpet. Privileging one right over 
another was also evidenced with respect to the freedom of religion where the LPF sought to emulate the 
French example of laïcété: the principle of a neutral, secular state as “the mother of all constitutional 
rights” (Akkerman, 2005: 349). Proposals to introduce this law extended to banning religious garb in 
schools and the civil service and would also be extended to state funding of religious schools. These 
offensives of the LPF were continued by the VVD even after the January 2003 elections when the LPF‟s 
participation in government ended. The CDA has kept a low profile in the Islam debate, but was 
nevertheless strongly opposed to liberal attacks on constitutional freedoms of religion and education 
(Akkerman, 2005: 350). Akkerman (2005: 350) notes that support for a neutral state at the expense of 
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religious and educational freedoms directly challenges the Dutch heritage of accommodating religious 
minorities, the foundation of Dutch consensus democracy since 1917. 
 
3.4.1.4 Compatibility with Democratic Principles 
Important for the electoral success of the right-wing is the extent to which such parties and their leaders 
are perceived as legitimate, or democratic, and effective in the sense of being able to affect policy and 
political processes. Bos and van der Brug (2010: 777) researched the electoral significance of public 
images of anti-immigration party leaders in the Dutch 2006 parliamentary elections in which four anti-
immigration parties participated. Data collected on two parties, Wilders‟ PVV and Marco Pastors‟ One 
Netherlands (EenNL), revealed that public perceptions of leaders‟ legitimacy and effectiveness were 
indeed important predictors of support. Even if such parties promote reforms or challenge the political 
elite, there is little difference between the determinants of success for anti-immigration and mainstream 
parties, provided the former continue to be seen to support the liberal democratic system and are deemed 
effective and legitimate (Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 779, 780, 791 – 793). Voters may be inclined to 
support a right-wing populist party if its anti-immigration message is well-received, but more extremist 
parties seen to reject or endanger democracy will be far less successful than their more moderate 
counterparts proposing smaller institutional changes (Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 778 – 780, 792).  
 
The effect of ideological considerations in determining voter preference for these far-right parties was 
only significant when perceptions of the party leaders‟ legitimacy and effectiveness were favourable (Bos 
and van der Brug, 2010: 791). Logically, internal party cohesion and discipline have been shown to have 
an important influence on electoral outcome for extreme right parties. The role of party leader in 
organising and uniting the party is particularly significant, given the centralised and populist nature of 
anti-immigration parties. The importance of effective leadership in generating internal unity was 
demonstrated after Fortuyn‟s death: despite the astonishing posthumous success of his party, the LPF was 
virtually concentrated around the personal charisma of Fortuyn and without him, it gave way to chaotic 
factionalism and was principally responsible for the subsequent collapse of the government, after only 83 
days, in which it was a coalition partner (Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 781; van der Veer, 2006: 114). 
Evidence of party agendas, statements and other documents has indicated that the strong internal 
coherence of radical right-wing populist parties in Europe renders them an increasingly viable alternative 
to the dominant programs of mainstream parties and internal consistency has a favourable impact on 
public perceptions of effectiveness (Betz, 2005: 32). These criteria are naturally applicable to all parties 
and it should not be assumed that the party-voter relationship of far-right populist groups is any different 
from that of mainstream parties.  
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3.4.1.5 Nationalism 
Along with a populist agenda that is anti-establishment, at the core of contemporary radical right-wing 
ideology is ethno-nationalist xenophobia founded upon an “ethno-pluralist doctrine” (Rydgren, 2008: 
738). “Ethno-nationalism” and nativism prioritise the survival of “own nation”, whereby the nation is 
conceptualised as a single ethnic group. Such parties have tendencies towards xenophobia and 
authoritarianism and apply liberal precepts partially to citizens along cultural or ethnic lines, indicating an 
“organicist nationalism” (Schori Liang, 2007: 4; Akkerman, 2005: 345). Whilst these attributes are fitting 
to several West European radical right populist parties, they are less applicable to the Norwegian Progress 
Party and to the now-defunct List Pim Fortuyn which employed the ethno-nationalist frame to a lesser 
degree. The same can be said for the PVV today, given its comparable ideology to that of the LPF. 
Although these Norwegian and Dutch parties do, or did, promote anti-immigration and anti-
multiculturalism agendas, their lesser subscription to ethno-pluralist doctrine suggests that their 
categorisation as “radical right” is debatable (Rydgren, 2008: 738). However, given their anti-
immigration frames, similar reasons for electoral success and fulfilment of the same political demand, 
Rydgren (2008: 738) considers them “functional equivalents” to the new wave of radical right-wing 
parties in Europe. 
 
Akkerman (2005: 342, 345) distinguishes between different types of nationalism and also considers the 
LPF more an anti-immigration party promoting a nationalism that was “civic” or “patriotic” rather than 
“ethnocratic” or “organicist”. Anti-immigration parties like the LPF that exhibit a more civic or culturally 
pluralist type of nationalism are seen to be more “liberalism-friendly” whilst ethnocratic nationalism is 
generally incompatible with liberalism. Akkerman (2005: 342) highlights the seeming paradox in the 
“dynamic and complex” relationship between liberalism and nationalism: one possible form of this 
alliance is “liberal nationalism” (the LPF) in which nationalist values are central, and the other is 
“liberalism as a host ideology of nationalism” (Akkerman, 2005: 342). This distinction is deemed 
essential for assessing the extent to which nationalist parties are either more liberal or more nationalist 
and radical nationalist right parties are considered to belong to the second grouping. The anti-immigration 
ideology of Pim Fortuyn focussed on the integration of immigrants and a stop on all future immigration, 
as opposed to the expulsion of immigrants which has been promoted by parties subscribing to an 
exclusive, ethnocratic nationalism (Akkerman, 2005: 343). Although both the List Pim Fortuyn and 
Vlaams Blok could be seen as examples of parties that are liberal nationalist, they differ in significant 
ways. Fortuyn saw himself as a “liberal patriot” in the image of celebrated Dutch patriot Baron Johan van 
der Capellen, who supported the American Revolution and in 1781 urged the Dutch people to organise 
against the “regent” class (Akkerman, 2005: 345). In contrast to populist brands of nationalism, Fortuyn‟s 
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civic nationalism was of a utopian nature, inspired by the Enlightenment, and was not motivated by a 
yearning for the past. The ability of immigrants to integrate, and especially Muslims whose values had 
allegedly not been shaped by the Enlightenment, was “measured” in terms of the enlightened principles of 
emancipation, tolerance and freedom of speech (Akkerman, 2005: 346). Much of the LPF‟s success is in 
fact attributed to the party‟s rejection of ethno-nationalism. 
 
3.4.1.6 Euroscepticism 
Populist fears over a loss of national sovereignty are also reflected in attitudes towards the European 
Union and questions of European expansion and integration. The recent expansion of the EU to include 
eight new eastern European members in 2004, and in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania, has been a contentious 
issue among national populations and one that has been readily taken up by radical right populist parties. 
Declining support for the EU – from 72% in 1990 to 54% in 2005 – has meant that populist opposition to 
the “big bang” EU membership has been well received and effectively employed as a political tool 
(Schori Liang, 2007: 11, 13). Eurosceptics, not outright rejecting the European objective but sceptical of 
the trajectory pursued by the EU, are commonly among populist ranks. Grievances towards the EU 
include its lack of accountability, undemocratic make-up in relation to the unelected Council of Ministers, 
elitist nature of the Brussels political circuit, and the loss of national sovereignty implied by a regional 
European superstate. In 1997, Fortuyn voiced his opinions in this regard when he referred to Europe as 
“soulless” and a “distant, bureaucratic monster” (Schori Liang, 2007: 11). In keeping with ethno-cultural 
proclivities, the populist right supports the existence of a united Europe insofar as it is founded upon the 
core values of Western and European civilisations – a “Europe for the Europeans” – where sovereignty is 
not invested at the regional, supra-national, or even state levels, but lies with cultural communities (Schori 
Liang, 2007: 12). 
 
Thanks to the internet and real-time access to information, the previously marginal populist radical right 
is able to articulate its message on an equal footing to mainstream parties (Schori Liang, 2007: 6). 
Growing European mistrust and scepticism for the political establishment has seen voters avenging 
themselves via “electoral rebellion” against corrupt elites, particularly in Eastern European states (Carle, 
2006: 73). A 2006 Eurobarometer report found that of all EU citizens, 32% trusted their parliament, 28% 
their government, and 14% their political parties (Schori Liang, 2007: 6). Many parties consider EU 
membership to serve the interests of national governments rather than those of citizens, who themselves 
are obliged to fund initiatives of which they do not necessarily reap the benefits. The populist radical right 
has been instrumental in fostering this sense of suspicion and mistrust among electorates. 
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Like Fortuyn, Wilders is also a Eurosceptic and indicative of his favourable attitude towards a 
nationalistic agenda, he supports the idea of “old Netherlands” as opposed to a borderless Europe. 
Wilders was instrumental in leading a successful campaign in the Netherlands against the European 
Union Constitutional Treaty, which was endorsed by the Dutch government (Wolin, 2011: 60). In a 2005 
referendum, 62% of Dutch voters did indeed opt to “Vote No” against the ratification of the treaty, as 
Wilders‟ campaign had urged (Carle, 2006: 73). It was feared that the establishment of a consolidated 
constitution for Europe would have required further relinquishing of state sovereignty to a regional 
“European superstate”. Carle (2006: 73) notes that Wilders‟ success in this regard reflects mounting 
distrust towards mainstream politics, evidenced by the fact that many Dutch citizens voted against the 
draft constitution precisely because their government was in support of it – the same government that had 
been so adamant that immigration would result in tolerance and a natural convergence of values. The 
Lisbon Treaty that came into effect in December 2009 is the amendment of earlier treaties and includes 
many of the reforms proposed by the draft constitution. 
 
3.4.1.7 Immigration 
The PVV is one of several anti-immigration and anti-Islam parties in Western Europe making gains in a 
country traditionally associated with a liberal social outlook (The Economist, 2010: 78). Intensified 
immigration from Eastern Europe, and after the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, boosted radical right 
populist parties‟ anti-immigration agendas. Confronting the EU is the fact that a cohesive immigration 
policy was not developed before opening and expanding borders with the Schengen arrangement and “big 
bang enlargement” (Schori Liang, 2007: 18). Immigration induces ethno-pluralist fears about the loss of 
traditional cultural values and these prevalent threat perceptions essentially revolve around cultural issues. 
International migration is increasingly deemed a security risk and reports on human trafficking and illegal 
immigration compound negative perceptions of immigration, causing a loss of faith in the capacity of 
politicians to tackle these problems. Many consider that European immigration levels have reached their 
point of saturation (Schori Liang, 2007: 18). Extensive media coverage of immigrants and asylum seekers 
has increased voter support for parties that traditionally “own” such issues and it has been suggested that 
the populist radical right has achieved its greatest success with regards to the immigration question, 
obliging even moderate parties to assume more rightist positions on the issue (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 
652; Schori Liang, 2007: 19). 
 
Defending a “diluted” national identity has become increasingly politicised, where accommodation of 
cultural diversity is considered to result in natives becoming a “colonised people” in their own country 
(Peters in Betz, 2005: 34). Western states‟ “new political cleavage” is seen to be this tension between 
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multiculturalism and national identity, where party competition no longer fits neatly into a succinct left-
right divide between Marxism and Liberalism (Betz, 2005: 34; Schori Liang, 2007: 29). Resolving the 
immigration problem is considered the most effective strategy in preventing the erosion of national 
identity. The anti-immigration frames of radical right-wing parties frequently refer to immigrants as a 
threat to national identity; as a significant source of crime, unemployment and social instability; and as 
exploiters of over-generous welfare states, implying less benefit for “natives” (Rydgren, 2008: 739, 746). 
Assessing the degree to which these frames reflect attitudes of radical right supporters and whether these 
frames influence the electorate‟s decisions to vote for the radical right, Rydgren‟s (2008: 739) study 
shows that frames associating criminality with social instability are most effective in mobilising electoral 
support for the radical right. These parties‟ anti-immigration stances often lead to conclusions that such 
attitudes account for electoral success, but anti-immigration belongs to a host of other core right-wing 
concerns (Rydgren, 2008: 740). 
 
Van der Veer (2006: 115) looks to Dutch cultural politics to explain the public‟s embrace of populism in 
the era of Fortuyn, and now Wilders. This cultural politics is seen to thrive off public desires and anxieties 
that allegedly render the Dutch incapacitated in managing the forces of globalisation and immigration. 
The turn from “technocratic politics” to the “emotional side of mass politics” occurred sometime around 
the end on the 1990s with the interruption of the “collective well-being”: public anger towards the 
continued socio-economic marginalisation of Turks and Moroccans living off welfare, and increasing 
numbers of asylum seekers who, upon the rejection of applications, continued to stay in the country as 
illegal immigrants (van der Veer, 2006: 116). The uniting factor was seen to be Islam and religion quickly 
became regarded as the cause of these social ailments. With mainstream parties‟ reluctance to politicise 
the issue, the question of immigration was exploited by Fortuyn who recognised the growing backlash 
against migration and globalisation. In addition to the mainstream‟s loss of domestic credibility in dealing 
with these issues, the country also suffered an erosion of international standing with the 1995 Srebrenica 
tragedy in which over 7000 Muslim men were killed under the watch of the Dutch UN battalion 
(Dutchbat), mandated to protect them (van der Veer, 2006: 117). Mainstream Dutch parties had also 
reached the end of their political tether trying to cope with the economic downturn and the political 
instability affecting the international economy. In this climate, Fortuyn gained ground by appealing to the 
festering concerns of the populace. 
 
Fortuyn owed much of his success as a populist to the amalgamation of disparate concerns under the 
blanket question of the “foreigners issue” (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 404, 405). Topics as 
diverse as asylum policy, criminality, law and order, the welfare state and Islam‟s threat to Dutch identity 
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and culture came to be seen as a single problem. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the foreigners issue 
assumed heightened significance. In October 2001, 17% of Leefbaar Nederland supporters (Fortuyn‟s 
party before founding the LPF) supported more stringent asylum policy; five months later, 52% of LPF 
voters were in favour of such measures. These tougher public attitudes are indicative of the populist 
right‟s ability not only to feed off public discontent, but also to be instrumental in its creation (Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 405). 
 
3.4.1 The Global Financial Crisis and the Populist Radical Right 
The electoral advances of the new wave of radical right-wing parties in Western Europe need to be 
contextually situated in terms of fundamental socio-economic and socio-cultural transformations that 
have jostled entrenched political and institutional structures in liberal capitalist democracies (Betz, 2005: 
38). These potentially destabilising processes legitimise the ethnocratic agenda of the populist right, 
accounting for why electorates in Western European countries have dismissed accusations of extremism 
associated with such parties and regard them as valid democratic competition (Betz, 2005: 38). Though 
enhanced socio-economic pressure brought on by the global financial crisis is only one explanation for 
the populist right‟s success in recent years, it is a particularly relevant consideration for this thesis in light 
of the hypotheses expounded by Realistic Group Conflict Theory that inform this discussion. As the 
previous chapter showed however, debate on Dutch national identity, integration and immigration policy 
over the last two to three decades suggests more to the growing appeal of the Dutch far-right than 
explanations of economic hardship. Similarly, some authors are critical of explanations of far-right 
support that deny the role populist radical parties themselves have in shaping their own success. Party 
characteristics such as leadership, organisation and ideology are important criteria for success and render 
rightist parties far more than mere “dependent variables, passively moulded by structural factors” (Mudde 
in Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 779). It is thus misguided to dismiss this trend purely as an articulation of 
political dissatisfaction: this “protest explanation” has been shown to be inadequate in accounting for 
contemporary support for such parties, and both ideological and pragmatic considerations among voters 
come into play when determining electoral preferences (see Bos and van der Brug, 2010) (Betz, 2005: 
32). 
 
As illustrated in the Dutch case, politicians have been obliged to seek new alliance partners in parties that 
do not share their policy goals; governments of “fractious coalitions” are consequently forced to assume a 
“hybrid course”, formulating policies that do not necessarily correspond tidily with old ideologies and do 
not reflect clear-cut, left-right principles (Ghitis, 2011). The formation of such “unwholesome new 
alliances” between centrist and right-wing parties may represent “the most dramatic development of the 
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2010 electoral season” (Wolin, 2010: 63). The strategy undertaken by the VVD and CDA, to allow the 
PVV to prop up the minority Dutch government, is considered a more stable approach in that it may 
ultimately “tame the wilder side of Mr Wilders”, although again it could afford him “power without 
responsibility” (The Economist, 2010: 78). It has also been suggested that bringing members of far-right 
parties into cabinet would serve to expose their ideas and personalities to the ultimate tests of reality and 
public scrutiny, thereby tempering the worst extremities (The Economist, 2011: 78). 
 
In the heat of the global financial crisis, the June 2009 EU parliamentary elections witnessed a record 
number of protest parties elected, as national governing parties found themselves at the mercy of 
discontented electorates and experienced significant losses. Increasing support for far-right parties has 
therefore not only been witnessed at the level of national party politics, but also has implications for the 
governing of the EU. Whilst economic cost-benefit analysis on the part of voters is certainly a significant 
explanation – indeed, one of the most dominant – for understanding European voting patterns, it does not 
fully account for the way in which voter dissatisfaction was expressed: via increasing support for centre-
right and far right-wing parties rather than the political left, which suffered major setbacks (Cremona, 
2010). In addition to the PVV which secured 17% of the Dutch vote making it the largest Dutch political 
party in the EU parliament, far-right, nationalistic and anti-immigrant parties in Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Britain and Finland all experienced significant gains, resulting in a record representation of 
Europe‟s far-right in the European Parliament (Cremona, 2010). Far-right parties also made important 
gains in Slovakia, Latvia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, France and Italy. The racist British National Party 
secured two seats and although Austria‟s Freedom Party emerged with a mere 13% of the Austrian vote, 
the October 2010 Vienna city elections saw the party attaining 27% (Wolin, 2011: 61). The noticeably 
weaker performance of social democratic parties, generally outperformed by their centre-right rivals, 
prompted the remark from one observer that it was a “sad evening for social democracy in Europe” 
(Schulz in Wolin, 2011: 61). 
 
3.5 DEMOCRACY, LIBERALISM AND THE DUTCH POPULIST RIGHT-WING 
 
The co-optation of several radical right-wing populist parties into government coalitions in recent years 
suggests that these groups need to be taken seriously and their impact upon policy critically considered. 
Both the presence and relative performance of these parties in national and regional politics serve as 
indicators of the “health” of representative systems: populist mobilisation suggests an erosion of 
representative democracy where electorates perceive elites as incompetent (Betz, 2005: 26). This 
indication of overall democratic health is also seen as serving a “healing function” for representative 
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democracy, where populist expression of dissatisfaction points to potential areas for reform, providing 
opportunity to strengthen democratic vitality (Akkerman, 2005: 338). This understanding interprets 
populism as a response to contexts of socio-cultural transformation and as a product of “change, crisis and 
challenge”: populism is thus not a feature of stable political systems (Schori Liang, 2007: 5). It has also 
been suggested that (yet another) central paradox to this latest wave of populist radical right and 
nationalist parties is that their re-emergence has not been a result of liberalism‟s shortcomings in the post-
communist era, but rather a product of its success (Schori Liang, 2007: 16). “Liberal” efforts to deepen 
regional cooperation and integration by fostering economic wellbeing under the European Union, and 
security and democracy under NATO, were portrayed as incontestably desirable and necessary policies by 
liberal establishments. National citizens were in effect denied the occasion to communicate public 
attitudes towards such “supra-national” concerns and the resentment this has bred has provided essential 
fodder for hungry populists (Schori Liang, 2007: 16). 
 
The solution of the populist right to public dissatisfaction and the challenges inherent in liberal 
democracy has been to advance an interpretation of democracy in the form of a plebiscitarian model for 
the political system in which the will of the people is paramount (Betz, 2005: 38). The very fact of 
proposing institutional changes and transformations to the way policy is made is considered 
fundamentally anti-liberal and anti-system: in liberal democracies where the “system” refers to the 
“democratic system”, radical right populism is therefore ipso facto undemocratic, according to Betz 
(2005: 26, 38). Populism‟s adoption of a “pseudo-democratic charade” and of perverted democratic 
principles to undermine democracy with democracy, are seen as further indicators of threat: coupled with 
a generally oppositional and belligerent stance, this is suggestive of a destabilising effect on liberal 
democratic representative systems (Betz, 2005: 26).  
 
However, the perspective that populism thrives off perceptions about political elites being out of touch 
with the populations on behalf of whom they stand, suggests that populist right parties are less a threat to 
democracy per se than an important test of representative democracy (Betz, 2005: 27). In the context of 
the most recent wave of radical right populist parties in Western Europe, Akkerman, (2005: 338) similarly 
contends that these parties should rather be considered hostile to the “liberal concepts of representative 
democracy” and not to democracy as such. In addition to rejecting the oligarchic and elitist dimensions of 
representative democracy, populists oppose pluralist democracy which also challenges the pre-eminence 
of the “people‟s will”. The democratic implications of right-wing “populism” appear less pressing an 
issue in the Dutch context, however: the PVV, as the LPF previously, has been regarded as more 
“populist” than “right-wing” and more “anti-immigration” than “populist” (Fennema in Akkerman, 2005: 
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340). Whilst the LPF‟s grievances lay more with immigration than democracy, a populist-inspired attack 
on representative politics has nevertheless informed its anti-immigration ideology (Akkerman, 2005: 
340). The contemporary Dutch populist right is “generally compatible” with the basic and formal precepts 
of democracy: indeed, in the Dutch liberal democratic state, it is a prerequisite that anti-immigration 
parties be seen to identify with democracy in order to be deemed politically viable contenders (Bos and 
van der Brug: 2010; Akkerman, 2005: 337). 
 
At the heart of liberal democracies is the conviction that the will of the people needs to be constrained by 
the rule of law and the constitution, which protect minorities from the “tyranny” of majority “mob rule” 
(Betz, 2005: 38). These provisions for minority protection are upheld by specialists and the “necessary 
evil” that is the political elite. When necessary, it is the duty of the courts to uphold the impartial rule of 
law should the majority push for actions that are unconstitutional: the aforementioned example of 
Fortuyn‟s “hierarchy of principles” and rejection of the anti-discrimination article in the Dutch 
constitution in the name of free speech, is a relevant illustration of unconstitutional tendencies. 
Prioritising state neutrality and secularism over religious freedom further indicates a strategy of 
“ordering” one liberal norm above another. Wilders‟ inflammatory statements about Islam also walk a 
very fine line between “free speech” and “hate speech”. The will of the people and the populists that 
“represent” it, cannot always be depended on to determine action and policy: demands need to be subject 
to legal checks. Whilst the people‟s will is important in theory, it is not of the utmost importance and this 
inherent tension between the rule of law and the popular will of the people stems from representative 
democracy‟s “inherently oligarchic dimension” (Papadopoulos in Betz, 2005: 38). 
 
It is in light of this perceived “imbalance” that populists promote more direct forms of democracy with 
legislative power to the people. The notion of non-elected judges as a balancing power is thus contrary to 
the populist idea, which implies populist opposition to a neo-liberal understanding of democracy 
(Akkerman, 2005: 339). Where the rule of law is based on the will of the people and also performs a 
constraining function that keeps impulsive decisions in check, the popular and liberal pillars of modern 
West-European democracies are not necessarily irreconcilable. Although populists tend not to regard the 
rule of law as supreme, it is necessary to establish whether the implication is that populism is outright 
anti-liberal or merely represents a challenge to constitutionalism. To the extent that radical right populist 
parties do not acknowledge the “restraining” function of the rule of law and are opposed outright to the 
constitutional structure of liberal democracy, favouring instead the direct, unfettered expression of 
popular will, they are “extremist” and anti-liberal (Akkerman, 2005: 339, 340).  
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Betz (2005: 36) understands the populist right‟s fixation on multiculturalism, citizenship and immigration 
as a fundamental threat to liberal democracy, a threat which is largely obscured by attacks on liberal 
democracy being made in the name of defending the very norms and values that are undermined: as the 
Council of Europe put it in a January 2000 report, thereby “using democracy‟s own weapons to fight it 
more effectively” (Betz, 2005: 26). As shown previously, debate on these issues in the Netherlands is of 
national scope and is not the exclusive purview of the right. In an effort to explain the extent to which 
defending liberal values was a true concern of the LPF, which cast itself as a “guardian” of values such as 
free speech, the separation of church and state, and equality of the sexes, Akkerman (2005: 337) suggests 
that the type of nationalism espoused by the radical right indicates the degree of compatibility with 
liberalism. The LPF‟s civic and culturally pluralist “liberal nationalism”, with ideological roots in the 
French Revolution, was “Jacobin” in the sense of being militant and radical (Akkerman, 2005: 346). This 
brand of nationalism is considered compatible with liberalism, whereas organicist and ethnocratic 
nationalism is anti-liberal, extremist and generally incompatible with liberalism, despite claims to 
“defend” core values (Akkerman, 2005: 342). The Vlaams Blok and Austrian Freedom Party are seen to 
fall into this latter category of radical right parties. Whilst the ethnocratic ideology of Belgium‟s Vlaams 
Blok is reflected in the party‟s calls to expel immigrants and establish a culturally homogenous nation, the 
Netherlands‟ LPF and PVV did and do consider radical integration via assimilation as the only feasible 
option (Akkerman, 2005: 343). Along with the conservative-liberal VVD (a liberal party in which 
nationalist priorities assume heightened importance during real or perceived crisis), these Dutch parties 
are not simply “rightist” parties and are (or were) “leftist” with respect to stances on certain ethical 
concerns such as abortion, euthanasia, sexual rights and state neutrality.  
 
The LPF was seen to be motivated by a “liberalism of fear”: an innate belief that supposedly “universal” 
liberal principles and natural rights were unrealisable in societies with regimes and ideologies hostile and 
not dynamic enough to be receptive to them (Akkerman, 2005: 347). The fear of despotism and of Islamic 
culture, deemed particularly antagonistic to liberal principles, has caused some to moderate liberalism‟s 
universalist aspirations and see liberal principles as rooted in the Enlightenment and in the West‟s Judeo-
Christian heritage, which separates the West from Islam (Akkerman, 2005: 347). Fortuyn was one such 
politician who turned “liberalism inward”, causing it to assume a defensive, culturally relativist and 
nationalist character whereby he defended national borders for fear that a hostile foreign cultural threat 
would lead to the downfall of Dutch culture and society, not unlike the scenario that led to the ultimate 
downfall of the Roman Empire (Akkerman, 2005: 347). Contrary to Betz then, this interpretation sees 
anti-immigration critique of liberalism as a denial of universal rights rather than as a rejection of the rule 
of law (Akkerman, 2005: 341). 
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Although the LPF failed as a party, it has had a huge impact on the Dutch political scene and its 
ideological legacy has influenced both the liberal VVD and PVV. The LPF showed that the combination 
of a liberalism of fear with militant and radical civic nationalism can be highly effective in mobilising 
broad support for anti-immigration policies (Akkerman, 2005: 351). Although Akkerman‟s (2005) 
research was conducted prior to the emergence of the PVV on the political scene (at the time of 
Akkerman‟s research, Wilders was likely still a member of the VVD, having established the PVV in 
2005), the categorisation of the LPF as a liberal nationalist, anti-immigration party supportive of a radical 
civic nationalism appears fitting to the PVV, which has filled the ideological vacuum left by the now-
defunct LPF. Extending this analysis to Wilders‟ Freedom Party, it would appear reasonable to assert that 
the PVV is similarly compatible with liberalism, and radically so. The LPF and PVV‟s support for a 
strictly secular tradition of tolerance is however a threat to the country‟s tradition of tolerating religious 
diversity, an almost constant feature of consecutive coalitions in the Netherlands since 1917 (Akkerman, 
2005: 351). The ambivalence about the liberal freedoms enjoyed since the 1960s is also reflected in the 
way that the Dutch value the freedoms afforded to them privately, but want these range of personal 
options to be accompanied by more restrictive rules in the public sphere. Religious customs, with their 
overt expression in both the private and public realms, present a challenge to this distinction (van der 
Veer, 2006: 122). 
 
3.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The political successes of the LPF and PVV, as well as Fortuyn and Wilders‟ propulsion into the public 
spotlight in the Netherlands, reflect(ed) a persisting and reckonable grassroots revolt against mainstream 
parties and political elites too mindful of electoral risks to tackle sensitive cultural identity issues and to 
stray from a purportedly naïve faith in multiculturalism to achieve social harmony. Whilst the political 
elite fulfils a crucial function, current tensions in the Netherlands and in liberal democracies elsewhere 
suggest that politicians need to take greater heed of citizens‟ concerns. The growing electoral appeal of 
populism evinces a crisis of political legitimacy and citizens‟ perceptions that demands can only be heard 
by turning to charismatic demagogues is an indication that established parties would be well advised to 
perform better in terms of upholding their end of the “social contract” and representing the very people 
with whom they enter into this understood “agreement”. Far-right populism‟s anti-Islam motivations are a 
particularly noteworthy development in a country where the inward-looking and exclusive liberalism that 
has emerged appears so starkly contradictory to traditional images of the Netherlands not only as a 
multicultural haven, but as a country that has had centuries of experience in accommodating religious 
pluralism. 
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Fortuyn and Wilders have ensured that today, the parameters of what is permissible in public and political 
debate concerning Islam have widened markedly. The Dutch immigration, integration and Islam debates 
have assumed increasingly cultural and ideological undertones, so much so that Wilders‟ recent acquittal 
for hate speech would be almost unthinkable a decade or two ago. This chapter has positioned the 
discussion of the Dutch relationship with Islam within wider cultural transformations including 
depillarisation, a shift away from Calvinist frugality to a culture of consumption and permissiveness, and 
heightened global attention to Islam‟s perceived incompatibility with liberal democracy and the forces of 
modernity. This chapter‟s chiefly ideological focus has emphasised the cultural clash between Islam and 
Western liberalism, but has also observed competing core values and intrinsic paradoxes within liberalism 
itself. This examination of the relationship between Islam, right-wing populism and Dutch liberal 
democratic political culture has distanced itself from suggestions that it is “immigrant culture” that needs 
to be deconstructed and scrutinised in order to adapt and coincide with dominant values, whilst “majority 
culture” is a given (van der Veer, 2006: 122). This chapter has instead placed particular emphasis on 
observing Dutch political culture in a critical light, seeing these values as subject to change and 
redefinition. The next chapter discusses the economic impact of the global financial crisis on the 
Netherlands in greater detail, in addition to analysing patterns in Dutch voting behaviour since 1989.  
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Chapter 4. The Global Financial Crisis and Patterns of Voting Behaviour in the Netherlands: Economic 
and Electoral Volatility 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The first section of this chapter looks at economic and financial developments in the Netherlands in the 
context of the global financial crisis. Consideration of the real impacts of the global financial crisis on the 
Dutch economy is necessary for contextualising the discussion presented in the following chapter, on 
trends in Dutch anti-immigration sentiments both prior and subsequent to the onset of the global 
economic meltdown. The theoretical framework employed to analyse these public sentiments, Realistic 
Group Conflict Theory, emphasises the role of competitive threat perspectives in shaping intergroup 
attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 318). Perceived threat, stemming from real or indeed perceived 
competition over scarce group resources, is therefore of central relevance to this exploration of negative 
intergroup attitudes. The first section of this chapter thus delves briefly into these actual economic and 
material circumstances in which competition and threat perceptions may be located in the present 
conditions. Recent trends within the Dutch financial and export sectors are observed, in addition to 
patterns of growth since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. The effects of immigration as 
such on the Dutch economy, in terms of impact upon natives‟ wages and employment opportunities, or 
the access of native Dutch to social welfare benefits, are beyond the purview of this research (see Longhi 
et al. 2010a; Longhi et al. 2010b and Zorlu and Hartog 2005 for more information on these effects). 
 
The political implications of this tumultuous macro-economic context are of particular interest to this 
thesis. Economic issues assumed heightened electoral significance in the political campaigns leading up 
to the 2010 Dutch general elections, overshadowing somewhat but certainly not displacing public 
concerns about immigration and integration, which have come to dominate and define Dutch party 
politics over the course of the last decade especially. The Dutch electorate‟s mobilisation along both 
economic and cultural lines has reflected in patterns of voting behaviour and electoral outcomes; the 
second section of this chapter thus observes voting trends in the Netherlands, from 1989 to the most 
recent Dutch general elections in 2010. The electoral effects of historical processes peculiar to Dutch 
society, including pillarisation, secularisation, the rise of the welfare state, and the decline of the 
traditional “system” parties – or Volksparteien – are also considered.  
 
Examining patterns in electoral outcomes enables appreciation of that aspect of public sentiment that is 
reflected in trends in voting behaviour and the changing distribution of power among political parties 
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from one election to the next. Whilst the next chapter looks at intergroup attitudes as reflected overtly in 
opinion polls and surveys, the ballot sheet offers an alternative platform for the expression of popular 
sentiment. This explicitly political manifestation of public attitudes is thus considered complimentary to 
the results of public opinion surveys presented in Chapter Five. Observing trends in electoral support also 
enables comparison with the results of opinion polls, making it possible to determine whether 
increasingly negative self-reported attitudes towards foreigners coincide with higher levels of support for 
parties promoting a distinctively anti-immigration agenda. This demonstrates the way in which public 
sentiment and politics are reflected in one other in a democracy.  
 
4.2 THE NETHERLANDS AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 
The Dutch economy is somewhat exceptional for its “hybrid character”: combining a strong and well-
developed welfare state with an “Anglo-American-oriented economy” that subscribes extensively to a 
neoliberal, market-driven and deregulated model (Engelen and Musterd, 2010: 701, 703, 704). The 
Netherlands‟ internationally-geared economy, where more than two thirds of the country‟s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) is earned beyond its borders, is characterised by large financial corporations, 
deep and liquid capital markets, a funded pension system, an export-dependent manufacturing industry 
and a large services sector that is responsible for more than 70% of total employment (Engelen and 
Musterd, 2010: 702). It has been argued that the recent economic and financial turmoil has confronted the 
country with a “triple whammy”: a rapid and sheer decline in the contribution of the financial sector to the 
country‟s overall GDP, a crisis to the Netherlands‟ extensive funded pension system which affects over 
90% of workers, and an abrupt drop in global consumption which has taken a sharp knock out of the 
country‟s export-geared economy (Engelen et al. 2010: 69). 
 
4.2.1 A Highly Open and Internationally-Oriented Economy 
The Netherlands was particularly hard-hit by slumps in world trade, contracting export markets, and 
declining consumer confidence during the global financial crisis (Cremona 2010; Masselink and van den 
Noord, 2009: 2). As one of the most open and export-dependent economies in Europe, the Netherlands 
has been particularly susceptible to the effects of international economic and market turmoil. The 
country‟s total exports in goods and services account for 80% of GDP, two times the European average, 
and the relationship between trade and growth in the country is directly proportional (Masselink and van 
den Noord, 2009: 3). Absolutely, the country is the largest European exporter per volume after France and 
Germany and the centrality of the external sector to the Dutch economy has been reflected over the course 
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of the last three to four years in the way that the Netherlands has been especially sensitive to variation in 
world trade (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 3).  
 
In addition to the Netherlands‟ substantial export sector, the country‟s international-looking financial 
sector and its elaborate pension fund system have also been heavily influenced by movements in external 
markets, further heightening the susceptibility of the Dutch economy to global developments. The 
Netherlands has the largest capital markets relative to GDP of all Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) members – larger even than the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Engelen et al., 2010: 58). At the outset of the crisis, Dutch banks had the highest exposure in Europe to 
American financial markets, at 66% of GDP, whilst the average exposure of European banks was under 
30% of GDP (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 3). Dutch banks‟ aggregate foreign claims during this 
period were in excess of 300% of GDP – the largest in the EU in percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
and again, more than double the European average of 135% of GDP (Masselink and van den Noord, 
2009: 3). Despite this large foreign financial exposure however, the contribution of the financial sector to 
the Dutch economy is limited, at 6% of GDP, since the external sector contributes most to the Dutch 
economy (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 3; Engelen and Musterd, 2010: 701). The Netherlands‟ 
internationally-oriented financial sector meant that it was in effect “hit twice”: by the 2008 credit crunch 
and the subsequent 2009 global economic slowdown (Engelen and Musterd, 2010: 701). This impact on 
the financial services sector resulted in the nationalisation of the Dutch banks ABN Amro and the Dutch 
branch of Fortis. Support was also given to ING and several other banks, an operation that cost the 
country almost 40% of GDP (Engelen and Musterd, 2010: 701).  
 
The strong downturn in 2008 thus led to a strong policy response by the Dutch government which 
implemented three recovery packages with several stimulus provisions. The Netherlands‟ remarkably low 
government debt at the outset of the crisis gave the country a favourable “starting position” and enabled 
the Dutch government to pursue ambitious measures to stabilise financial markets, contributing over EUR 
80 billion into the banking system (Engelen and Musterd, 2010: 705). The first two packages were 
adopted at the end of 2008 and start of 2009; the third, in March 2009, was almost double the combined 
size of the previous two. The total stimulus worth of these packages was around 2% of GDP and targeted 
those areas most susceptible to the crisis, including household purchasing power, employment protection 
and private and public investment (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2009). Reducing corporate taxes and 
the social contributions of employees were included to limit the reduction of the economy, support 
financial institutions and stabilise financial markets (EC Economic Forecast Spring 2009; EC Economic 
Forecast Spring 2010). Though government assistance to financial institutions was partially repaid at the 
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end of 2009, financial institutions in the Netherlands are still vulnerable (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 
2010). These massive state investments to strengthen the financial system have accumulated substantial 
budget deficits, necessitating a more restrictive policy approach for the future (Engelen and Musterd, 
2010: 705, 707). The task of budgetary consolidation has fallen upon the incumbent government headed 
by the pro-austerity, conservative VVD. From 2011, government intends to terminate the fiscal stimulus 
package introduced and to promote strong budgetary correction measures (EC Economic Forecast, 
Autumn 2010).  
 
The financial crisis led to a considerable decline in stock markets globally. Dutch households‟ 
investments were however limited, reaching about 40% of GDP in 2007 which was comparatively low in 
Europe (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 4). This figure does however discount the indirect holding 
of stocks via occupational pension funds which are exceedingly high in the Netherlands – indeed the 
highest in Europe. A strong association between a well-developed funded pension system and deep, liquid 
and sophisticated financial markets is noted: both total assets and the contribution of pension funds are 
exceptionally high in the Netherlands (Engelen et al., 2010: 59, 65). Dutch households‟ large pension 
savings funds and assets implicate them deeply in the “financialisation” of the country, and they are thus 
highly dependent on invested savings and insurances (Engelen et al., 2010: 62). In non-crisis periods, this 
elaborate funded pension scheme is a massive boon, indicating that the country‟s ageing population is 
saving for the future. The financial crisis has however had a significantly detrimental effect on these 
pension fund assets which lost about EUR 70 billion – 12% of GDP – in the space of about one year, a 
loss of wealth that is indirectly shouldered by households via higher premiums or lower pension 
disbursements (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 4). Decline in Dutch household wealth via this 
occupational pension system adversely impacts private consumption and thus economic growth. There 
has however been a lack of public outcry in response to an impending pension crisis in the country, 
suggesting a broad acceptance of continued financialisation (Engelen et al., 2010: 69). 
 
Dutch households and corporations are both relatively dependent on bank loans. This high level of 
indebtedness has seen Dutch banks repeatedly restricting the conditions under which credit may be 
borrowed, making the process of financing corporations through bank loans difficult. The Netherlands‟ 
high dependence on bank credit thus makes the country susceptible to variations in credit conditions 
(Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 4). In 2009, the Dutch housing market did not appear significantly 
affected, as overvaluation has steadily disappeared during the course of the last decade. Housing prices 
were reported to have come down by about 5% in 2009, and were expected to be negatively affected by 
uncertainty about future earnings and wealth, as well as by anticipations that housing prices would 
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deteriorate (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 5). Whilst the full financial implications of the credit 
crisis are somewhat difficult to appreciate at this stage, Engelen and Musterd (2010: 705) write that the 
economic repercussions of the crises are more “clear-cut, straightforward and substantial”. 
 
4.2.2 Patterns of Growth: 2007 – 2011 
Given the Netherlands‟ very low unemployment rate, its considerable and stable current account surplus, 
low level of government debt, as well as its budget surplus at the outset of the financial crisis, the Dutch 
economy was initially thought reasonably well-positioned to ride out the worst of the storm (Masselink 
and van den Noord, 2009: 1, 6). Indeed, it initially appeared largely unaffected by the volatility across the 
Atlantic, though the fact of the highly open Dutch economy did suggest that it was only a matter of time 
before the negative repercussions of the turmoil abroad would reflect in bank balances, consumer 
confidence and domestic demand – areas in which the Dutch economy has been made particularly 
vulnerable. 
 
Economic growth in 2007 was strong at 3.5% (the average within the euro region was 2.75%), and 
marked the highest since the beginning of the century for the Netherlands (EC Interim Forecast, February 
2008). The main engine behind this growth was a healthy domestic demand and positive international 
environment promoting strong export growth (EC Interim Forecast, February 2008; EC Economic 
Forecast, Autumn 2007). In 2007, the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), a measure of 
consumer price inflation, was relatively low at 1.6%, making the Netherlands one of the best-faring 
countries in the EU in this respect (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2008). The labour market in 2007 was 
exceptionally tight, with a high unfilled vacancy rate approximately totalling the unemployment rate. 
Whilst this usually drives wages up, the flexibility of the labour force, comprising large numbers of part-
time and temporary workers able to adjust supply to economic circumstance, meant that drastic wage 
increases were not experienced. Dutch corporations have traditionally battled to attract and retain 
qualified workers due to this tight labour market and employers have thus been unwilling to let go of 
labour during periods of decreased demand, giving rise to the phenomenon of “labour hoarding” 
(Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 6; EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2010; EC Economic Forecast, 
Autumn 2010). This has tempered the low unemployment rate, around 3% and the lowest in Europe at the 
outset of the crisis, at which point the Netherlands also boasted one of the highest current account 
surpluses in Europe, at 10% of GDP (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 5, 6; EC Interim Forecast, 
September 2007). 
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Considerably reduced economic activity was witnessed in 2008. Though average GDP increased by 2.1%, 
this was principally the result of a carry-over of the unusually high growth experienced in the second half 
of 2007 (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2008; EC Interim Forecast, January 2009; EC Economic 
Forecast, Spring 2009). The initial effects of the recession into which the Dutch economy slipped in 2008 
were therefore obscured at first and were not immediate: the tight labour market performed strongly with 
the unemployment rate even dropping to 2.8%; regarding public finances, the government budget still 
reported a 0.7% of GDP surplus (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2008; EC Interim Forecast, September 
2008; EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2009). The second quarter of 2008 did however report the lowest 
quarterly growth since 2005 and unemployment rose in the last quarter for the first time since the start of 
2005 (EC Interim Forecast, September 2008; EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2008; EC Economic 
Forecast, Spring 2009). Substantially increased registration levels at higher educational institutions for the 
2008/2009 academic year may have reflected the considerable “discouraged worker effect” in the 
Netherlands – continued studies serving to postpone labour market participation – although a 1990 baby 
boom (resulting in an almost 5% increase in the number of births) may also have been a factor, since this 
age group turned 18 in 2008 (Beets and Willekens, 2009: 8).  
 
The Netherlands‟ flexible labour market and low dependency on foreign capital meant that structurally, 
the country‟s economic wellbeing was comparatively good (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 1). In 
spite of labour market shortages, wage demands were restrained: attributed to government‟s offer to lower 
social contributions in exchange for lower wage demands from unions (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 
2008). Uncertainty about unemployment further subdued wage demands, as did the fact that prior wage 
agreements had been conducted during a period when economic growth was assumed to be positive and 
inflation high (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2008; EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2009). Along with 
low unemployment; high participation in the labour market; current account surpluses limiting 
dependency on foreign capital; government‟s budget surpluses, and low levels of debt enabling 
intervention in financial markets, the prospects of the Dutch economy making a sustained recovery were 
considered relatively strong, though the need for substantial and tough fiscal adjustment was recognised 
(Masselink and van den Noord (2009: 6, 7). From the second half of 2008, the effects of the crisis were 
felt most keenly in the export sector and its impact on the Dutch economy began to appear more 
significant than initially presumed (Engelen and Musterd, 2010: 701; EC Interim Forecast, September 
2008). Traditional strengths of the Dutch economy, such as its funded pension system and strong position 
in world trade, increasingly appeared to be sources of weakness that heavily compromised consumption 
and investment. A subdued 2008 consumer price index of 2.2% was largely due to a lag in time taken for 
higher raw material prices to reflect in consumer prices (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2008; EC 
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Economic Forecast, Spring 2009). Oil and gas prices in the Netherlands have delayed effects on inflation 
as energy prices are only adjusted on a bi-annual basis: sudden oil price hikes in the first half of 2008 
were therefore not fully reflected in the 2008 inflation rate (EC Interim Forecast, September 2011). This 
delay only had a limited effect on 2009 inflation, being compensated for by the sharp fall in oil prices at 
the end of 2008 (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2009). 
 
The budget balance benefitted from several measures by the government to up revenue: increasing several 
taxes in mid-2008 including fuel levies and an aviation tax, raising duties on tobacco and alcohol, as well 
as increasing social contributions like health care premiums (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2007; EC 
Economic Forecast, Spring 2009). Despite the Netherlands‟ positive trade balance in 2008 suggesting a 
favourable competitive position, Dutch price and cost competitiveness had declined since 2000 as a result 
of unit labour costs increasing more steeply relative to surrounding countries. This was more the result of 
rising compensation for employees than productivity gains and though wages were moderated in 2004 
and 2005, the generally tight labour market in the Netherlands benefitted employees by driving wages 
upwards (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2009).  
 
Economic activity in 2009 saw a marked contraction of 4%, concentrated within the first half of the year, 
and the second quarter was the fifth consecutive quarter to witness a drop in GDP (EC Interim Forecast, 
September 2009). Both exports and imports contracted abruptly as was to be expected given the Dutch 
economy‟s sensitivity to global trade developments and variations in international demand: net exports 
made a negative contribution to growth in the first half of 2009 and a positive contribution in the second 
half (EC Interim Forecast, February 2009). This rebound in the latter half of 2009 was mainly due to a 
revival in global trade and the rejuvenation of exports (Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 5; EC 
Economic Forecast, Spring 2010). Negative effects on wealth were considered to impact consumption 
more significantly in the Netherlands relative to other European states. Until the end of 2008, Dutch 
consumer confidence levels reflected general European patterns, suffering from the economic slowdown 
and financial crisis, but began to decrease more sharply at the start of 2009 (Masselink and van den 
Noord, 2009: 5; EC Interim Forecast, September 2008). Producer confidence levels in the Netherlands 
were thought to have experienced a greater fall relative to other European countries, though this has still 
been higher than the average. These downward trends indicate that Dutch private consumption and 
investment have taken a greater knock than in other European contexts (Masselink and van den Noord, 
2009: 5). 
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Households‟ wealth losses due to falling stock markets and reduced pension fund assets were anticipated 
to result in higher savings rates (EC Interim Forecast, September 2009; EC Economic Forecast, Spring 
2010). An improvement in asset prices, particularly in the stock market at the end of 2009 and first 
quarter of 2010 did however improve households‟ financial positions, impacting positively on pension 
fund assets. These promising trends in the stock market were expected to reduce the need for higher 
premiums or lower pensions and thus boost private consumption, although the wealth position of Dutch 
households was still under pre-crisis levels (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2010). An increase in private 
consumption was projected to reduce the need for precautionary saving and was associated with the 
resilient Dutch labour market: despite loosening in 2009 (as seen by the steep drop in the vacancy rate), 
the low unemployment rate increased only modestly to 3.7% (EC Interim Forecast, September 2009; EC 
Economic Forecast, Spring 2010; EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2010). Unemployment increases had 
been moderated by government‟s part-time working plan, labour flexibility, “labour hoarding”, earlier 
retirement patterns and a drop in labour supply from worker discouragement and continued studies (EC 
Economic Forecast, Autumn 2009; EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2010). These factors allaying 
unemployment growth in 2009 were however generally temporary and unemployment in 2010 increased 
to 4.5% (EC Interim Forecast February 2010; EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). 
 
Whilst benefiting from a reduced Dutch annual contribution to the EU, the sharpest drop in the Dutch 
budget was experienced in 2009, with the modest 2008 surplus turning into a general government deficit 
(EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2010). Measures undertaken by the government to initiate recovery, in 
conjunction with decreasing gas revenues, partly contributed to undermining the budgetary position 
within a short space of time (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2009; EC Economic Forecast, Spring 
2010). In 2009 and 2010, the Dutch government sought to encourage economic recovery by accelerating 
public works to improve infrastructure (Lucardie and Voerman, 2010: 1099). Options for cutbacks 
amounting to approximately €35 billion were identified and whereas the suggestion of getting rid of tax 
relief for housing mortgages was rejected, in October 2009 the cabinet agreed on raising the age for 
receiving general state pensions from 65 to 67 years (Lucardie and Voerman, 2010: 1099, 1100). 
Disagreements meant that the issue was however deferred. 
 
After a deep recession, the first signs of a recovery in the second half of 2009 gave greater momentum to 
growth and positive GDP growth of 1.8% in 2010 was witnessed. The main engine behind this was the 
external sector, thanks to an acceleration in global trade enhancing net exports, though a weak domestic 
demand dampened this gradual recovery by contributing negatively to GDP growth (EC Interim Forecast 
September 2010; EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). Net exports thus improved the trade balance, 
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positively contributing to the current account surplus (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). The third 
quarter of 2010 did however see GDP growth take a considerable knock from stocks, pointing towards a 
more modest recovery than suggested. The economy did nevertheless grow again in the fourth quarter due 
to higher energy consumption during the cold winter (EC Interim Forecast, February 2011; EC Economic 
Forecast, Spring 2011). Though domestic demand improved significantly in the second quarter of 2010 
from investments in equipment, this largely took the form of replacement investment and was not due to 
capacity increases. Improvements over pre-crisis investment levels were thus not achieved and the 
recovery outlook was more moderate than investment suggested (EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2010; 
EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). The annual HICP inflation rate reached an all-time low in the first 
half of 2010 (EC Interim Forecast, September 2010; EC Interim Forecast, February 2011).  
 
The current account balance in 2010 made a strong comeback, returning to the pre-crisis level of over 
6.5% of GDP (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). General government debt mounted from 60.8% of 
GDP in 2009 to 62.7% of GDP in 2010 and is expected to increase only modestly to 63.9% in 2011, 
stabilising around this level in 2012 (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). The reason for this modest 
increase is that banks‟ repayment of state financial support is expected to tone down the increase in the 
debt level stemming from a deficit which continues to be high (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). In 
2009 for instance, Fortis bank repaid a 34 billion euro short term loan totalling about 6% of GDP (EC 
Economic Forecast, Spring 2009). Dutch public finances have experienced an abrupt decline: the 0.6% of 
GDP surplus in 2008 resulted in a 5.4% of GDP deficit in 2009 and though it was expected to worsen 
even further in 2010, the general government balance stabilised at a deficit of 5.4% of GDP (EC 
Economic Forecast, Spring 2011; EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2010). The most significant reason for 
the surplus decline from 2008 to 2009 was the combined impact of several delayed effects of the 
economic crisis which increased government spending, especially the rise in unemployment benefits (EC 
Economic Forecast, Spring 2011).  
 
Government‟s intentions to pursue a budgetary consolidation policy in 2011 are intended to slow the 
growth of public sector debt by improving the general government balance, reducing the size of 
government and moderating wages in the public sector in the short to medium term. In addition to the 
departure from the stimulus package and the implementation of consolidation measures, higher gas 
revenues are also anticipated to contribute to a much-improved general government balance in 2011, and 
an ameliorated general government deficit of 2.3% of GDP in 2012 (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011; 
EC Economic Forecast, Autumn 2010). This general government position has been relatively positive in 
comparison to other countries in Europe – partly a result of rising gas revenues – and this good 
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performance has allowed the Dutch government to stoke the economy by increasing the deficit 
(Masselink and van den Noord, 2009: 6). Although this strategy is successful in boosting demand, it 
requires necessary and unappealing budgetary adjustment in the future. 
 
Positive but moderate annual growth has been predicted for 2011, at 1.7%, with weakened external and 
domestic demand pointing towards a significantly slower economic recovery (EC Interim Forecast, 
September 2011). Although growth in domestic demand was once again positive in 2011, this has indeed 
slowed as anticipated due to fiscal stimulus measures being gradually withdrawn from 2011 and 
government‟s embarking upon its grand consolidation strategy (EC Interim Forecast, February 2011; EC 
Interim Forecast, September 2011). Only in the first half of 2012 is real GDP expected to recover its pre-
crisis position, indicating the lengthiness of the recovery process (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). 
Whilst an additional rise in the oil price could delay global recovery and hence the Netherlands‟ prospects 
for economic revival, the more vibrant demand witnessed from emerging markets could improve the 
growth outlook (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). 2011 has so far witnessed falling levels of private 
consumption, falling real disposable income from higher inflation and fiscal cutbacks, and declining 
consumer confidence. Negative real wage growth and negative effects on wealth stemming from the 
housing and stock markets have also been experienced (EC Interim Forecast, September 2011). A more 
broad-based recovery for the Dutch economy will thus come to depend on resolving the debt crisis to re-
instil confidence in the private sector (EC Interim Forecast, September 2011). Despite exports being the 
traditional growth engine for the Dutch economy and the major driver of economic recovery, the positive 
contribution of net exports to growth did decline in the second quarter of 2011 as anticipated (EC Interim 
Forecast, September 2011). A deceleration in global trade means that export growth will cool off for the 
remainder of 2011. With an improving capacity utilisation rate and producer confidence, investment also 
looks set to contribute positively to economic growth in 2011, with a further upturn in 2012 expected 
when capacity utilisation rates match the pre-crisis rate of 82%, encouraging corporations to make new 
investments (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). Private investment growth is expected to remain 
subdued and stricter criteria for approving credit to corporations by banks, as well as hikes in long-term 
interest rates, do not bode favourably for private investment (EC Interim Forecast, September 2011).  
 
HICP did rise markedly as expected, averaging 2.2% in the first half of 2011 compared to 0.9% in 2010, 
and it is expected to average 2.5% for the rest of 2011 (EC Interim Forecast, September 2011). Inflation 
in the Netherlands in July 2011 was higher than the average level for the euro-region – recall that at the 
outset of the crisis, the Netherlands had one of the lowest inflation levels in the EU (EC Interim Forecast, 
September 2011). This significant increase was principally due to unprocessed food, oil and gas price 
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hikes, since energy prices have lagged inflationary effects (EC Interim Forecast, February 2011). In light 
of the extent of the contraction in output experienced, the unemployment increases from 3.7% in 2009 to 
4.5% in 2010 are relatively slight and are forecast to decline modestly from 4.2% in 2011 to 4% in 2012 
(EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). The labour market is thus considered likely to have a positive 
impact on growth, as unemployment levels in particular have continued to surpass expectations (EC 
Interim Forecast, February 2011). More positive consumer expectations about unemployment and more 
unfilled vacancies suggest that the Netherlands will see a gradual decrease in the unemployment rate, 
though this will still be above pre-crisis levels (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). The private sector 
will be the engine behind employment growth as budgetary consolidation measures to reduce government 
will negatively impact the public sector. Though higher inflation, higher social contributions by 
employers, and improved labour market prospects are expected to drive public sector wages and unit 
labour costs upwards, measures to moderate wages in the public sector may spill over into the private 
sector (EC Economic Forecast, Spring 2011). 
 
Reflecting the country‟s tradition of technocratic policy-making discussed in Chapter Two, all political 
parties in the Netherlands submit policy proposals to the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) for review, the 
body advising government on economic issues (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 4). In 2010, the role of the 
CPB in limiting the scope of policy was even more pronounced in the context of the global economic and 
euro crises and CPB figures featured prominently in election debates. Cutbacks and austerity measures 
totalling €30million were presented as inevitable policy and this need for significant budgetary cuts, a 
result of economic crisis and aging population, dominated the policy framework for the 2010 electoral 
season (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 4, 5). So whilst questions of immigration and integration have 
continued to play an important role in election campaigns, anxieties about the Dutch economy have 
overshadowed these issues to a certain degree (RFE/RL 2010). The centre-right conservative-liberal VVD 
was the party most in favour of implementing harsh austerity measures, standing for large budget cuts, 
cutbacks on Dutch contributions to the EU, smaller government and reducing welfare benefits for 
immigrants (RFE/RL 2010). The 2010 elections were thus very much about voting for the party most able 
to assume the reigns in stimulating economic recovery and it is noteworthy that the party favouring the 
most stiff austerity measures ultimately drew the greatest confidence of the electorate. This reinforces the 
sentiments of the party‟s financial expert, Frans Weekers, that the Dutch electorate fully appreciated the 
necessity of making sacrifices to achieve economic revival (RFE/RL 2010).  
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4.3 VOTING OUTCOMES OF DUTCH GENERAL ELECTIONS: 1989 – 2010  
 
Recent changes experienced in Dutch politics are most conspicuous when observing patterns of electoral 
behaviour. Whereas election outcomes were traditionally quite predictable and “boring”, instability and 
rapid transformation have become quite characteristic of politics in the Netherlands (De Vreese, 2008: 
147). The country has a multiparty system of proportional representation and as no party has ever come 
close to achieving a parliamentary majority, coalition governments define the post-war Dutch electoral 
system (Anker et al., 2011: 5; Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 647). In addition to the large number of parties 
usually represented in parliament – since WWII, 7 to 14 parties – the possibility of electoral volatility is 
great (Anker et al., 2011: 5). The Pedersen Index measures electoral volatility by calculating the net 
percentage of voters changing their vote from one party to another: if all parties maintain levels of 
support, the index is 0, whereas a complete change of voter support (new parties replacing existing 
parties), will yield an index score of 100. As aggregate shifts are measured, an equal number of voters 
shifting from one party to another and vice versa will produce a net electoral change of 0 (Anker et al., 
2011: 5). Whilst the Pedersen scores for successive Dutch parliamentary elections from 1959 to 1989 
show relative electoral stability, elections in the post-1994 period have been more volatile (Anker et al., 
2011: 6).  
 
This section therefore looks at patterns of voting behaviour from the 1989 general elections to the most 
recently-held elections in 2010. How particular issue frames become prioritised is highly dependent on 
the make-up of government and the distribution of parliamentary seats. Each successive election held 
over this last twenty-year period will be looked at briefly, in terms vote share among the major political 
contenders and the particular make-up of the coalition government formed. Elections in which major 
upsets were experienced will necessarily be accorded greater focus. Broader trends in voting behaviour 
will make particular reference to the electoral impact of depillarisation and secularisation; the decline of 
the major “system” parties and increasing fragmentation of the electorate; as well as the heightened 
electoral volatility of recent years. The ideological implications of these developments for the balance 
between left and right is of particular interest: whilst the relative distribution of power between these 
blocs does reveal increasingly little about levels of tolerance in the country or the extent to which liberal 
democratic values are upheld, shifts along the political spectrum do say something of the overall political 
self-understanding of the Netherlands. This ultimately has implications for how the country sees itself and 
even more importantly, how it perceives “others” and the wider question of diversity.  
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4.3.1 1989 Lubbers III (CDA-PvdA)  
The general election of September 1989 saw the CDA gain the most votes, followed by the PvdA, VVD 
and then the D66 (Democrats ‟66). This outcome led to the formation of a so-called “Roman-red” 
coalition government in November 1989 between the CDA and PvdA, headed by Prime Minister Ruud 
Lubbers of the CDA for the third time since 1982. Right-wing Hans Janmaat‟s Centre Democrats (CD) 
obtained one parliamentary seat. 
 
Considered the third major political force in the Netherlands after Christian democracy and social 
democracy, conservative liberalism represented by the VVD made important advances in the 1990s. The 
early years of the decade saw the “foreigners issue” first being introduced on the political agenda under 
Bolkestein‟s leadership of the VVD (1990 – 1998) whilst still an opposition party, indicating that the 
VVD had come to recognise the electoral advantage of politicising the issue (van Kersbergen and 
Krouwel, 2008: 400, 401). Mobilisation around discontentment with prevailing strategies to manage 
diversity thus only commenced once the opposition VVD had begun to appreciate and tap into the 
electoral potential of this public disenchantment, pushing for greater immigration controls. The VVD was 
however obliged to temper its anti-immigration outlook so as not to alienate the business community that 
favoured a supply of cheap labour, or the party‟s more libertarian wing (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 
2008: 402). Mounting voter dissatisfaction with mainstream party strategies to tackle immigration, the 
EU, multiculturalism and integration thus led to the two chief ideological forces in the Netherlands 
experiencing a gradual loss of votes: for the CDA, this had already begun in the 1960s and as of the late 
1970s, the PvdA started to experience a similar trend of downward support (van Kersbergen and Krouwel 
(2008: 401).  
 
4.3.2 1994 Kok I (PvdA-VVD-D66)  
The 3 May 1994 general elections saw the defeat of the traditional supporter of pillarisation, the CDA, 
prevented from entering government for the first time since 1918 after having been part of successive 
government coalitions for a century. This reflected the declining electoral significance of religious 
identity (van der Veer, 2006: 115). Both previous governing parties suffered significant losses: the CDA 
lost a record 20 seats from a previous total of 54 and the PvdA lost 12 of 49 seats. These elections are 
thus noteworthy because it was from this point on that all subsequent elections witnessed marked levels 
of electoral change and volatility. The right-wing CD succeeded in increasing their share of seats by 2, 
occupying 3 seats in parliament. 
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The new government coalition as of August 1994 was formed between the PvdA and the two liberal 
parties, the VVD and progressive Democrats (D66). Termed a “Purple Coalition” (comprising of the 
social democrat “reds” and “blue” liberals and excluding the Christian Democrats), the new cabinet under 
Kok witnessed a marked shift in policy: previously unquestioned respect for cultural diversity was 
replaced by greater emphasis on immigrants‟ integration and societal participation. This election outcome 
provides a good example of how political change can be influential on policy change: whilst the CDA 
was part of government, a multicultural approach was supported, but with the party being forced out in 
the early 1990s, a more noticeably social-economic approach was pursued (Scholten, 2011: 77).  
 
4.3.3 1998 Kok II (PvdA-VVD-D66)  
The PvdA and VVD led by a large margin in the May 1998 general elections at the expense of their junior 
cabinet partner, the D66. The largest opposition party, the CDA, came in at third place with a reduced 
number of seats. These elections thus consolidated the previous coalition‟s majority, where the good 
economic performance of the “purple coalition” between 1994 and 1998 meant that support was retained 
and even enhanced. The new Kok II cabinet came into effect from August 1998. Achieving only 0.6% of 
the vote and losing the three parliamentary seats achieved in 1994, the right-wing Centre Democrats did 
not return to parliament (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 643). The meagre success of the CD at this time is 
often attributed to the fact that unlike Fortuyn who enjoyed the image of a “normal democratic 
politician”, Hans Janmaat was deemed too politically incorrect to win public legitimacy (Koopmans and 
Muis, 2009: 649).  
 
The convincing performance of the social democrats meant that for the first time, the left and right blocs 
were completely in balance. This deviated from the norm in Dutch party politics where the right-wing has 
generally had a majority vote share (Anker et al., 2011: 9). The PvdA‟s campaign had a strong 
socioeconomic character and a recognisable leader in Wim Kok who identified with the middle class 
(Anker et al., 2011: 9). Since the 1998 elections however, support for progressive parties in the 
Netherlands has declined, reaching a record low in 2002. The electoral gains of the liberal right in the 
1998 election saw an increase in the restriction frame in parliament and the media (Vliegenthart and 
Roggeband, 2007: 313). As highlighted in Chapter Two, a shift from multiculturalism to more restrictive 
immigration policy was already well underway in the 1990s whilst the PvdA was in government.  
 
The somewhat “quiet shift” towards the “Third Way” approach with the PvdA entering into coalition with 
the conservative-liberal VVD and more progressive-liberal D66, was not motivated by pressure from the 
radical right, whose support faltered during this time (Bale et al., 2010: 416). Both the VVD and PvdA 
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had moved towards a more restrictive stance on immigration policy quite independently. Though labour 
was reluctant for the foreigners issue to increase in salience, VVD leader Frits Bolkestein was influential 
in promoting and intensifying the anti-immigration and anti-Islam agenda. Left-right political contestation 
increasingly assumed more cultural than socio-economic undertones. Like Fortuyn at a later stage, 
Bolkestein framed minorities‟ failures to integrate in a cultural light in terms of language, religion and 
social behaviour as opposed to looking at “objective” socio-economic factors such as education, income 
and labour market opportunities – the issue frame naturally encouraged by the PvdA (Bale et al., 2010: 
416). From 1994 to 2001 the VVD was in coalition with the social democratic PvdA, who traditionally 
draw a large immigrant vote, and in order not to estrange their alliance partner, the extent to which 
Bolkestein could point the VVD on a more anti-immigration, Eurosceptic and mono-cultural course was 
limited (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 402). VVD-CDA relations also constrained the VVD‟s 
conservative and nationalistic direction, since the CDA was the traditional defender of pillarisation and 
supporter of multiculturalism. In light of such considerations therefore, the VVD was unable to solicit the 
anti-immigration vote unreservedly, opening up the political space for populist parties to tap into this 
strong electoral base of anti-immigration voters (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 402). 
 
The 1990s had been a period of strong economic growth and a general political and economic 
convergence about the direction of policy (van der Veer, 2006: 115). Strongest opposition was from 
peripheral radical left parties and the “largely impotent” Christian Democrats which were not expected to 
provide a reckonable political challenge (van der Veer, 2006: 115). The two successive purple coalitions 
thus brought together labour and the conservative liberals in a secular government. It has been argued that 
the coalition partners‟ efforts to achieve consensus and not to politicise differences resulted in 
parliamentary debates becoming “boring” and by the end of the 1990s, socialist prime minister Wim Kok 
complacently declared that the Dutch welfare state had been fully realised – only trivial “technical 
difficulties” were left to iron out via political discussion (van der Veer, 2006: 115). In light of the 
electoral upset that was to occur in 2002 with the astounding gains of the LPF, van der Veer (2006: 115, 
116) writes that the era prior to the 2002 elections indicates how technocratic politics is susceptible to 
disregard for the “emotional side of mass politics”. By the end of the decade however, mainstream parties 
had reached the end of their tether in attempting to deal with the global economic downturn. Ignoring 
brooding public uneasiness around immigration, globalisation and Islam was increasingly difficult. 
 
4.3.4 2002 Balkenende I (CDA-LPF-VVD)  
The May 2002 general elections in the immediate wake of Fortuyn‟s murder saw the CDA emerge 
victorious, followed by the newcomer LPF. Fortuyn‟s party achieved an astounding 17% of the vote and 
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26 of 150 parliamentary seats, making it the second largest party in the newly-elected Parliament. This 
was unparalleled for a new political contender in the Netherlands, let alone one peddling a distinctively 
radical right-wing agenda, the key issues of which were “sending back asylum-seekers” and “foreigners 
should adapt” (Coenders et al., 2008: 273; Carle, 2006: 73; Maas, 2010: 232). The VVD achieved third 
position, trailed by the PvdA. The surprising performance of the CDA, upping its number of seats from 
29 to 43, saw the party redeem its place in government after 8 years in opposition. The CDA‟s success 
was due in large part to the popularity of party leader Jan-Peter Balkenende who became prime minister, 
and to the party‟s neutral stance towards the LPF. Leefbaar Nederland (Liveable Netherlands), Fortuyn‟s 
old party, made it into parliament for the first time. The centre-right Balkenende I coalition government 
that came into effect from July 2002 was comprised of the CDA, LPF and VVD. It was to be a short-lived 
coalition, however: internal conflicts within the LPF after the demise of its leader ultimately led to the fall 
of the first Balkenende I cabinet after a mere 83 days (Bos and van der Brug, 2010: 781). 
 
This election has been ranked as the fourth most volatile by the Pedersen index of electoral volatility of 
all West European general elections since 1900 (behind Italy 1994, Germany 1920 and France 1906), 
with the high percentage of aggregate party electoral gains and losses, 30.7%, being unmatched 
previously (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 643). Political commentators remarked upon the need to 
understand better this significantly altered Dutch political milieu after years of predictability; even newly-
incumbent Prime Minister Balkenende admitted that striving towards the multicultural society was no 
longer a desirable goal (Maas, 2010: 232; Vink, 2007: 345). The 2002 election thus upset the country‟s 
once-stable political situation and represented a significant break from the usually poor electoral 
performances of radical right parties (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 642). A heightened prevalence of 
integration and immigration issues in the media accompanied the rightist LPF‟s entry into government 
and these topics drew even more media coverage during the 2003 elections; in 1998, these issues barely 
featured in the campaigns of political parties (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007: 311).  
 
Whilst structural conditions are worthy of academic interest when looking at the context in which radical 
right parties achieve electoral success, the role of long-term and relatively gradual processes such as 
political, institutional or value changes is insufficient in accounting for explosive electoral performances 
and dramatic transformations in public opinion and the media (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 644). One of 
the most important factors for increased electoral support for the LPF is considered to be the political 
space, or opportunities, afforded to the party to voice its claims publicly (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 
658). A policy vacuum afforded the radical right the opportunity to take advantage of unaddressed issues 
and exploit this “electoral niche” (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 658). The fact that the VVD and PvdA had 
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previously been brought together in a single “purple coalition”, meant that there was a substantial degree 
of concurrence around the policy stances of the political mainstream. However, this factor, along with 
explanations about perceptions of ethnic threat and grievances towards the political establishment (as well 
as more long-term socio-economic factors and the post-pillarisation decline in party loyalty), fails to 
explain why the electoral potential of the radical right lay unexploited for so long before the LPF filled 
this gap (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 658, 659). Fortuyn‟s explosive posthumous electoral success and 
ability to mobilise support are attributed to an “appealing media performance” where his public exposure, 
media visibility and the resonance of his rhetoric had a profound impact on public opinion (Koopmans 
and Muis, 2009: 642). As his support in opinion polls rose, more media space was afforded to Fortuyn to 
air his views and publicly articulate claims and expressions of political demands (Koopmans and Muis, 
2009: 651, 659).  
 
4.3.5 2003 Balkenende II (CDA-VVD-D66)  
Following the resignation of the Balkenende I cabinet due to internal conflicts within the LPF, new 
general elections were held in January 2003. The factious LPF experienced massive losses, with its 
number of seats shrinking from 26 to 8. The CDA won by a slim margin, followed by the PvdA and 
VVD. Balkenende continued as Prime Minister, forming the new centre-right “Balkenende II” cabinet in 
May 2003 with the VVD and D66. This time around, the right-wing Liveable Netherlands did not succeed 
in achieving any parliamentary seats. Despite losing heavily in these elections, the LPF‟s anti-
immigration rhetoric and its anti-Islam message have continued to resonate among the Dutch public.  
 
4.3.6 2006 Balkenende III (CDA-VVD) and 2007 Balkenende IV (CDA-PvdA-CU)  
Following the fall of the Balkenende II cabinet, the centre-right Balkenende III minority interim cabinet 
took over in July 2006, composed of the CDA and VVD. An early general election was called in 
November 2006 and the CDA continued to lead. The elections witnessed significant electoral shifts: the 
main opposition party, the PvdA, saw its share of parliamentary seats shrink, as did the VVD and D66 
which both suffered considerable losses. The Socialist Party (SP) however made the most gains, 
increasing its number of seats from 9 to 25. Two new parties, Geert Wilders‟ PVV and the Party for the 
Animals (PvdD) were both successful, winning 9 and 2 seats respectively. These elections resulted in the 
centre-left Balkenende IV cabinet between the CDA, PvdA and the Christian Union (CU ) as of February 
2007. 
 
After going into opposition in 2002 then, the PvdA lost even more support in the 2006 elections. The 
party did however still make it into government by entering into a coalition with the CDA and the 
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conservative Christian Union (CU). The social democrats‟ strategy towards immigration and integration 
was shaped by the populist radical right and by the reactions of other mainstream political parties on the 
right and left: at least one of the main centre-right parties responded to the populist right by adopting its 
agenda, thus obliging the PvdA to take a similarly tougher stance on these issues. Party unity impacted 
upon labour‟s performance as did the SP‟s reaction to the radical right, being better poised than Labour to 
respond to voters‟ concerns about migration and multiculturalism. Labour thus suffered credibility and 
competitiveness losses, not to mention a leakage of votes to left libertarians, left traditionalists as well as 
to the right and centre-right (Bale et al., 2010: 421, 422).  
 
The integration policy of the coalition government that came into power appeared to be slightly more in 
line with stereotypical interpretations of such strategies in the Netherlands (Vink, 2007: 348). Although 
Vink (2007: 348) stated his expectations of a “more relaxed immigration policy” from Prime Minister Jan 
Peter Balkenende and his cabinet at the time, the possibility of marked changes in the existing restrictive 
situation seemed doubtful: the decision to naturalise approximately 25 000 asylum seekers residing 
illegally in the Netherlands since the 1990s was the product of “hard bargaining” between an 
unenthusiastic CDA and its coalition partners. It therefore appeared that more of the same was expected 
from the fourth Balkenende government, albeit with a “slightly softer touch” (Vink, 2007: 348). With the 
deepening effects of the economic crisis in the Netherlands, the newly re-established confidence in the 
Dutch government, reflected in the autumn 2008 Eurobarometer, vanished. Parties such as the D66 and 
PVV that clearly articulated and defined their positions towards multiculturalism and Europe achieved 
substantial electoral support in the European parliamentary elections of 2009 (Eurobarometer 71, Spring 
2009). Mainstream parties such as the PvdA, increasingly seen as ambivalent, suffered considerably. 
 
4.3.7 2010 Rutte Cabinet (VVD-CDA with PVV)  
The Balkenende IV cabinet collapsed in February 2010 after PvdA ministers resigned over differences 
about continuing the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan. A general election was held in June 2010 and 
after lengthy coalition talks to establish a purple coalition with the PvdA and other left-wing parties, a 
right-wing minority coalition government was established in October between the VVD and CDA 
instead, headed by Mark Rutte of the VVD. Labelled a “political earthquake” by several newspapers, the 
2010 elections heralded a “miraculous comeback” for the VVD which had struggled to compose a 
successful political strategy (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 3). The current VVD-CDA coalition receives 
parliamentary support from Wilders‟ PVV to achieve a “vulnerable” parliamentary majority of 76 seats, 
only one above the 75 majority threshold (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 12). Rutte is the first conservative-
liberal Dutch prime minister in 93 years, since 1918, and though the VVD emerged with the most seats, 
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the “big winner” of the 2010 elections was Wilders‟ PVV: the party almost tripled its seats from 9 to 24, 
outperforming the expectations of pre-election polls which forecast that the party would double its seat 
total (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 8; RFE/RL 2010). The PVV campaigned for conservative values, left-
leaning stances on social and economic questions and the prevention of the “Islamisation of the 
Netherlands” (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 9; RFE/RL 2010). Like its more extreme politics, the PVV 
draws much of its support from geographically peripheral regions where perceptions about alienation 
from central government are likely to be most pronounced. Significant PVV support came from Wilders‟ 
own region of Limburg (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 6). 
 
Unlike the PvdA, both the CDA and VVD indicated during coalition talks that they were open to the 
possibility of collaboration with the PVV, even though the Christian Democrats did cite concerns about 
Wilders‟ criticisms of religion and Islam in particular (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 13). Potential 
cooperation with the PVV was a sensitive issue and several policies of the party were criticised for being 
contradictory to the Constitution: there were therefore concerns that the Dutch government would risk 
tarnishing its international image by cooperating with an “extreme right” party. Employers‟ organisations, 
traditional supporters of the VVD, were especially vocal in their reservations about the prospect of 
including the PVV in cabinet, arguing that the move would not bode well for international trade or the 
Netherlands‟ reputation (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 12, 13). The parliamentary support offered by the 
PVV to the eventual VVD-CDA coalition is a somewhat unorthodox response to the electoral outcome, 
though the economic crisis did heighten the sense of urgency in forming a new government. To his credit, 
Wilders showed during coalition talks that he was open to compromise and one day after the election, his 
party expressed its willingness to consider increasing the retirement age, a notion that the PVV had firmly 
discarded during the electoral campaign (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 13). The exceptional economic 
context in which this most recent election took place implies that regardless of the specific make-up of the 
coalition, the next years will necessitate “painful measures” and a general framework will need to be 
agreed upon even if all the creases between the coalition partners and the PVV have not been ironed out 
(Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 13). The new government will have to obtain ad hoc parliamentary majorities 
for reforms as it goes along and trust among the cooperating parties will be imperative (Becker and 
Cuperus, 2010: 13). 
 
4.3.8 Voting Patterns in Perspective 
The Dutch party system has undergone fundamental changes over the course of the last four to five 
decades. With the rise of the welfare state in the Netherlands from the 1950s and the onset of 
depillarisation and secularisation, the country‟s once predictable and stable electoral structure has become 
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increasingly fragmented and volatile. These developments have had hugely significant implications for 
the political prospects of those traditional parties (the three so-called Volksparteien: the CDA, PvdA and 
VVD) that once represented the interests of the established social pillars and which dominated the Dutch 
electoral landscape. The rise of new political contenders appealing to more specific interests has meant 
that established parties have had to rework fundamentally their political strategies, policies and ideology 
in order to remain politically viable competitors. Traditional “system” parties‟ focus upon making grand 
compromises with diverse coalition partners and their attempts to advance an internationalist direction, 
uphold the principle of an open, tolerant society and bring together the elites and masses, have produced 
considerable difficulties. Smaller parties that have honed in on particular group interests and voter issue 
concerns have meanwhile increasingly reaped electoral rewards (Anker et al., 2011: 8). These 
developments ultimately have important repercussions for the left-right ideological balance in the 
Netherlands. 
 
4.3.8.1 The Electoral Effects of Depillarisation and Secularisation 
Prior to 1967, the year in which the D66 participated in its first Dutch general election, the Netherlands 
was categorised as a “frozen party system” (Rokkan in Anker et al., 2011: 6). Elections effectively served 
as a “glorified census”, reflecting the relative size of the different societal pillars: it was along these 
religious-ideological divisions that the electorate voted (Anker et al., 2011: 6). Merely observing figures 
on religious group and class numbers thus enabled fair prediction of voting outcomes. From 1967 then, 
the secularisation and depillarisation of Dutch society has resulted in a declining share of support for 
religiously-affiliated parties and a leaking of so-called “system” parties‟ core electorates: party support is 
increasingly determined by individual preference and no longer by group membership or communal 
religious-ideological identity (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 402; de Vreese, 2008: 146; Anker et 
al., 2011: 6). It has therefore been remarked upon that it was with the twin processes of depillarisation 
and secularisation that Dutch voters finally began to “choose” (Rose and McAllister in Anker et al., 2011: 
7). Becker and Cuperus (2010: 9) suggest that the mainstream party to have benefitted most from 
depillarisation is the VVD. 
 
The rise of the Dutch welfare state in the 1950s and the expanding range of available social provisions 
meant that citizens became less dependent on their communities as a basis of support (van der Veer, 2006: 
119). Religious and ideological associations performed a progressively less necessary social function. 
Independence from societal pillars as foundations of group support has proved especially detrimental to 
the fortunes of social democracy: once uniting the working and middle classes, the traditional working 
class electorate has increasingly turned its back on this ideology for both cultural and material reasons. In 
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some instances, the VVD, PVV and SP have proven more capable in appealing to working class concerns 
than the PvdA (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 12). Whilst many explanations for social democracy‟s decline 
look to non-conventional factors, citing for instance the increasing salience of cultural cleavages, 
materialistic reasons are still important. Though the context of the global financial crisis makes a shift 
away from the original proponents of the welfare state somewhat surprising, perceptions about social 
democrats being lenient towards immigrants, supporting excessively high taxes, overly relying on deficit 
financing and cosseting public sector employees with generous benefits, have eroded confidence in social 
democratic parties (Wolin, 2011: 62). Conservative parties are seen as more risk-averse and have been the 
principle recipients of voter trust. There is of course also an important anti-establishment aspect to this 
shift away from the mainstream left. With the exceptions of Spain and Portugal where social democratic 
parties still preside, most governing coalitions are between liberal and centre-right parties. Dwindling 
support for the PvdA, as well as the internal divisions that have come to haunt it, is thus a story not 
peculiar to the Netherlands alone, but illustrates a more general European trend (Wolin 2011: 61). 
 
Whilst the decline of pillarisation has meant that voting behaviour and electoral outcomes no longer 
reflect religious-ideological cleavages, sociological factors and class lines have made a reappearance in 
the cases of the D66 and PVV, which appeal to almost polar opposite electorates (Becker and Cuperus, 
2010: 11). A new cultural cleavage in voting patterns in the Netherlands has emerged around issues 
including European integration, immigration and integration, crime and domestic security, the nation and 
globalisation. This cleavage is seen to separate those of different educational levels, to divide optimists 
from pessimists, and to split those individuals that have benefited from “the new economic order” from 
those who have been marginalised by it (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 11, 12). Public attitudes have also 
assumed heightened significance for political behaviour in this new cultural-orientated context. In 
addition to globalisation, global trends such as liberalisation, immigration and the development of new 
technologies and knowledge all impact upon society and heighten the discrepancies between different 
classes in terms of opportunities available to those that are “connected” and those that have been cut off 
(Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 11, 12). Rising voter volatility since the 1990s coincides with the increasing 
salience of cultural issues in determining voting behaviour, although left-right ideological considerations 
do continue to shape support. Though this non-material dimension is not a new phenomenon and was an 
important political factor in the sixteenth century with the cleavages between the Calvinists and 
libertarian bourgeoisie, it has assumed greater prominence over the last two decades with regards to 
dividing those favouring cultural liberalism from those seeking more restrictive immigration policy (Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 408). The shift in traditional left-right party competition from socio-
economic to more “non-material” and cultural issues, popularised by the likes of Fortuyn and Wilders, 
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has also contributed to party fragmentation and centre parties have battled to politicise the foreigners 
issue to their electoral advantage. 
 
4.3.8.2 Declining Volksparteien and Fragmentation of the Dutch Party System 
The latest general elections point to several structural trends: the decline of the two main Volksparteien, 
the CDA and PvdA, as well as the social democrats‟ loss of dominance on the left since the traditional 
working and lower middle classes appear to have turned their backs on social democracy and the once-
hegemonic PvdA (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 11; Anker et al., 2011: 8, 9). This loss of PvdA hegemony 
among the progressives has however not been accompanied by a decrease in party support for the left or 
right, as support for each bloc has generally remained stable. It has merely meant that the left is 
increasingly fragmented by more pronounced differences among the electorate in the context of declining 
support for the Volksparteien, which have been unable to accommodate these splintering preferences 
(Anker et al., 2011: 3). The 2010 elections saw the PvdA achieve 30 seats in comparison to the more 
radical Socialist Party that won 15, the GreenLeft that secured 10, and the D66 also with 10. 
 
This fragmentation of the Dutch left in particular points to important divergences between the liberal, 
cosmopolitan progressives and the more conservative left (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 10; Anker et al., 
2011: 10). The former group focuses on reform (especially in the labour market to open access to 
outsiders), raising the retirement age and advancing the cause of knowledge and empowerment. This side, 
represented by the GreenLeft and D66, also values the advantages wrought by globalisation and 
international migration, and typically draws support from educated professionals, urban middle classes 
and students (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 10; Anker et al., 2011: 10). The latter, more traditional left 
stream values the advancement of the welfare state, opposes introducing market forces in the public 
sector, draws most support from workers in the healthcare and industrial sectors and is represented by the 
Socialist Party. The PvdA has battled to charter a definitive path and accommodate both the “optimistic 
story of change, reform and progress” advanced by the liberal left and the “story of social security, 
protection, public services and defence of rights” promoted by the traditional left (Becker and Cuperus, 
2010: 12). Given these considerable differences among parties on the left, it is not surprising that there 
has not been more left-left cooperation. 
 
Since 1990, all three traditional Volksparteien have witnessed declining levels of support as well as a loss 
of control over establishing government coalitions (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 7). In the 1950s, the 
Volksparteien were able to attract 90% of the vote, but today the percentage of their accumulative support 
is just above 50%, a development that Anker et al. (2011: 8, 11) refer to as the “systemic meltdown of the 
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postwar Dutch party system”, which centres increasingly around “intermediating people‟s parties”. 
Indeed, not since the beginning of universal suffrage in 1919 has the country‟s largest political party been 
as small as the VVD is today, a fact that points to the Dutch electorate being more fragmented than ever – 
the “main result” of the 2010 election according to Becker and Cuperus (2010: 12). This fragmentation is 
demonstrated by the VVD‟s inordinately narrow victory and the country‟s first minority government 
since the Second World War. There is therefore no single party currently that unequivocally dominates 
the Dutch political system and winners are not clear-cut. The two strongest parties attract a mere 20% of 
total voter support whilst the next two strongest account for 14% to 16% and the three runners-up draw 
between 7% and 10% of the vote (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 7; Anker et al., 2011: 11).  
 
This situation of political fragmentation – the “Balkanisation of Dutch politics” – makes the formation of 
a stable coalition government and the achievement of majority support for the cabinet in parliament all the 
more challenging (Anker et al., 2011: 8). The task of forming a cabinet in 2010 was compounded even 
further by the context of the global crisis and the very divergent views on both sides of parliament as to 
how the crisis should be approached (RFE/RL 2010). The previously stable, rigid system made up of only 
a few major Volksparteien has thus shifted to a fluid party system where party support is determined by 
individual preference. The implication is that more parties are required to form a coalition in order to 
achieve majority support: whilst two parties were traditionally sufficient for this purpose, three-party 
governments have become the norm since 1994 and as of 2010, there was serious consideration of a four- 
or even five-party coalition (Anker et al., 2011: 8).  
 
A comparable pattern of leaking support was experienced by centre parties in the 1970s, and Becker and 
Cuperus (2010: 7, 11) note that a similar cycle today sees the periphery on both the right and left 
accumulating strength: the CDA and PvdA have suffered a multi-directional loss of votes to the liberal 
left (D66), the traditional left (SP) as well as to the radical right populists (PVV). Increasingly, 
mainstream parties have come to recognise the advantages of aligning with the electorate‟s 
disenchantment with accommodating and supporting foreigners. The extreme right is not exceptional for 
promoting a xenophobic policy frame and stigmatising immigrants and this has ever more become the 
strategy of the political mainstream (Fekete, 2008: 36). It would therefore be a mistake to perceive the 
European right-wing as operating on the sidelines with minimal influence on middle-of-the-road politics: 
in many instances, the radical right has been instrumental in shifting the debate towards its once 
“marginal” agenda (Wolin, 2011: 62). 
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These developments have important ideological implications for party politics, competition, and the 
political programmes of established mainstream parties on both the left and right of the political spectrum. 
In addition to mounting electoral pressure and competition from the radical populist right that has 
successfully lured away voters, the increasing electoral salience and politicisation of the so-called 
“foreigners issue” has fundamentally impacted the programmes and policies of Dutch centre parties: both 
the CDA and VVD on the centre-right have seen shifts towards more restrictive immigration and asylum 
policy (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 398; Bale et al., 2010: 411). As these parties traditionally 
“own” law and order and nationalist issues, they are well-positioned to benefit strategically from linking 
immigration to questions of domestic stability. The adoption of a more hard-line profile that is anti-
immigration, Eurosceptic and nationalistic and that strays from the multicultural ideal could however be 
deemed contradictory to traditional centre-right values and may ultimately ward off voters (Van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 398). Being seen as too extreme or hard-line could mean a loss of votes 
and running the risk of factionalism: the politicisation of the foreigners question is thus something of a 
“Catch-22” scenario for the centre-right.  
 
Following Fortuyn‟s offensive, both the VVD and CDA have reworked their respective policies towards 
immigration and integration, though the parties have emphasised different approaches to integration: 
whereas VVD policy focused on individual responsibility and a formal, bureaucratic stance, the CDA 
highlighted participative citizenship, values and beliefs (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 406). 
Freedom of religion is central to CDA policy and the party supports religion‟s public presence and the 
right to found religious schools; the VVD however promotes the mingling of different religious 
orientations within a single school to achieve integration (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 406). The 
VVD in particular has struggled in the past to establish policy coherence, and attempts to pursue a 
conservative and nationalistic path (promoting monoculturalism, Euroscepticism and tighter immigration 
and asylum policy) whilst simultaneously chartering a more libertarian course (in support of 
multiculturalism, individual freedoms and economic liberalism) have proven electorally unattractive, 
pitting supporters of each wing within the party against one another in an “uneasy coalition” (Becker and 
Cuperus, 2010: 3; van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 399, 411 – 413). This has had serious implications 
for the social cohesion of the party and internal tension was especially reflected after the VVD‟s electoral 
losses in the 2006 elections and the subsequent leadership struggle that took place between libertarian 
Rutte and the more hard-line conservative Verdonk, culminating in Verdonk‟s expulsion and the 
establishment of her Trots op Nederland party (van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 400).  
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Despite fierce challenges from the right to the leadership of the VVD, Rutte has been successful in 
restoring party stability and his performance in election debates went a long way in salvaging the position 
of the conservative liberals (Becker and Cuperus, 2010). The VVD increasingly appeals to a more 
representative support base, which not only includes established elites, but also the middle stratum and 
parts of the working class (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 9). Voters among the old working class that have 
risen in social standing have become gradually more conservative and the VVD‟s campaign focussing on 
tackling the budget deficit, adopting a stricter attitude to immigration and challenging bureaucracy, sat 
well with this segment of the electorate (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 9).  
 
Another noteworthy outcome of the latest Dutch general elections involves the much-reduced levels of 
support for the CDA, whose number of parliamentary seats shrank from 41 to 21. The CDA‟s losses have 
been even more drastic than the loss of support suffered by the social democrats. The current coalition is 
the first time that the CDA has participated in a government alliance in which it was not the dominant 
party. Growing support for the right-wing PVV is one reason for the Christian Democrats‟ dismal 
performance and Balkenende‟s long eight-year tenure in office gave rise to perceptions that change was 
needed: the former prime minister showed himself incapable of assuming control when trying periods 
demanded assertiveness and authority from him, such as in the debate surrounding the Dutch commitment 
to the Iraq War (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 7). Between 1917 and 1994, the CDA dominated the Dutch 
political system as a result of its sheer size, which ensured a majority. The party thus enjoyed influence 
over government formation and wielded the power to determine whether to govern with labour on the left 
or the centre-right (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 7). After being excluded from the “purple coalitions” of 
1994 and 1998, the CDA was able to recover in 2002 from its weak position in the nineties, heading 
government once again after being stuck in opposition for eight years. In 2010, the CDA was 
outperformed another time, achieving fourth place after losing in major cities and especially in the 
countryside. The VVD has increasingly performed better in those rural regions where once the CDA had 
its stronghold and the province of Brabant in particular, something of an economic centre, has witnessed 
large numbers of ex-CDA supporters turn to the VVD in recent years (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 6; 
Anker et al., 2011: 8).  
 
Whilst the CDA has not experienced a leadership struggle similar to that of the VVD, tensions have arisen 
on a lower level among those party members against a tougher position on immigration, integration and 
multiculturalism (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 400). The CDA has proved particularly flexible in 
terms of adapting its policy to the increasing politicisation and mobilisation around immigration and 
integration: the party toned down its Christian identity in the 1980s and 1990s in response to the 
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overarching movement towards neo-liberalism, but around the turn of the millennium it re-emphasised its 
“moral agenda” in defence of societal values, welcoming the shift in party competition towards more 
cultural issues (Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 405). The CDA‟s move towards a more neoliberal 
direction economically and a more neoconservative direction culturally has resulted in the Protestant 
leadership of the party distancing itself from progressive factions of the CDA, alienating more traditional 
Catholic voters in the south (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 8). It has also been suggested that the party has 
lost ground not only as a result of secularisation, but also because it no longer needs to mediate between 
different social groups (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 8). The CDA is likely to be torn between assuming a 
more neo-liberal, right-leaning and nationalistic character, so as to appeal to a more right-wing vote, 
whilst at the same time attempting to retain the support of the many that favour socio-economic 
redistribution, and among whom the Christian Union has already started making inroads (Van Kersbergen 
and Krouwel, 2008: 411). 
 
Like the Dutch centre-right, leftist parties have similarly undergone important policy readjustments in 
response to the populist radical right. The PvdA has pursued a number of strategies in an attempt to 
remain politically viable and to keep abreast of electorally-salient voter concerns. Labour has however 
struggled to articulate a concise political programme and to match up to the performances of its electoral 
competition. Although generally successful in participating in coalitions since 1989, the PvdA has been 
less successful electorally. Whilst still the dominant force on the left, this position is eroding and the 
PvdA has battled to establish an authentic position and unique project among its fellow progressives 
(Anker et al., 2011: 22, 24). Like the VVD, the PvdA went a long way in improving its electoral position. 
At the start of 2010, polls indicated that the social democrats were likely to achieve 13 to 15 
parliamentary seats in the pending general elections, drawing 9 to 10% of the vote – a stark contrast to the 
spring of 2006 when support for the PvdA was at 40% and 60 parliamentary seats (Becker and Cuperus, 
2010: 3; Anker et al., 2011: 2). The February 2010 resignation of several PvdA ministers over differences 
about continuing the Dutch military mission in Afghanistan led to the collapse of the unpopular 
Balkenende IV cabinet (2007 – 2010) and three weeks later, Wouter Bos stepped down as leader of the 
PvdA (Anker et al., 2011: 2). These events set in gradual motion the social democrats‟ recovery process 
and whereas the “famous rule in Dutch politics” holds that the party to blame for a coalition‟s breakdown 
will suffer in the following elections, this did not hold true for labour (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 3).  Job 
Cohen, the well-liked former mayor of Amsterdam, was named Bos‟s successor and Cohen‟s candidacy 
for prime minister in the 2010 elections sparked an almost “Dutch Obama effect” with unofficial 
campaign slogans like “Yes we Cohen” (Anker et al., 2011: 2). This momentum generated during the 
campaign was however not maintained and the PvdA and VVD were neck-and-neck on election night 
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until it finally emerged that the conservative liberals were the ultimate victors, by one parliamentary seat 
(Anker et al., 2011: 2).   
 
There has not been a uniform response by the social democrats to the populist radical right. Whilst the 
PvdA has attempted to reach out to both blue-collar workers and professional elites by promoting the 
welfare state and the progressiveness of society simultaneously, professionals and labourers have not 
converged on a shared project (Anker et al., 2011: 10). Core constituencies of the PvdA have leaked to 
the GreenLeft which still supports traditional multiculturalism, to the populist left (Socialist Party), to the 
D66 on the liberal left and even indirectly to the right-wing populist PVV, all of which have appeared less 
politically ambivalent and fickle (Bale et al., 2010: 417; Anker et al., 2011: 8, 24). Since the rise of the 
LPF in 2002 then, the PvdA has sought to reclaim its “lost” electorate, although proposals to adopt a 
tougher stance on immigration and integration have divided the party and its constituency, leaving the 
social democrats in an uncertain position (Anker et al., 2011: 23). Despite labour‟s eventual attempts to 
adopt a tougher stance on immigration and a more mono-cultural outlook, the mobilisation of both left 
and right dissatisfaction by the radical populists could not be averted and the PvdA‟s attempts to 
compensate for its association with multiculturalism have been interpreted as weak and apologetic 
(Fekete, 2008: 20). Fortuyn‟s condemnation of PvdA support for expanding the welfare state sat well with 
the traditional left who considered ethnic minorities to profit disproportionately from benefits and this 
attack from the right has been continued by the PVV and Verdonk‟s Trots op Nederland movement (Bale 
et al., 2010: 416). The PvdA‟s inability to “defuse” the foreigner‟s issue promoted by the right and to 
reset the agenda by encouraging instead a distinctively centre-left frame, resulted in internal dissension 
within the party between those eager to abandon the party‟s “political correctness” and those wanting to 
“stick to their guns” (Bale et al., 2010: 416). The additional populist challenge to the social democrats 
from the left, presented by the SP, contributed to the PvdA‟s internal divisions: campaigning on a more 
left-wing, mono-cultural and Eurosceptic platform, and combining classic social democracy vis-à-vis the 
economy and welfare with a more conservative cultural attitude, socialist policy has been more attractive 
to traditional left voters (Bale et al., 2010: 417). 
 
4.3.8.3 An Increasingly Volatile Dutch Electorate 
In addition to being increasingly fragmented, the Dutch electorate is also more volatile. Despite the 
consensual nature of Dutch politics implying that government changes are characterised by continuity and 
do not typically result in drastic foreign or domestic policy changes, electoral volatility in the Netherlands 
has been on the increase since the 1990s, measured by the number of seat changes per party per election 
(US Dept of State, 2010; Van Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 402). The processes of depillarisation, 
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secularisation and the increasing individualisation of voting behaviour have been reflected electorally by 
higher voter volatility: from 1919 (the introduction of universal suffrage) to 1967 when the D66 first 
participated in the elections, party support was stable and the Pedersen index score was low. From 1967, 
the Pedersen scores are slightly higher, around 10, indicating that with each election, a net 10% of seats 
would shift from one party to another. In 1989 the Pedersen index was 5, but in 1994 the score was 22 
(Anker et al., 2011: 6, 7). Thus, whereas pre-1989, elections typically resulted in about 10% of 
parliamentary seats changing to other parties, since 1990 this percentage has increased to between 25% 
and 30% (de Vreese, 2008: 147). Almost half the number of seats in the Second Chamber changed parties 
from the 2006 to the 2010 elections – a total of 68 seats out of 150 (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 5).  
 
Weaker party loyalty, resulting in an “open model of electoral competition” as opposed to a structured 
model, means that whilst voting preferences are flexible, this may also make for volatile elections 
(Andeweg and Irwin in Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 645). The trend towards voting according to 
individual preference was particularly evident during the “exceptionally volatile” 1994 elections, where 
significant electoral shifts took place as a result of campaign issues surrounding the welfare state and 
austerity measures (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 645; Anker et al., 2011: 7). Since the 1960s, research on 
Dutch voting patterns has shown that multiple party identification is common and electoral support 
oscillates between parties on both the left and right of the political spectrum, although the balance of 
power between these left and right blocs tends to be stable, with voters voting either among the SP, 
GreenLeft and PvdA on the left, or among the VVD, CDA and one radical right populist party on the 
right. 
 
This balance of power is in fact slightly in favour of right-wing parties, indicating that changes in voting 
behaviour occur mainly within these ideological blocs and not between them (Anker et al., 2011: 6). 
Leftist parties typically draw 40% to 45% of the vote and have thus always relied upon the support of a 
party on the right such as the CDA or VVD, even when the liberal left D66 is part of the left-wing bloc 
(Anker et al., 2011: 9, 10). Party competition within the left and right-wing blocs has also become fiercer, 
meaning that the possibility of leftist parties cooperating with one another to achieve dominance is 
doubtful (Anker et al., 2011: 11). Despite the Netherlands‟ international image as a permissive, liberal 
and tolerant society then, there is actually no progressive majority in the country and barring the 1998 
general elections when both sides were in balance, right-wing parties have always had the majority share 
of the Dutch vote (Anker et al., 2011: 3, 9). The old left-right distinction reveals little about the extent to 
which political parties are “democratic” or “liberal” in the Dutch context (Ghitis, 2011). The 1998 and 
2002 elections produced the greatest change in share of support for the left and right, where 1998 saw 
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considerably higher levels of support for the left, and 2002 tended towards more support for the right. The 
subsequent 2006 and 2010 elections show that left support has returned to pre-2002 levels and though the 
decline of the Volksparteien has not affected vote share of the right and left, this decline has made 
coalition-building more challenging (Anker et al., 2011: 12). The individualisation of electoral choice 
does however suggest that voters may increasingly come to choose between right and left, affecting these 
relatively stable levels of ideological support (Anker, 2011: 12).  
 
Accompanying the incidence of higher voter volatility since the 1990s has been the phenomenon of 
“floating voters” that have featured prominently amongst the Dutch electorate (Becker and Cuperus, 
2010: 5). Around 20% to 25% of Dutch voters generally abstain from the electoral process, although their 
mobilisation is possible, populist-style, when it comes to questions of immigration and integration (van 
Kersbergen and Krouwel, 2008: 404). During the nineties, major shifts in the vote occurred within the 
traditional party system, amongst the Volksparteien and within the left and right blocs, but from 2002 it 
has been the “new political entrepreneurs of populism” outside this mainstream party system that have 
gained most from floating, “footloose” voters: the LPF in 2002, the SP in 2006 and the PVV in 2010 
(Anker et al., 2011: 7; Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 5). The traditional centre parties PvdA, CDA and VVD 
have increasingly proven unable to accommodate the growing individualisation of voters‟ preferences, 
something for which new parties have demonstrated greater talent. Regarding the most recent 2010 
elections, approximately 40% of the Dutch electorate is reported to have been undecided about their 
voting choice up until just before, or even on, actual Election Day, compared to 20% before 1990 (Becker 
and Cuperus, 2010: 4; De Vreese, 2008: 147). Voters born between 1978 and 2000 were most likely to 
determine their voting decision late into the election campaign and more than 70% of voters from this 
group made their choice during the last weeks of the 2010 electoral campaign (Anker et al., 2011: 16). 
The most recent elections also stood out with regards to the frequent use of polling as a weekly indicator 
of voter preference and this has assumed heightened influence over the campaigning process. Many 
voters made use of internet voter guides such as StemWijzer and Kieskompas to assist in determining their 
electoral choice, which allegedly have a disproportionate influence over voting behaviour in the 
Netherlands and are biased towards more extreme parties because electoral platforms can be favourably 
manipulated (Becker and Cuperus, 2010: 4). Of those voters born between 1978 and 2000, almost 70% 
made use of these guides in the 2006 elections, indicating a willingness to “shop around” (Anker et al., 
2011: 16). Voter turnout in 2010 was also noticeably lower than previous election years. 
 
The instability of recent elections is thus quite exceptional in the history of the Netherlands and de Vreese 
(2008: 147) notes that whilst this development might be a thorn in the side for mainstream political 
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parties favouring a predictable and stable electoral process, recent electoral change and instability offer a 
“healthy antidote of choice and competition in an otherwise stable democracy”. Election outcomes tend 
however to be conservative and generally in keeping with historical patterns: although voter volatility 
may imply greater unpredictability, this does not necessarily entail greater support for right-wing parties 
and it is also not uncommon for “floating voters” to side with mainstream parties – as was the case in 
2003 for the social democrats (Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 645). Increased electoral volatility and 
declining party identification does however mean that voting behaviour is increasingly shaped by internet 
guidelines for voting and is sensitive to media portrayals of parties and their representatives (Becker and 
Cuperus, 2010: 5). Public scrutiny of party leaders‟ radio and television debates has contributed to the 
perspective that the Dutch political system is a “spectators‟ democracy”, where debating skills have 
almost become a prerequisite for leaders, from whom voters expect a shining performance (Becker and 
Cuperus, 2010: 4).  
 
Research has indeed pointed to the increased personalisation of media coverage in the Netherlands come 
election time, suggesting that the media performances of politicians are an increasingly relevant 
consideration when looking at explanations of electoral support, particularly when this is sudden or 
explosive. Whereas there was a balanced coverage of political parties and political candidates in the 1994 
and 1998 elections, by 2002 65% of news reporting focussed on the candidates specifically (De Vreese, 
2008: 151). During the 2002 election campaign, Pim Fortuyn was the most frequently mentioned 
politician in the media, drawing 24% of all media focus – roughly equal to the amount of press coverage 
received altogether by the politicians of the parties that secured second, third, fourth and fifth positions 
(Koopmans and Muis, 2009: 643, 658). It was found that public discourse had a significant impact on 
electoral support for the LPF, as did “discursive opportunities”: the degree to which Fortuyn‟s claims 
were visible publicly, as well as the extent of public concordance with his rhetoric (Koopmans and Muis, 
2009: 654, 655). Electoral competition in the Netherlands therefore increasingly seems to demand a 
radiating performance from party leaders, suggesting that populist mavericks and political entrepreneurs 
would stand to gain the most from this turn towards political theatricality.   
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The collapse of the Wall Street investment bank Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008, prompting the 
outbreak of the current global financial crisis, has resulted in important challenges to the previously 
pervasive belief and trust in US-style economic liberalism (Callinicos, 2010). As seen, these financial and 
economic crises have necessitated a more interventionist role for the Dutch state which is reasserting 
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itself in a way that is almost diametrically opposed to the process of state withdrawal witnessed during the 
“neoliberal age” of the 1980s and 1990s. This reassertion of the state is however not motivated by 
ideology, but by economic necessity and pragmatism (Engelen and Musterd, 2010: 707). The intention of 
this chapter has been to contextualise the Dutch economy within the global financial crisis, observing the 
effects of these global developments at the national level. Although the Netherlands has fared better than 
some of its neighbours with regards to several important performance indicators, not least as a result of its 
favourable “starting position” at the onset of the crisis, the openness of the Dutch economy has rendered 
the country especially sensitive to global economic and financial turmoil. 
 
The analysis of voting behaviour in the Netherlands following on from the discussion of the Dutch 
economy highlights the increased volatility and fragmentation of the Dutch electorate in the aftermath of 
important societal processes including depillarisation, secularisation and the rise of the welfare state. In 
addition, the decline of the Volksparteien indicates how these traditional “system” parties have been 
especially hard-pressed to retain their core constituencies and remain politically competitive in the face of 
shifting popular concerns and the rise of new, formidable political contenders. The effect of the Dutch far-
right on the politics and electoral position of the centre is highlighted by the way in which the LPF and 
PVV have impacted especially upon the electoral prospects of the VVD and CDA on the centre-right, and 
the PvdA on the centre-left. The 2010 electoral performance of the economically conservative VVD 
reflects real public support for fiscal responsibility and austerity. Meanwhile, the PVV‟s vast 
improvement over its previous position and vote share, achieving third place on a strongly anti-
immigration platform, indicates that the public‟s cultural concerns about foreigners and protecting a 
distinctively “Dutch” way of life have by no means been marginalised by economic concerns in the 
present macro-climate. The next chapter looks in greater detail at the dynamic interplay between these 
cultural and economic concerns in shaping perceptions of intergroup threat and competition. These 
perceptions ultimately have important implications for intergroup attitudes in the Netherlands. 
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Chapter 5. Dutch Attitudes: Threat Perceptions and Realistic Group Conflict Theory 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Understanding what motivates negative sentiment towards out-groups is important for devising the 
appropriate strategies to ease intergroup hostility and discrimination (González et al., 2008: 668). 
Whereas the previous chapter observed patterns of electoral support as one manifestation of public 
attitudes, this chapter will look at the expression of Dutch public sentiment towards immigration and 
immigrant out-groups as reflected in public opinion surveys. Although a fair number of studies explain 
cross-national variance in public attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, there is a dearth of 
research on longitudinal changes in attitudes: what comparative work there is on the topic is 
“overwhelmingly geographical rather than temporal” (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011: 80). This 
chapter does not wish to observe trends in Dutch public opinion in isolation; observations of attitudinal 
change will thus be located within the context of the economic and financial developments discussed in 
Chapter Four and will also take into consideration recent patterns of electoral support. 
 
The global financial context is not observed here as a possible determinant of anti-immigration and anti-
immigrant sentiment. Whilst many studies consider the influences of economic and cultural factors on 
group attitudes, very few studies look at how or why opposition to immigration and sentiments towards 
immigrants shift (Brader et al., 2008: 960). The intention for this discussion is to observe whether less 
favourable macro-level structural conditions have been accompanied by shifting sentiments towards 
immigration, integration and immigrant out-groups. Public opinion is not static, suggesting that the 
conditions in which popular sentiments are readjusted are important, in addition to the underlying 
motivations for attitudinal shifts. This chapter therefore emphasises the role of social context and 
structure in understanding shifting responses at the group level towards ethnic minority out-groups, where 
intensified concerns about material and economic well-being, as well as about seemingly conflicting 
identities and values, could induce more negative inter-ethnic relations (Coenders et al., 2008: 283). 
 
Though causal links are not drawn, this chapter does explore some of the potential motivations underlying 
the attitudinal shifts observed. In order to examine the way in which possible shifts in Dutch public 
attitudes may have been motivated by economic and material considerations, changes in levels of public 
support for allocating immigrant out-groups certain finite, common material resources are observed. 
Changes in the evaluation of immigrants‟ cultural impact on Dutch society from 2008 to 2010 is 
considered to suggest something of the way in which shifts in Dutch public attitudes may have been 
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motivated by cultural and non-material considerations. Realistic Group Conflict Theory is relied upon to 
structure the discussion on threat perceptions arising from inter-group conflict and competition over 
scarce resources, which are conceptualised here – somewhat unconventionally – in both economic and 
cultural terms. The emphasis here is therefore not on explaining negative group attitudes, or how they 
come to be formed; the focus is on whether they change in the context of enhanced economic and 
financial pressure, what the extent of the shift is, and what the possible motivations for these shifting 
perspectives could be. Studies on intergroup perceptions in the Netherlands have in fact been largely 
consistent in finding that cultural explanations relating to national identity considerations are more 
pertinent predictors of negative out-group sentiment than considerations of economic or material 
wellbeing, especially where Islam and Muslim immigrants are concerned. 
 
This chapter therefore first presents the most pertinent findings of the public opinion surveys over the 
course of the 2008-2009-2010 period. The theoretical considerations that follow are intended to provide a 
framework for understanding the attitudinal trends highlighted. Though no conclusions will be drawn 
regarding the extent to which economic or cultural factors may have affected attitudinal change, the 
ensuing descriptive analysis about explanatory studies will evaluate the likely impact of material or non-
material considerations on shifting public perceptions towards immigration and immigrants in the context 
of the global financial crisis in the Netherlands.  
 
5.2 ANTI-IMMIGRATION SENTIMENTS 
 
In an effort to examine the extent to which attitudes towards immigrants and immigration in the 
Netherlands may have deteriorated in the context of the ongoing financial crisis and economic recession, 
especially with regards to Islam and Muslims, this chapter consults the findings of a series of three public 
opinion surveys from 2008, 2009 and 2010 carried out by the German Marshall Fund of the United States. 
The Transatlantic Trends: Immigration (TTI) study is one of the few surveys measuring longitudinal 
trends in public opinion towards immigration and integration policies in several European countries and 
in North America (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 974, 975). Also included are respondents from the United 
Kingdom and Canada. These surveys‟ express intention to gauge shifts in public attitudes towards 
immigrants and immigration – that is, attitudinal change over time – is especially well-suited to the 
purposes of this research. As the first survey was carried out in early September 2008, just prior to the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, the surveys enable comparison between attitudes before and during 
the structural climate of financial and economic pressure. The 2009 and 2010 surveys accorded particular 
focus to the effects of the crisis on attitudes (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 975).  
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Evaluating longitudinal time trends in public perceptions necessarily demands consistency in terms of 
conceptualisation, use of attitudinal measures, and regarding questions posed. A number of specific 
questions therefore feature repeatedly in each of the three successive surveys, enabling the comparison of 
responses between years and thus enhancing the perceptibility of attitudinal shifts. Certain relevant 
questions were however not posed consistently each year, meaning that some observations are not 
possible across the entire 2008 – 2010 period. It is important to bear in mind that the intention of 
consulting public perception data is not to examine the extent of public support for a particular statement 
or policy scenario; it is to observe variation in attitudes and shifts in levels of support, or opposition, from 
one year to the next. 
 
5.2.1 Transatlantic Trends: Immigration 
To assess the extent to which publics were generally optimistic or generally pessimistic about 
immigration in their respective countries, the 2008 Transatlantic Trends: Immigration survey asked 
respondents whether they viewed immigration as more of an opportunity or more of a problem. In 2008, 
47% of European respondents (from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and 
Poland) considered immigration more of a “problem” than an “opportunity”, whilst American 
respondents were split on this topic. In the case of respondents from the Netherlands and France however, 
majorities considered immigration more of an opportunity: that only 36% of Dutch respondents in 2008 
considered immigration to be more of a problem, meant that the Netherlands was the most optimistic 
country about immigration at the outset of the crisis (TTI 2008). Whilst a larger share of respondents in 
every country polled saw immigration as more of a problem in 2009 than in 2008, 45% of Dutch 
respondents considered immigration more a “problem” than an “opportunity” in 2009, meaning that the 
Netherlands experienced the greatest increase (9%) in the percentage of respondents who perceived 
immigration more negatively from 2008 to 2009. This indicates that less favourable economic conditions 
were accompanied by less positive public evaluations of immigration within the first 12 months of the 
crisis, though evidence of the economic crisis‟ impact on public opinion towards immigration was 
limited. From 2009 to 2010, a smaller share of Dutch respondents evaluated immigration negatively and 
the percentage of those deeming immigration a problem fell to 39% (recall that at the outset of the crisis 
this percentage was 36%), making the Netherlands one of the most pro-immigration countries (after 
Canada) in the survey once again (TTI 2010). 
 
Gustin and Ziebarth (2010: 987) suggest that the increase in the number of Dutch respondents considering 
immigration more of a problem than opportunity from 2008 to 2009 may be due to the “explicitly anti-
Islamic” PVV‟s political ascendancy over the course of this period. Wilders‟ various demands, including 
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the unheeded call to tax Muslim headgear, certainly intensified public and media debate around 
immigration and Islamic issues and may partially account for the negative direction of Dutch attitudes 
towards immigration from 2008 to 2009 (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 987). It is interesting however that 
the period from 2009 to 2010 saw more favourable attitudes, given that this survey was conducted in the 
build-up to the June 2010 general elections. This context would have seen political campaigns focussing 
greater attention on immigration and integration concerns, heightening the salience of these topics in the 
media and in public discourse. Nevertheless, considerably less favourable perceptions of immigration 
from 2008 to 2009 suggest an association with a less favourable macro-economic climate; whether this 
context was responsible for inducing perceptions about a heightened cultural or economic threat is 
something that will be discussed at a later point in this chapter. Gustin and Ziebarth (2010: 987) maintain 
that neither economic nor cultural perceptions of threat alone explain heightened levels of Dutch 
immigration scepticism from 2008 to 2009: instead, it is suggested that the enduring debates in the 
political, public and media realms about immigration, immigrants and integration, may more pertinently 
account for Dutch attitudinal shifts over this period. 
 
A degree of proof of greater immigration scepticism from 2008 to 2009 was witnessed by all respondents 
generally, declaring that they were more anxious about legal immigration in their respective societies if 
their household financial situations had deteriorated over the course of the 12 months between 2008 and 
2009. Though attempts were made to connect these higher levels of scepticism to the deepening effects of 
the global financial crisis, and though these levels may indeed be attributed to the economic crisis, the 
TTI data did not provide irrefutable confirmation to support this (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 975, 976).  
 
Evidence of a measurement effect was however found, whereby the actual process of answering survey 
questions impacted upon the attitudes of respondents towards immigration and immigrants. To gauge 
whether responses towards immigration had been affected by participation in the 2008 survey, some 
respondents were asked whether immigration presents more of an opportunity or more of a problem at the 
outset of the survey, whilst others were asked this same question upon completion. Other respondents 
were asked this question twice: once at the beginning and then again at the end. The Netherlands showed 
a large degree of discrepancy in this regard: the percentage of people considering immigration more of an 
opportunity at the end of the survey was 11% higher than when this question was asked at the beginning. 
Whilst this was true for all countries to a certain extent, it suggests that respondents in the Netherlands in 
particular do not have clearly-defined opinions about whether immigration poses more of a problem than 
an opportunity. Public perceptions towards these topics are thus highly complex and nuanced, and 
scepticism about the repercussions of immigration is “mixed with optimism” (TTI 2008). 
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In 2008, Dutch respondents were divided on perceptions about whether most Muslims arriving in the 
Netherlands have an interest in integrating culturally or not (47% vs. 44% respectively) (Gustin and 
Ziebarth, 2010: 987). Just over half (54%) of Dutch respondents in 2009 believed that unwillingness on 
the part of immigrants to integrate was the principle barrier to integration, whilst 30% were of the opinion 
that discrimination by Dutch society was the major culprit. That the greatest barrier to integration was 
considered to be immigrants‟ unwillingness was a finding that applied across the political-ideological 
spectrum, across age groups, and even across the education levels of respondents (Gustin and Ziebarth, 
2010: 986). This indicates broad societal consensus in the Netherlands that the responsibility for failure to 
integrate lies with immigrants themselves. The majority of Dutch citizens in 2009, 56%, favoured 
permanent labour migration over temporary migration – a percentage that remained exactly stable since 
the 2008 survey. For a majority of Europeans generally (54%), the main rationale for favouring 
permanent over temporary migration was that permanent immigrants are better able to integrate into 
society (TTI 2009). In 2010, the majority of Dutch continued to support granting legal labour migrants 
the opportunity to stay in the country permanently, although since 2008 the European average in support 
of this measure has declined slightly: 10% of European respondents asserted that the answer was context-
dependent, suggesting that European publics are starting to lean towards the differentiation of labour 
migration policies. The Dutch were however the most pessimistic about the extent of immigrants‟ 
integration in 2010, with only 36% agreeing that immigrants in general were integrating well (TTI 2010). 
This percentage was the same for evaluations of Muslim integration specifically, implying that Dutch 
respondents do not distinguish between the integration patterns of Muslim immigrants and immigrants in 
general. Perceptions about second-generation immigrant integration did however differ: a majority (66%) 
considered second-generation immigrants in general to be integrating well, whilst 56% evaluated the 
integration of Muslim immigrants‟ children positively (TTI 2010).  
 
In 2009, an exaggerated immigrant presence in the country was perceived: the estimated percentage of 
immigrants in the Netherlands was 25%, whilst the actual percentage is 11% (TTI 2009). However, the 
high number of naturalisations in the Netherlands means that the number of de jure immigrants, as 
reflected in official statistics, is not revealing of the perceptible foreign presence in the country. However, 
in comparison to other respondents, the Dutch were not inclined to perceive an excessive non-European 
immigrant presence in their country – only 32% thought this was so in 2009, decreasing to 27% in 2010 
(TTI 2009;  TTI 2010).  
 
In 2008, the Netherlands had one of the highest percentages of respondents (83%) who considered that 
immigrants should be given the same access to social welfare benefits as the native-born population (TTI 
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2008). Whilst 74% of Dutch in 2009 supported extending to legal immigrants the same social benefits as 
native-born Dutch, this percentage had dropped considerably over the preceding last 12 months, from 
83% in 2008 (TTI 2009). In 2009, legal immigrants were considered a lesser burden on social services 
than illegal immigrants, and less likely to pose a terrorist threat (TTI 2009). In 2010, 58% believed that 
health care should be made available to all immigrants, regardless of legal status, with 81% supporting 
across-the-board access to emergency healthcare (TTI 2010). In 2009, the Netherlands had the lowest 
percentage of public support (61%) for according immigrants the same rights to political participation as 
Dutch citizens, witnessing the greatest drop in support for this measure, from 68% in 2008 (TTI 2009). 
This period from 2008 to 2009 also saw a massive drop in levels of support for extending to legal 
immigrants the right to vote in local elections: from 76% supporting this right in 2008, to only 49% in 
2009 (TTI Topline data 2008; TTI Topline data 2009). In 2010 however, a majority (56%) of Dutch 
respondents supported extending local voting rights to legal immigrants (TTI 2010). Forty-two percent in 
the Netherlands in 2010 contended that access to state-run public schools should be made available to all 
citizens, including both legal immigrants and illegal immigrants (TTI Topline data 2010).  
 
In 2008, the Dutch were also the most optimistic about the cultural effects of immigration (72%). Despite 
a fair share of Dutch respondents agreeing that “Muslim” culture had important things to offer “Dutch” 
culture, the gap of 31% between evaluations of the positive cultural effects of immigration in general 
(72%) and Muslim immigration specifically (41%), was the largest of all the countries surveyed (Gustin 
and Ziebarth, 2010: 986). Though not an unexpected finding given the impassioned nature of the Islamic 
debate in the Netherlands highlighted thus far, this attitudinal discrepancy does provide important 
empirical evidence of the fact that the Dutch public evaluates the cultural benefits and threats of particular 
groups differently. It is therefore necessary that data on public opinion differentiate the various cultural 
and religious backgrounds of the immigrants referred to in surveys. Although most respondents also 
concurred in 2009 that immigration contributes favourably to national culture, and a majority supported 
policies to extend to immigrants equal social benefits and rights to political participation, there was 
considerable disapproval with the notion of government paying for language courses to facilitate 
integration (TTI 2009). Attitudes about immigrants‟ cultural enrichment potential for Dutch society were 
however somewhat less positive in 2010. Only a slim majority of Dutch respondents in 2008 (53%) 
considered Western European and Islamic lifestyles to be reconcilable, generally corresponding to the 
sentiments of other respondents (TTI 2008). 
 
In terms of whether European publics favoured immigrants who were more disposed to cultural 
adaptation, or whether finding employment was of greater importance, it was found that all respondents in 
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2009 prioritised both the cultural and economic integration of immigrants. In the Netherlands, however, a 
considerably larger share of respondents emphasised cultural adaptation (TTI 2009). In 2010, the 
Netherlands was once again an outlier for placing high priority on common cultural values as a 
precondition for citizenship, with 33% saying that shared cultural values were most important. Thirty-
seven percent considered the most important precondition for citizenship to be speaking the national 
language, with 27% highlighting respect for political institutions and laws. This suggests that cultural 
adaptation is a prime priority for full immigrant integration into Dutch society. In the Netherlands, culture 
and language are considered highly important criteria for integration and citizenship and this emphasis on 
language and cultural values should serve as a guideline to policymakers designing naturalisation 
conditions (TTI 2010).  
 
One of the key interests of the TTI survey in comparing attitudinal trends from 2008 to 2009 was the 
possible effect of the global financial crisis on attitudes towards immigration (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 
975). Unlike the 2008 study however, there were no questions referring explicitly to perceptions towards 
Muslim minorities in the 2009 TTI survey. It was found that concerns about the economic crisis 
overshadowed all other concerns in the countries surveyed, including issues of immigration. Although 
greater levels of moderate scepticism about immigration were found for all countries polled, with more 
respondents viewing immigration as a problem than an opportunity, the fact of Dutch respondents‟ 
considerably more negative attitudes in this regard in 2009 than in 2008, was identified as one of the key 
trends over the course of this 12-month period (Gustin and Ziebarth; 2010: 974, 975). Despite the 
generally unimpressive variation in attitudes towards immigration, the context of financial and economic 
crisis in which more negative sentiments towards immigration were witnessed among Dutch respondents 
does suggest that these structural conditions had some influence on this more negative attitudinal shift. As 
section 5.3.1.1 will show however, there is not much evidence of intensified perceptions of economic 
threat.  
 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the Dutch economy in 2009 had shown signs of recovery and 
attitudes among respondents in the Netherlands towards the economic prospects of the national, EU and 
global economies, as well as towards the domestic labour market, were reported by the European 
Commission (EC) to have shown the greatest improvement of all the EU27 countries polled since 2008 
(Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 984). In spite of this lack of evidence for economic-induced anxieties about 
immigration in the Netherlands, there was stronger support for tightening immigration controls among 
Dutch respondents from 2008 to 2009: the percentage of those favouring easier entry into the Netherlands 
for work or study purposes decreased from 64% to 55%. Similarly, despite the fact that the number of 
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foreign-born residents in the Netherlands has in fact remained reasonably stable in recent years, in the 
region of 10%, the TTI studies of 2008 and 2009 reflect increasing scepticism among the Dutch about 
immigration and integration issues (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 983). This suggests that explanations of 
attitudinal shifts in the Netherlands via reference to out-group size and recent increases in foreign 
numbers are insufficient. Gustin and Ziebarth (2010: 984) also suggest that given the inadequacies of 
economic threat perceptions in explaining this “increasingly restrictive mood” in the Netherlands, 
consideration of cultural concerns may be more helpful. 
 
The 2009 survey did find that enhanced personal financial pressure experienced by respondents in general 
had a certain effect on their immigration attitudes. In all the countries polled, excluding the United States, 
respondents whose household financial situation deteriorated over the preceding 12 months were more 
likely to express anxiety about legal immigration than households whose financial situations had either 
stayed the same or improved. Thirty-six percent of those Dutch respondents who reported that their 
household financial situations had deteriorated over the course of the last 12 months were worried about 
legal immigration; of those whose household financial situations had either improved or been stable 
however, 30% were worried about legal immigration (TTI 2009). The 2010 TTI survey also found that in 
general, respondents‟ personal economic, employment and financial statuses were important in shaping 
attitudes towards immigrants‟ impact on labour markets (TTI 2010). In 2010, 43% of European 
respondents who reported being unemployed were also of the opinion that immigrants take jobs away 
from European nationals; 35% of employed respondents, by contrast, thought the same. Similarly, of 
those Europeans whose household financial situation worsened from 2009 to 2010, 39% asserted that 
immigrants took jobs away from citizens; of those whose financial situation improved or remained stable, 
32% shared this opinion. The results for the Netherlands correspond to this aggregate European trend and 
there thus appears to be a certain effect of personal financial situation on changes both in attitudes 
towards legal immigrants and in evaluations of the labour market impact of immigrants (TTI 2010).  
 
In addition to this slight effect of household financial situation on fears about legal immigration, 
respondents‟ political inclinations had a considerably greater effect on perceptions towards immigration, 
indicating a degree of politicisation of immigration attitudes generally (TTI 2009). For all six European 
countries polled in 2009, right-leaning respondents were considerably more inclined to view immigration 
as a problem than respondents associating with the left (TTI 2009). Whilst the immigration attitudes of 
those on the left and in the centre remained relatively stable from 2008 to 2009, right-leaning European 
respondents were considerably more inclined to see immigration as a problem in 2009 compared to 12 
months prior (TTI 2009). Of those European respondents identifying with the right, there was a 7% 
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increase from 2008 to 2009 in the percentage that deemed immigration more of a problem than 
opportunity; the European left witnessed a 2% increase whilst the centre saw a 1% increase over this 
period (TTI 2009).  
 
A majority in the Netherlands (71%) in 2009 maintained that most of the immigrants in the country 
enjoyed legal status, though the majority of respondents also expressed anxiety about those immigrants in 
the country illegally (33% reported being worried about legal immigration whilst 58% reported being 
anxious about illegal immigration). Thirty-nine percent of Dutch respondents (up from 37% in 2008) also 
supported the legalisation of illegal immigrants, comparatively low in contrast to the responses of other 
countries. All countries surveyed in 2009 indicated more negative perceptions of illegal immigrants than 
legal immigrants (TTI 2009). Since 2008, the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration surveys have shown 
more favourable perceptions towards legal immigrants across the board (TTI 2010). Perceptions that legal 
immigrants increase crime in society deteriorated markedly from 2009 to 2010, from 54% to 45% 
respectively; perceptions that illegal immigrants increase crime also decreased, from 69% of Dutch 
respondents supporting this view in 2009, to 66% in 2010  (TTI Topline data 2010; TTI Topline data 
2010). Sixty-six percent of respondents in the Netherlands supported the immigration of environmental 
migrants affected by natural disasters, similar to the European average of 68%. The 2009 Transatlantic 
Trends: Immigration report therefore suggests that many of the negative stereotypes about immigrants 
today refer to illegal immigrants specifically and distinguishing between legal and illegal immigrant 
status in surveys is important (TTI 2009).  
 
The TTI survey recognised 2010 as a noteworthy year for immigration questions in both Europe and the 
United States. Like the 2009 survey, the primary intention was again to establish whether public 
perceptions of immigration had shifted in the context of economic anxieties in the countries included in 
the report: the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the 
Netherlands (TTI 2010). One of the key findings was that general attitudes about immigration, in terms of 
presenting more of a problem or opportunity, appeared to have stabilised. Though more pessimistic 
perceptions of immigration were seen in 2009, the possible effects of the economic crisis in heightening 
immigration scepticism were acknowledged to be “complex”: though majorities did not rate the economic 
implications of immigrants on natives‟ employment opportunities and wage levels as particularly 
significant, households that experienced greater financial pressure from 2008 to 2009 did indicate a 
greater propensity to display anxiety about legal immigration than those who were not adversely affected. 
Gustin and Ziebarth (2010: 975) consider this the only conclusive result of the 2009 survey. The 2010 
study similarly concludes that the economic crisis may have influenced perceptions towards immigration: 
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respondents whose personal financial situations deteriorated from 2009 to 2010 were more inclined to 
view immigrants as posing a competitive threat to labour market opportunities. As Gustin and Ziebarth 
(2010: 983) write, greater consideration of Dutch respondents‟ economic and cultural perceptions is a 
good starting point for understanding both heightened concern about immigration as well as the 
complexities surrounding public attitudes towards this phenomenon.  
 
5.3 THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND ETHNIC COMPETITION THEORY 
 
It has been said that the “perception of threat is the most powerful and consistent indicator of political 
intolerance across Europe” (Duch and Gibson in Cremona, 2010). Attempts to explain prejudice have 
often looked to personality factors; processes of categorisation via in-and out-group identification; 
membership to a particular social group; perceptions of cultural difference; and the defence of traditional 
values and those norms considered to “define” a particular group (González et al., 2008: 668). Increasing 
research interest has been accorded to the role of value differences and conflicts between groups in 
inducing prejudicial sentiments, where perceptions arise about cherished group principles and ideals 
being violated by the opposing beliefs of another group (González et al., 2008: 668). Much has been said 
of the link between prejudice towards out-groups and perceptions of threat and fear, and previous research 
has distinguished four basic types of threat, real or perceived, that can potentially result in prejudice: 
realistic threats, symbolic or cultural threats, negative stereotyping and intergroup anxiety (Stephan et al. 
in Zárate et al., 2004: 99; González et al., 2008: 668, 669). These threat perceptions may occur at either 
the individual or in-group levels, though this discussion is predominantly concerned with perceptions of 
symbolic and realistic threats at the group level, rather than at the level of the group members themselves.  
 
Even before the onset of the global financial crisis, it was shown and indeed widely accepted that inter-
ethnic relations in the Netherlands had evolved in an increasingly negative direction over time (Coenders 
et al., 2008: 270). The work of Semyonov et al. (2006) is one of the few studies examining longitudinal 
trends in attitudes towards foreigners. Investigating the development of anti-foreigner sentiment in 12 
European societies (including the Netherlands) from 1988 – 2000, the authors find considerable increases 
in anti-foreigner sentiment for all the countries observed. Corresponding to general trends, a steep 
increase in negative sentiment in the Netherlands was witnessed from 1988 to 1994. From 1994 to 1997, a 
slight decrease in anti-foreigner sentiment was found, after which negative out-group sentiments again 
increased, albeit mildly, reaching 1994 levels in the year 2000 (Semyonov et al., 2006: 436). Relative to 
the other European countries observed over this period, levels of anti-foreigner sentiment in the 
Netherlands appear to be middling. These findings, interestingly, corroborate those of Coenders et al. 
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(2008) who looked at shifting ethnic attitudes towards ethnic minorities in the Netherlands from 1979 to 
2002. Almost half the Dutch respondents surveyed (47%), endorsed ethnic discrimination in 1979 
(Coenders et al., 2008: 275). Forward seven years, this percentage decreased markedly to 25%, although 
from 1986 the share of ethnic Dutch favouring ethnic discrimination increased consistently up until about 
40% in 1992. A slim fall in support was witnessed until 1996, after which a sharp increase in support for 
discrimination was seen in 1998, attributed to greater endorsement of discrimination in the housing 
market (Coenders et al., 2008: 275). Since then, and up until 2002, the authors note that levels of support 
for ethnic discrimination appear to have stabilised at a level relatively similar to that in the early nineties. 
An important shortcoming of much of the data on public perceptions is that they are highly time-specific 
and data gathered prior to September 2001, if not used in conjunction with more recent studies to 
determine trends and variance, provide an incomplete picture (Savelkoul et al. 2010: 2) 
 
The two main explanations for intensified hostility towards out-groups look to anxieties surrounding 
economic and material concerns and concerns about clashing identities and values. Explanations of 
material and non-material sources of threat are typically seen to correspond to Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory and Social Identity Theory respectively (Coenders et al., 2008: 270, 271). This discussion is not 
concerned so much with the determinants of anti-immigration and anti-immigrant sentiment as it is about 
understanding attitudinal shifts witnessed in the current economic context. To this end, the extent to 
which particular trends in public responses in the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration surveys may have 
emerged in response to material or non-material sources of threat is explored. Particular reference is made 
to shifts in attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, data permitting. The principle theoretical interest here is 
group conflict and competition, though other common explanations for inter-group attitudes and 
behaviour are highlighted. Briefly discussed below are the hypotheses of Ethnic Competition Theory, 
encompassing the complementary premises of Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Social Identity 
Theory. The hypotheses of Intergroup Contact Theory also receive mention (Scheepers et al., 2002: 18; 
Savelkoul et al., 2010: 2).  
 
Central to Social Identity Theory is the role of group definition and categorisation in shaping attitudes, via 
the mental process of “social identification”. A supposedly inherent need to perceive one‟s own in-group 
positively, and sometimes more favourably and superior to other groups, results in negative attributes 
being applied to outsiders (Scheepers et al., 2002: 18; Coenders et al., 2008: 273). Unfavourable 
sentiments on the part of the in-group are then generalised to the entire out-group level via “social contra-
identification”; evaluating out-groups negatively is however not a given part of the process in cultivating 
a positive in-group identity and is said to depend on the extent of group identification, normative views 
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about group differences, as well as the political and ideological context in which social identity processes 
take place (González et al., 2008: 670; Savelkoul et al., 2010: 3, Scheepers et al., 2002: 18; Coenders et 
al., 2008: 273). Those identifying more strongly with the in-group, then, are considered more prone to 
being sensitive about potential threats to the wellbeing of the group (González et al., 2008: 670).  
 
Therefore, whereas realistic conflict focuses on “social-structural sources” of group variation, with 
economic competition serving as the central explanation for negative intergroup relations, social identity 
focuses on group membership, categorisation and identification (Sniderman et al., 2004: 36). The chief 
interest for this research however, is not in-group insularity and the (social-) psychological dimensions of 
negative attitudes towards out-groups. With the global financial crisis providing the contextual backdrop 
to this discussion, the suppositions of Realistic Group Conflict Theory are more pertinent to this attempt 
to assess whether increased economic and financial pressure in the Netherlands has been accompanied by 
intensified anti-immigrant and anti-immigration sentiment among a native Dutch in-group. Although 
theoretically distinguished here, Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory are not 
mutually exclusive and both are useful for understanding the underlying processes of group identity 
formation and ways in which negative sentiments towards immigrant minorities or other “out-groups” 
may be induced.  
 
Ethnic Competition Theory therefore combines the “dispositional notions” of Social Identity Theory as to 
why people possess a general predisposition towards viewing other groups negatively to begin with, and 
the “situational notions” of Realistic Group Conflict Theory. This gives rise to the hypothesis that in 
situations of intergroup competition or where perceptions of ethnic threat are prevalent, the twin 
processes of social identification and contra-identification will be heightened (Savelkoul et al., 2010: 3; 
Scheepers et al., 2002: 18; Schneider, 2008: 54). Negative sentiments towards out-groups, prejudice and 
proclivities towards ethnic exclusionism (entailing opposition to extending civil rights to legal migrants), 
are then evoked (Scheepers et al., 2002: 18; Schneider, 2008: 54). Ethnic Competition Theory holds that 
membership to particular social categories necessarily makes some in-group members more inclined to 
perceiving ethnic threat than other individuals within different social strata, implying that some 
individuals are more predisposed to harbouring exclusionary tendencies than others, especially within 
ethnically overlapping “economic niches” (Schneider, 2008: 54, 55). Therefore, those in disadvantaged 
socio-economic positions are expected to perceive more ethnic threat from immigrants when out-group 
members are of a similarly marginalised socio-economic position, as is the case for Muslims in the 
Netherlands. This theory clearly focuses on individual-level predictors of ethnic threat, albeit within a 
larger structural context, and is for this reason not appropriate to this express interest in group threat. 
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Another common explanation for negative out-group sentiments, though one that determines micro, 
individual-level variation in attitudes towards out-groups, is Intergroup Contact Theory which proffers a 
contradictory hypothesis to that of Ethnic Competition Theory. Whereas the latter considers a higher 
foreign presence to induce threat and negative sentiment, the former suggests that a more prevalent 
foreign presence heightens opportunities for exposure to cultural difference, enhancing the likelihood of 
in-group familiarisation with an immigrant other. Pre-conceived notions and stereotypes about the extent 
of inter-ethnic difference are thereby challenged and prejudice and perceptions of threat are ultimately 
reduced (González et al., 2008: 671; Savelkoul et al., 2010: 2, 4). The size of the out-group is thus often 
used as a measure not only of competition, but also of opportunities for intergroup contact (Schneider, 
2008: 53, 54). The contact hypothesis both explains hostility or prejudice towards a socially defined (out-) 
group, as well as suggests how this prejudice may be reduced via opportunities to perceive members of an 
out-group as more similar in terms of morals, beliefs and attitudes, for instance, than initially anticipated. 
Allport (1954) was instrumental in identifying four criteria for optimum contact between groups. Unless a 
proclivity towards prejudice is deeply imbedded in an individual‟s character, it is argued that prejudice 
may be reduced provided majority and minority groups approach one another as equals in the pursuit of 
common objectives. This effect will be buttressed by a supportive institutional and structural environment 
(laws, customs, norms and the general social milieu) and is conditional on whether contact is of such a 
nature that it provides opportunities for “acquaintance potential”, resulting in perceptions of common 
interest and humanity between groups (Allport, 1954: 281). The assimilationist turn in the Netherlands is 
evidence that the Dutch in-group and Muslim out-group are not accorded equal status in their engagement 
with one another. The requirement that Muslims discard visible symbols of their Islamic identity and 
assume Dutch cultural norms reflects a decidedly asymmetrical strategy for integration. It appears then 
that in the Dutch context, a key criterion for prejudice-reducing contact is absent.  
 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory emphasises the impact of contextual circumstances in shifting responses 
towards ethnic out-groups. The research of Coenders et al. (2008: 271) on changing ethnic attitudes in the 
Netherlands corroborates the centrality of structural and ideological context for understanding shifting 
public reactions towards minority groups. It is shown that the various integration strategies undertaken in 
the Netherlands have had important consequences for interethnic attitudes and Dutch attitudes towards 
Muslim groups have reportedly been less favourable in an assimilation, as opposed to multicultural, 
context (Coenders et al., 2008: 269). Over the course of a shifting ideological milieu from 2001 to 2004, 
the attitudes of ethnic Dutch towards Islamic out-groups (Turks and Moroccans) deteriorated, whilst 
public perceptions of Antilleans and Surinamese did not differ significantly (Coenders et al.; 2008: 282). 
Dutch respondents also perceived all ethnic out-groups more unfavourably in an assimilation ideological 
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context as opposed to a multicultural ideological context – effects which were more pronounced for 
Turkish and Moroccan out-groups, but were still also found for attitudes towards Surinamese and 
Antilleans (Coenders et al., 2008: 282). As highlighted in Chapter Three, concerns about group identity in 
the Netherlands focus particularly on Turks and Moroccans by virtue of their Islamic religious-cultural 
identity, whereas other minority groups are perceived as less “problematic” to Dutch identity (Coenders et 
al., 2008: 272). The turn from multiculturalism towards assimilation thus appears to have resulted in more 
negative sentiments towards Islamic groups in particular and these findings do suggest that a shifting 
ideological context is relevant for understanding attitudes towards out-groups. The possibility of 
alternative explanations other than ideological context for less favourable attitudes towards Muslims over 
this period is acknowledged by the authors, but they fail to mention specifically the significant series of 
“shock events” occurring between 2001 and 2004 that have had a lasting influence on public debate in the 
Netherlands, such as 9/11 and the murders of Fortuyn and van Gogh. 
 
“Situational” triggers (contextual features) and predisposing factors (individual characteristics) may have 
an interactive effect on exclusionary reactions, where contextual triggers may either spur those already 
predisposed towards supporting a particular policy (by virtue of their status in society or political-
ideological inclinations, for instance), or mobilise more general, broader public support (Sniderman et al., 
2004: 46). Public support for exclusionary policies may therefore either be intensified or generated, the 
latter enlarging the share of public support for exclusionary policies over and above that core of the 
electorate already inclined, dispositionally, to support them (Sniderman et al., 2004: 36). This thesis has 
so far considered the cultural and social conditions in which inter-group relations in the Netherlands have 
taken place: it has been observed, for instance, how an ideological shift from multiculturalism to cultural 
assimilation, rising secularism, and the demise of a strong Calvinist tradition have shaped popular 
consciousness and ideas about contemporary “Dutch” identity. The particular interest of this chapter, 
however, is the role of expressly economic period effects in affecting attitudinal shifts over time in the 
context of the global financial crisis.  
 
Contextual-level theories look at structural conditions and why in-groups are inclined to develop specific 
views towards out-groups in certain settings (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 317, 318). The most common 
theoretical perspective in this regard is that of group threat, where the intergroup competition that results 
in unfavourable attitudes is regarded in zero-sum terms. Whether the competitive circumstances giving 
rise to group hostility need to be real or perceived is debatable; irrespective, exclusionary and prejudicial 
responses by the in-group are believed to materialise under conditions of (real or perceived) competitive 
threat to the collective economic, cultural or religious interests of the in-group (Ceobanu and Escandell, 
125 
 
2010: 318). This discussion is especially interested in why group attitudes vary over time and not why 
attitudes vary across individuals (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown, 2011: 94). Economic conditions in the 
wider context of the global financial crisis provide the macro-level setting in which the evolution of 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are observed. In line with Realistic Group Conflict Theory, 
less prosperous economic periods which intensify real or perceived intergroup competition are anticipated 
to be more conducive to the intensification of negative attitudes, though the literature has shown that the 
attitudinal effects of economic conditions are contested (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 322).  
 
Quillian‟s 1995 cross-national comparative study of anti-immigrant attitudes, using Eurobarometer data 
on 12 European countries, was instrumental for using both individual and contextual-level predictors. His 
research results support the perceived group-threat hypothesis which, like Ethnic Competition Theory, 
asserts that relative out-group size has a positive effect on anti-immigrant prejudice. Average levels of 
prejudice in European Economic Community (EEC) countries were strongly associated with in-group 
perceptions of threat. Perceptions of economic competition and threat were dependent on a country‟s 
economic situation (in terms of 5-year GDP per capita) as well as out-group size (percentage of non-EEC 
citizens), which strongly influenced prejudice levels (Quillian, 1995: 601, 605, 606). The author‟s 
intentions to advance an expressly group-level explanation of prejudicial attitudes were buttressed by the 
finding that micro-level variables, such as individual characteristics, were insufficient on their own in 
explaining cross-national variation in prejudice (Quillian, 1995: 599). McLaren (2003: 925) similarly 
found that a sense of group threat to resources or national symbols resulted in a willingness to expel 
immigrants. Willingness to oust immigrants was mainly motivated by perceptions of cultural and 
religious threat to the nation, and by threats to the economic well-being of other citizens and society as a 
whole (group threats) – not so much by anxieties over personal well-being (McLaren, 2003: 925). Like 
Quillian, it was found that individual threats were either fairly weak or insignificant predictors of 
exclusionary sentiments in most European countries, coinciding with findings that self-interest has little 
direct influence on voting behaviour and that concern for one‟s country or society is important (McLaren, 
2003: 925). The next section examines group-level competition and threat perspectives further, within the 
framework of Realistic Group Conflict Theory. 
 
5.3.1 Realistic Group Conflict Theory 
Competitive group threat perspectives are especially salient to Realistic Group Conflict Theory, which 
maintains that competition among social groups over finite common resources results in conflicts of 
interest and negative attitudes towards out-groups (Savelkoul et al., 2010: 2; Scheepers et al., 2002: 18; 
Zárate et al., 2004: 100; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010: 318). Circumstances of heightened competition 
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over scarce resources are important to this theory, and are considered to foster perceptions about group 
interests and goals being incompatible, thereby heightening levels of perceived group threat and giving 
rise to negative reactions towards out-groups (Esses et al., 1998: 701; Coenders et al., 2008: 271). In-
groups are said to develop notions that they have a proprietary claim on certain resources, which reflects a 
clearer sense of social position vis-à-vis other groups resulting from historically asymmetrical power 
relations (Quillian, 1995: 588). When a dominant group perceives challenges to resources that it had 
come to regard as its own, defensive reactions to protect majority in-group interests are prompted towards 
those out-groups identified as the source of threat to this “exclusive claim to privileges” (Quillian, 1995: 
588; Coenders et al., 2008: 281). Whether this response manifests in prejudice or hostility depends on the 
extent of threat perceived or experienced (McLaren, 2003: 915). Quillian (1995: 588) refers to this as 
“group-threat theory”, of which Realistic Group Conflict Theory is considered an adaptation, and which 
stresses the relationship between perceptions of threat to in-group prerogatives and expressions of 
prejudice towards out-groups. The chief assumption of Realistic Group Conflict Theory then, is that 
intergroup relations revolve around in-group attempts to maintain a dominant position in economic and 
resource terms; this thesis argues that this similarly applies to desires to maintain a dominant cultural 
position with regards to values and identity (Schneider, 2008: 54).  
 
The connection between less favourable economic conditions and prejudice is seen to stem either from 
the transferral of responsibility for economic hardship to out-groups in line with scapegoating tactics, or 
from competition experienced between groups over finite resources (Quillian, 1995: 590). This thesis 
discussion conceptualises these finite resources in both economic and cultural terms. Shifts in attitudes 
among the Dutch public during the global financial crisis towards the allocation of both economic and 
cultural resources to immigrant out-groups are therefore examined. Whilst competition or the transferral 
of blame may occur between individuals, the collective threat hypothesis says that deteriorating economic 
conditions among a few in-group members will heighten prejudice among all group members and not 
only among those experiencing competition from immigrants directly; correspondingly, when economic 
conditions improve, weaker perceptions of competition diminish the sense of group threat (Quillian, 
1995: 590).  
 
Though perceptions of competition and threat may occur at the individual or group levels, Realistic Group 
Conflict Theory focuses upon conflict occurring at the group level and how the wellbeing and interests of 
the group and society at large are perceived to be at stake (Esses et al., 1998: 701). Perceptions of 
collective threat do not necessarily correspond to the interests of individual group members and the 
prejudice arising from threats to established group privileges is understood as a collective phenomenon, 
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with group relations ultimately influencing individual attitudes (Quillian, 1995: 586). Important in 
inducing this sense of collective threat is the perception that resources are under pressure and are 
potentially not available to all groups in adequate measure; group competition therefore represents a 
“zero-sum” game, where one group‟s gains imply losses for the other (Esses et al., 1998: 704; McLaren, 
2003: 915). Potential contenders for these scarce resources must thus be perceived as “competitive” by 
the in-group: that is, comparable to the in-group with regards to certain relevant qualities or aspects 
(Zárate et al., 2004: 100). To be considered a threat then, potential “competitors” must be considered 
similar to the in-group in terms of certain “relevant” dimensions (educational or occupational level, for 
example); for “irrelevant” dimensions pertaining to characteristics such as ethnicity or religion that are 
unrelated to the ability to attain resources, the more the out-group is perceived as dissimilar from the in-
group in terms of cultural criteria such as morals and values, the more likely perceptions of competitive 
threat will be (Esses et al., 1998: 704; Zárate et al., 2004: 100). The extent to which a certain out-group is 
considered to pose a competitive threat therefore depends on perceived sources of similarity and 
dissimilarity with the in-group in terms of relevant and irrelevant dimensions. This gives rise to the 
important hypothesis of Realistic Group Conflict Theory that perceived out-group threat is greater among 
in-group members who perceive their own status as similar to that of the majority of out-group members 
where relevant work-related dimensions are concerned.  
 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory reflects the materialistic assumptions of Marxist theory, emphasising the 
link between real in-group interests and perceptions of what constitutes group interests (Bobo in Quillian, 
1995: 588). Despite the theory‟s explicit reference to “realistic” group conflict, suggesting in-group 
prejudice as a reaction to collective threats to the real interests of the in-group, Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory has been revised to include both actual and perceived dimensions of group competition and threat. 
Previous research has shown how perceived competition can serve as a strong predictor of perceived 
threat – indeed, that perceptions of threat are responsible for most directly determining unfavourable 
attitudes vis-à-vis ethnic minorities (Savelkoul et al., 2010: 2). This brings to mind the words of 
American sociologist William Isaac Thomas that “when people define situations as real, they become real 
in their consequences” (Bauman, 2011: 83). Ceobanu and Escandell (2010: 318) similarly comment upon 
the potential of perceived group threat to be as powerful as actual group threat, both when material, 
tangible resources come under pressure, and when nonmaterial commodities are at stake.  
 
Neither Social Identity Theory nor Realistic Group Conflict Theory adequately account for cultural 
conflict and competition in the same way that traditional interpretations of Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory explain economic-induced rivalry over tangible resources. Social Identity Theory focuses on the 
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projection of favourable and unfavourable attributes onto particular groups as part and parcel of the 
process of group identity formation; the way in which the construction of social identities can give rise to 
culturally-motivated conflict and competition is however underemphasised. That conventional 
interpretations of Realistic Group Conflict Theory do not explain non-material conflict, is considered a 
serious shortcoming, and the theory‟s preoccupation with material explanations limits its overall 
explanatory power. Group conflict is considered here to have as much a cultural dimension as an 
economic or material component. In an effort to emphasise the contestation between values, ideals and 
identities that are perceived as incompatible and irreconcilable, the use of Realistic Group Conflict 
Theory in this discussion will focus on cultural and symbolic sources of threat in addition to the 
consideration of conventional group conflict explanations that look to economic and material motivations. 
This discussion therefore takes the liberty of amending Realistic Group Conflict Theory somewhat, to the 
extent that the focus is not overwhelmingly on material sources of conflict. Schneider (2008: 54) similarly 
extends the dominantly material focus of Realistic Group Conflict Theory by including conflict over 
perceived value differences in her definition of the theory: indeed, her research on anti-immigrant 
attitudes in Europe ultimately supported a cultural, and not economic, interpretation of Ethnic 
Competition Theory.  
 
Distinguishing between different dimensions of competition and sources of threat allows for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the origins of ethnic threat perceptions and what contributes towards 
them, thereby enabling the devising of appropriate strategies and policies to assuage threat-induced 
prejudice and negative group attitudes. The fact that competition and conflict can occur just as much 
within the realm of the intangible and immaterial, as that of the tangible and material, suggests that 
Realistic Group Conflict Theory is appropriate for explaining threats to national identity or culture. 
Depending on the circumstances in question, economic competition or group identity concerns may vary 
in their relevance for explaining negative intergroup attitudes – or, as is the express intention of this 
thesis, explaining possible shifts towards more negative sentiments (Coenders et al., 2008: 282). 
Sniderman et al. (2004: 36) support this notion about the fluctuating significance of material and non-
material factors for group attitudes, contending that citizens‟ concerns about economic and cultural issues 
are not continuous: these issues assume heightened salience in the “right” circumstances and when 
particular risks to economic or cultural identity prospects become prominent. As indicated, numerous 
studies have pointed towards the relationship between perceptions of collective group threat and 
prejudiced attitudes; in order to understand more about the sources of threat undergirding this 
relationship, it is necessary to consider the material and non-material dimensions of perceived threat in 
greater depth. Group competition stemming from perceptions of rational and economic threat is observed 
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first, followed by that group conflict which is motivated more by cultural and symbolic sources of 
perceived threat. 
 
5.3.1.1 Rational and Economic Threat 
Although the Netherlands occupied a more favourable “starting position” compared to its neighbours at 
the outset of the global financial crisis, the relative economic and financial decline experienced since 
2008 has enhanced the salience of economic concerns, as evidenced by the heightened priority accorded 
to these issues during the 2010 electoral campaign. The 2009 and 2010 Transatlantic Trends: 
Immigration surveys indicated that respondents in the Netherlands listed “the economy” as the most 
important issue in the country, overshadowing all other concerns including immigration (TTI Topline data 
2009; TTI Topline data 2010). Further indicating the prioritisation of economic concerns in this context is 
the fact that support for raising the legal retirement age in the Netherlands increased dramatically from 
2008 to 2010, from 28% to 43% – the greatest increase in public endorsement for this measure of all the 
countries polled (TTI Topline data 2010). The preponderance of economic and financial concerns was 
also demonstrated by the outcome of the 2010 Dutch general elections, where the VVD – the party most 
in favour of harsh austerity measures to tackle the budget deficit – achieved the largest share of electoral 
support. It is therefore evident that less favourable economic conditions in the Netherlands have been 
accompanied by the enhanced salience of economic concerns. However, the extent to which greater 
economic concern may have induced perceptions of out-group threat, thereby heightening levels of 
prejudice and negative sentiment towards immigrant groups and immigration, is not so clear-cut. 
 
As indicated by the surveys, those respondents who experienced greater household financial pressure did 
indicate greater anxiety about legal immigration than those who were reportedly not affected by negative 
economic circumstances. This finding is relatively self-evident: it is to be expected that the extent of 
economic competition experienced varies according to social category, where in-group members whose 
social position is similar to that of most ethnic minority members will be subject to higher levels of out-
group competition and will thus be more predisposed to ethnic exclusionism (Scheepers et al., 2002: 19). 
Because a large share of immigrants and Muslims occupy a socio-economically marginalised position in 
the Netherlands, they will necessarily pose a greater economic and social threat to “lower-strata 
members” of the ethnic Dutch majority; in-group members with similarly low educational and income 
levels, who are unemployed, perform manual labour and live in urban areas, will face more competition 
on average in the labour market and elsewhere from ethnic minorities than other Dutch citizens 
(Scheepers et al., 2002: 19). Scheepers et al. (2002: 19) write that these very real competitive conditions 
may reinforce in-group-out-group social identification, inducing more support for ethnic exclusionism. 
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Recall that hypotheses about economic threat describe how in-group perceptions about out-group 
members possessing similar skills and “relevant” attributes will heighten the sense of threat to in-group 
job and financial security (Zárate et al., 2004: 104). Though this constitutes a micro-level perspective of 
in-group threat, and the focus of this thesis is not to look at variation in perceptions of threat and 
competition across individuals, Quillian‟s (1995) aforementioned study did highlight the interaction 
between individual- and group-levels of competition. Perceptions of threat to the group trickle down to 
the individual level, resulting in perceptions of threat to the well-being of the person or household. 
Importantly, perceptions of threat among a few in-group members can also be interpreted as a collective 
threat to the interests of the dominant group as a whole. 
 
Despite the context of the global financial crisis showing more negative sentiments towards immigration 
(more of a “problem” than “opportunity”), the surveys do not seem to indicate intensified perceptions of 
economic threat towards immigrants themselves. For example, the percentage of Dutch respondents of the 
opinion that immigrants take away jobs from native workers in fact decreased from 27% in 2008 to 23% 
in 2009, (increasing marginally to 24% in 2010), indicating that immigrants were not considered more of 
a threat to the native labour market in a less favourable economic climate (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 
983, 984; TTI Topline data 2010). In contrast, in both the United Kingdom (50%) and United States 
(57%), majorities maintained that immigrants negatively impact natives‟ job security. Two-thirds of 
Dutch respondents in 2009 did not believe that immigrants brought wages down – the largest percentage 
of all countries polled for this survey (TTI 2009). The share of Dutch respondents blaming immigrants for 
having a negative effect on the wages of natives actually decreased: whereas 27% of respondents in 2009 
considered immigrants to have a downward effect on native wages in 2009, 23% held this opinion in 
2010 (TTI Topline data 2010). A greater share of respondents in 2010 (51%) than in 2009 (43%) also 
recognised the employment-creating potential of those immigrants that set up new businesses in the 
Netherlands (TTI Topline data 2010).  
 
In 2008, the Netherlands had one of the highest percentages (83%) of respondents who considered that 
legal immigrants should be given the same access to social welfare benefits as the native-born population; 
the share of respondents who supported this in 2009 did however decrease to 74% (TTI 2008; TTI 2009). 
In 2010, 58% believed that health care should be made available to all immigrants, regardless of legal 
status, with 81% supporting across-the-board access to emergency healthcare (TTI 2010). The fact that 
the perception that immigrants benefit from Dutch health and welfare services over and above what they 
contribute in taxes actually decreased from 2009 (52%) to 2010 (41%), indicates that resentment towards 
immigrants benefiting disproportionately from the welfare state did not seem to increase over this period 
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(TTI Topline data 2010). Respondents in 2010 also showed a large degree of divergence on this matter of 
immigration‟s fiscal impact on the Dutch economy: 41% deemed immigrants a “fiscal drain” whilst 24% 
considered immigrants a benefit and 25% indicated that they were unsure of immigrants‟ fiscal impact 
(TTI 2010). Perceptions about legal and illegal immigrants being a burden on social services also 
decreased from 2009 to 2010, from 45% (legal) and 60% (illegal), to 40% and 53% respectively. 
 
The TTI surveys therefore reveal that the Dutch public generally does not appear to attribute greater 
personal financial pressure to the impact of immigrants on natives‟ wages and employment opportunities. 
So whilst the economic concerns of the Dutch public have become considerably more salient, there is not 
much evidence of Quillian‟s (1995) scapegoating tactics in the Netherlands, in the economic sense at 
least. The heightened salience of economic issues does not appear to be accompanied by the collective 
blaming of immigrants for the economic and financial woes of those in-group members whose personal 
and household financial positions deteriorated in this context, as suggested by the aforementioned group 
threat hypothesis described by Quillian (1995). In the Netherlands, there does not seem to be a significant 
degree of group threat stemming from perceptions about Muslim immigrants possessing similar work-
related credentials and competing for similar labour market opportunities as the ethnic Dutch population. 
It is logical to expect that among those native Dutch with similar educational or skills levels to the 
majority of Muslim immigrants, a greater degree of economic and material threat is perceived and 
experienced. On the aggregate, group level however, where Muslims in the Netherlands occupy a more 
marginal socio-economic position vis-à-vis the majority ethnic Dutch population, explanations about real 
and perceived economic threat do not seem sufficient for making sense of greater Dutch immigration 
scepticism.   
 
Even in the context of the global financial crisis then, debates on immigrants and immigration appear to 
have remained predominantly cultural and have not taken on economic undertones. Despite enhanced 
economic and financial pressure, Dutch respondents show a considerably higher preference for cultural, 
rather than economic preconditions for immigration and citizenship. This reflects the fact that concerns 
about immigrants and immigration continue to be predominantly about cultural difference, even in less 
favourable economic circumstances. Worsening economic and financial conditions do not appear to have 
been accompanied by more negative sentiments towards immigrant out-groups, or by a greater desire to 
reduce immigrants‟ access to economic resources in the form of social benefits. In addition, perceptions 
about immigrants‟ negative impact on the financial prospects of Dutch natives, in terms of influencing 
wages and access to jobs, decreased in the context of economic recession. This suggests that Dutch 
perceptions about immigrants posing an economic threat to the material well-being of the dominant group 
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have in fact decreased during the financial crisis, contrary to the material hypotheses of Realistic Group 
Conflict Theory.  
 
5.3.1.2 Cultural and Symbolic Threat 
Attitudes towards out-groups and their members are not motivated by economic or material self-interest 
only and may be driven by a desire to protect the social welfare and certain defined cultural symbols of 
the in-group (McLaren, 2003: 916). Perceived threats to group national identity and culture are 
intrinsically of a collective nature. Prejudice stemming from symbolic factors is a form of resistance to 
change to the status quo, guided by “moral feelings” that out-groups are responsible for undermining 
traditional in-group values (Kinder and Sears in McLaren, 2003: 916). As previously discussed in Chapter 
Three, perceived threats to “Dutch” values from Islam in particular may for example stem from the 
incongruity of an overt and externalised religious presence in secular Dutch society; the threat of a 
“patriarchal culture” to the principle of gender equality; or from the clash between a “cohesive”, 
communitarian group identity and the highly-valued spirit of individualism in the Netherlands. Therefore, 
though stereotypical and misinformed perceptions of “otherness” and difference contribute towards 
tension between a Dutch majority and Muslim minority, there are nevertheless fundamental and very real 
points of division around particular values (Sniderman et al., 2004: 47). The extent to which identity 
concerns and symbolic threats influence issues related to immigrants and immigration is said to be 
dependent on the “prominence” of group distinctiveness, which promotes perceptions about intrinsic 
cultural identity differences along the lines of those cherished group values, morals, beliefs and symbols 
that make up a particular “worldview” (Sniderman et al., 2004: 36, 37; González et al., 2008: 669; Zárate, 
2004: 100).  
 
Sniderman et al. (2004: 47) write that culture is essentially a “concentration of shared convictions”: a 
collective understanding of what is morally right or wrong and what should be protected and prioritised, 
or outlawed. The perception that an out-group promotes a contrasting worldview to that of the in-group is 
considered threatening to a supposedly “coherent” dominant cultural identity. The in-group consequently 
fears the  displacement of an “established” and given way of life, prompting negative reactions towards 
the out-group (González et al., 2008: 669; Zárate et al., 2004: 100; Coenders et al., 2008: 272). Studies 
have shown the connection between perceptions of threat to in-group values and more hostile attitudes 
towards immigrant and minority out-groups (González et al., 2008: 669). McLaren‟s (2003) study on 17 
European countries, for instance, revealed that perceived threats to national and cultural identity were 
associated with anti-immigrant attitudes among the in-group. Schneider‟s (2008: 53, 63) cross-national 
study on 21 European countries revealed that immigrants‟ non-Western background contributed more to 
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average levels of perceived ethnic threat than the economic status and educational levels of immigrants: 
lack of familiarity and fears about clashing values and culture offered a more plausible explanation for the 
relationship between size of the out-group and anti-immigrant attitudes, than economic and social 
competition between groups (Schneider, 2008: 53). Similarly, Sniderman et al. (2004: 43) found that 
concerns surrounding Dutch national identity and culture had a more significant impact upon ethnic 
attitudes and behaviour than economic concerns, and immigrants‟ lack of cultural integration was of 
considerably greater significance than a lack of economic integration with regards to evoking opposition 
to immigration. 
 
Identity issues are at the heart of many ethnic conflicts and anti-immigrant attitudes globally, and during 
relatively good economic conditions, concerns about conflicting group identities and values may 
overshadow economic and material concerns (Coenders et al., 2008: 282). Several studies have revealed 
that concerns about national identity have increased substantially in the Netherlands since the turn of the 
millennium, with the majority of public discussion surrounding threats to Dutch identity and culture 
focussing on Islam in particular, which has come to be identified as a symbol of the challenges associated 
with ethnic minorities and cultural diversity (Coenders et al., 2008: 282). As mentioned in the previous 
section, the economic marginalisation of the Muslim minority in the Netherlands and their social deficits 
vis-à-vis the majority Dutch population suggest that Muslims represent less an economic threat in terms 
of competing over scare resources such as houses and jobs, and more a symbolic and cultural source of 
competition. Therefore, there is not so much evidence of economic competition between an ethnic Dutch 
majority and Muslim minority, as there is evidence of cultural conflict over norms and values and 
concerns about identity (Savelkoul et al., 2010: 4). 
 
The research of Sniderman et al. (2004: 45, 46) on the Netherlands similarly found support for the 
hypothesis that cultural conflict is the main factor in inducing negative responses to immigrant minority 
out-groups. Though economic threats at both the personal and national level were a significant source of 
hostility towards all immigrant groups, concerns about national identity and perceived threats to Dutch 
culture were substantially stronger predictors of hostility and exclusionary responses towards minority 
groups, regardless of whether the group was Muslim or not (Sniderman et al., 2004: 40). The data used 
for these analyses were however gathered between 1997 and 1998, before September 2001 and the 
murders of van Gogh and Pim Fortuyn – events which were influential in steering the Dutch immigration 
and integration debates in a more restrictionist direction, centring greater attention on Islam and Muslims.  
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According to the 2008 TTI survey, the Dutch were the most optimistic about the cultural potential of 
immigration (72%) to improve Dutch society via exposure to new ideas and customs. Over the course of 
the first year of the financial crisis however, Dutch perceptions about the positive cultural influence of 
immigration decreased markedly: 60% of respondents evaluated immigration‟s cultural influence 
positively in 2009, after which the level of these attitudes remained stable, at 59% in 2010 (TTI Topline 
data 2010). This finding does suggest, interestingly, that economic conditions may well have an influence 
on cultural evaluations of out-groups. This trend also largely appears to mirror the aforementioned shift in 
Dutch sentiments about whether immigration presents more of a problem or opportunity: a strong 
decrease in positive evaluations from 2008 to 2009, after which the period from 2009 to 2010 does not 
see a marked shift in attitudes. In 2009, of those considering immigration more of a problem than 
opportunity (45%), a majority (58%) considered immigration to impact Dutch culture negatively, 
suggesting that the majority of those with anti-immigration sentiments are motivated by perceptions of 
cultural threat (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 985). The implication is that the Dutch public‟s perceptions of 
immigration in general are closely connected to cultural evaluations of this process. Perceptions about the 
cultural credentials of out-groups are important not only for overall evaluations of immigration, but also 
for understanding changes in the extent to which immigration is perceived in a  positive light, or with 
greater scepticism. The negligible change in perceptions about the impact of immigration on the Dutch 
labour market from 2008 to 2010 (in terms of immigrants‟ perceived impact on wages and the 
employment opportunities of natives), thus lends credence to this possibility that the shift towards greater 
Dutch scepticism vis-à-vis immigration during the financial crisis is associated more with less favourable 
cultural evaluations of immigration, than less favourable economic evaluations of immigration.  
 
Whilst this discussion has distinguished between the material and non-material determinants of negative 
group sentiment, threats to cultural identity and economic self-interest are not mutually exclusive and 
considerations of material and non-material threats are very much “entangled” (Sniderman et al., 2004: 
41). It has been suggested, for instance, that perceptions of threat to the national economy have a “strong 
symbolic component”, where an essentially economic sense of threat can translate into a threat to national 
identity (Sniderman et al., 2004: 42). Material and non-material concerns occupy a dynamic place in 
public discourse and are constantly shifting: whereas a particular period may result in public prioritisation 
of non-material and symbolic concerns related to national identity and culture, other circumstances may 
see material and economic concerns hold greater sway over attitudes towards immigrant out-groups and 
immigration. The relative importance of economic and cultural threats in contributing to negative 
perceptions is therefore context-dependent. Sniderman et al. (2004: 47) found that when the issue of 
culture assumes heightened significance, it generates as powerful a response proportionately among those 
135 
 
least concerned about a threat to Dutch culture, as it does among those most concerned about this issue. 
This demonstrates the mobilisation potential of cultural and symbolic concerns in Dutch society 
generally, even among those for whom the issue is not a perpetual concern. Even in the context of 
economic recession in the Netherlands, where public prioritisation was indeed accorded to issues 
pertaining to the national economy, perceptions of immigrant out-groups and immigration appear to be 
dominated by a cultural logic.  
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter therefore finds some support for the Realistic Group Conflict Theory hypothesis insofar as 
perceptions of cultural and non-material threat are concerned. The economic dimensions of this theory 
however are less relevant to the Netherlands under the circumstances of the global financial crisis: despite 
the less favourable economic conditions in which attitudinal shifts towards immigration and immigrants 
were observed, there is not much evidence from the Transatlantic Trends: Immigration studies to suggest 
that immigrants have been perceived as a greater economic threat to in-group interests. This implies that 
the considerably more negative sentiments towards immigration witnessed from 2008 to 2009 were not 
motivated by perceptions of material threat. As questions pertaining to immigration and integration in the 
Netherlands appear to be evaluated more from a cultural than economic perspective, an association 
between economic conditions and cultural evaluations of immigration and immigrant out-groups is more 
likely. The “failure” of Islamic groups to integrate into the Dutch labour market, for instance, is 
considered a question of cultural difference. From this perspective then, the economic marginalisation of 
Dutch Muslim reflects unsuccessful cultural integration patterns (Gustin and Ziebarth, 2010: 984). This 
possible association between less favourable economic conditions and heightened perceptions of cultural 
threat is deserving of greater exploratory analysis.   
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Chapter 6. Conclusion 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
At the heart of the debate surrounding immigration and integration in the Netherlands, especially where 
this concerns Muslims and Islam, are questions about norms and values. Indeed, Akkerman (2005: 346) 
comments that “the extent to which the debate about integration and immigration in the Netherlands has 
been dominated by the Enlightenment framework is remarkable”. This “Enlightenment lens” was already 
developed in 1991, when Frits Bolkestein, then-leader of the VVD, attacked the political correctness of 
the Dutch left and warned against the denigration of enlightened Western principles. This framework for 
approaching integration and immigration topics was employed more dominantly when the LPF took the 
reins of this discourse (Akkerman, 2005: 346). Research has consistently shown that the Dutch are among 
the most concerned Europeans about cultural integration issues, and immigrants‟ subscription to national 
values and norms is prioritised over all other preconditions for citizenship. This chapter offers a 
discussion of some of the core liberal values espoused and cherished by Dutch society and concludes with 
a consideration of liberal democratic political culture in the Netherlands in this age of cultural diversity.  
 
6.2 A RE-EVALUATION OF ESSENTIAL LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC VALUES? 
 
The intention for this section is to provide answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 1, by 
drawing from the discussions and conclusions presented in the preceding chapters. Qualified answers will 
be given to questions about key liberal democratic values such as equality; tolerance; secularism; the 
freedom of religious expression; free speech and anti-discrimination. The overall intention is to ascertain 
what the Dutch experience in terms of its citizenship and integration policy, religious pluralism, patterns 
of voting behaviour, and rising levels of support for the populist right, reveals about the state of liberal 
democracy in the Netherlands. 
 
6.2.1 Equality 
Is “equality” about embracing diversity and multiculturalism or does it instead involve efforts to 
entrench a dominant and homogenising status quo? 
 
Along with countries such as the United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden, the Netherlands is considered 
to have a deeply-entrenched sense of superiority about the way in which society has been organised in 
accordance with a distinctive set of “Dutch” values (European Commission, Perceptions of the EU, 
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2001). As shown in Chapter 5, Dutch respondents in public opinion surveys are consistently the most 
ardent supporters of immigrants‟ conformity to national cultural values as the most important 
precondition for citizenship. Such notions about “Dutch” cultural superiority indicate an ingrained sense 
of cultural hierarchy among the majority. Equality between societal groups, irrespective of whether they 
constitute a majority or minority, is essential for genuine integration. Aside from the practical challenges 
associated with identifying the best manner in which to go about facilitating integration, there appears to 
be a fundamental problem with how integration is conceptualised in the Dutch context. The turn towards 
an assimilationist strategy heightens the asymmetrical nature of this process, and requirements that 
immigrants shed their identities, assimilate Dutch values and culture, provide “proof” of loyalty via 
citizenship and distance themselves from Islam, certainly do not reflect the EU‟s conceptualisation of 
accommodation as a mutual, two-way process (van Bruinessen in Vink, 2007: 343). The EU‟s 
understanding of integration implies concession and compromise on the part of all groups for the 
achievement of social cohesion and broad-based societal participation – and not merely the assimilation 
of out-groups into the overarching, dominant “culture” of the majority.  
 
The implication of requiring that minority cultural identity be relinquished and that immigrants don the 
cultural norms of the majority, is that groups do not approach one another as equals. As long as 
immigrant integration takes place within a context of perceived group hierarchy and on asymmetrical 
terms, genuine integration can only ever be partial. Central to the question of equality however, is the 
level at which this is to be accorded to all within society, since the goals of individual equality and group 
equality cannot be pursued simultaneously. From a strictly liberal perspective then, the principle of 
individual equality cannot be reconciled with Muslim demands for group rights, as the latter are seen to 
encroach upon the rights of other individuals and to transgress the private boundaries of cultural 
autonomy (Fukuyama, 2006: 16). The call to ban the headscarf in the Netherlands is one example of a 
formal effort to entrench – or perhaps more aptly, enforce – individual equality. 
 
6.2.2 Tolerance 
How tolerant is liberal democratic political culture in the Netherlands today, in the context of more 
restrictionist immigration strategies and integration policy’s turn towards an assimilationist, rather than 
multicultural, approach? 
 
It has been said that Dutch voters are starting to “reconsider...their famous tolerance” in light of cultural 
anxieties about immigrants not necessarily sharing the same values (Sterling 2011). The Dutch pride 
themselves in their long history of tolerance, but this tradition was part of a wider strategy of non-
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interference with other religious-ideological pillars; in the private realm, the Dutch are considered rather 
socially conservative (van der Veer, 2006: 118; Fukuyama, 2006: 14). The ability to display tolerance 
towards cultural diversity is considered a function of the particular “self-understanding” of the dominant 
culture of a society: whilst no community is inherently “tolerant” or “intolerant”, the extent to which the 
majority thinks of itself as tolerant is important for structuring group behaviour (Mahajan, 2007: 328, 
329). Dutch society‟s experience in accommodating religious-ideological pluralism has been instrumental 
in shaping a collective consciousness about “Dutch tolerance”, which is regularly invoked in public and 
political discourse and in discussions about the Netherlands. The pervasiveness of the notion of “Dutch 
tolerance” makes the recent turn towards restrictionist immigration policy and assimilationist integration 
strategies all the more seemingly contradictory to the “Dutch way”. The extent to which this idea about a 
tolerant Dutch “self” has been able to constrain negative reactions towards immigrant out-groups is 
difficult to determine. This vision of tolerance has however been challenged by the Dutch right, the rise of 
which has occurred not only in spite of a tolerant self-understanding, but largely as a result of it. The 
traditions of political correctness and cultural relativism in the Netherlands are two ways in which 
perceptions about Dutch tolerance have manifested themselves. Pim Fortuyn was especially vocal in his 
criticisms of Dutch political correctness, which he blamed for promoting a naïve vision of society and for 
enabling avoidance of sensitive, albeit critical, issues pertaining to immigrant integration.  
 
The reassertion of “Dutch” national identity and culture of late evinces a less-tolerant self-understanding 
in the Netherlands. Tolerance of cultural diversity is inextricably linked to multiculturalism and the turn 
towards an assimilationist policy frame for integration also suggests an altered Dutch self-perception that 
has been less able to keep in check the cultural nationalism of the Dutch majority. It has been suggested 
that the character of societal tolerance is important for multiculturalism‟s resilience within a particular 
context, and for the way in which cultural diversity is approached. Mahajan (2007: 329, 330) 
distinguishes between a liberal and Orientalist conception of tolerance: the former prioritises individual 
autonomy, whereas the latter sees the individual as rooted within a particular community – a “situated 
self” – which teaches tolerance of other communities and their different interpretations of the “good life” 
irrespective of the content of these interpretations. The Orientalist conception of tolerance and a so-called 
“situated self” is therefore considered more amenable to the toleration of other communities and their 
distinctive worldviews than the liberal conception of tolerance and the autonomous self. Though tolerance 
stemming from a strong sense of “situated self” is not necessary in order for multiculturalism to thrive 
within a particular society, it is thought to restrain an “assertive cultural majoritarianism” from 
encroaching on the cultural space of communities (Mahajan, 2007: 332). From the perspective of a liberal 
conception of tolerance, those choices that do not reflect “the ideals of autonomy”, and which are 
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informed by a group logic, cannot be supported: the liberal notion of tolerance therefore operates within 
limits and does not universally embrace all conceptions of the “good life” (Mahajan, 2007: 333).  
 
Whilst tolerance cannot be enforced, it appears that setting the boundaries of tolerance in the Netherlands 
is critical and ultimately, inevitable. This would involve the state playing a more active role in creating a 
“facilitating environment” and setting the parameters for more meaningful, understanding, and respectful 
social relations. The state and its institutions do have a responsibility to ensure peaceful and constructive 
cross-cultural engagement. The promotion of tolerance is possible by defining more clearly the limits of 
permissible debate and mediating, legally if need be, between potentially conflicting group demands in 
the wider interests of social harmony and the achievement of the “good society”. Though judicial 
intervention may appear incompatible with the notion of tolerance in most Western liberal democracies, a 
degree of mediation is necessary for addressing the inevitable conflicts that arise within multicultural 
contexts (Mahajan, 2007: 334). 
 
6.2.3 Laïcété vs. Freedom of Religious Expression 
How does the principle of a secular, neutral Dutch state and society conflict with an overtly religious and 
externalised Islamic presence? 
 
The extent to which religious expression and visibility is acceptable within secular Dutch society is also 
undefined, and leads to overblown and hysterical anxieties about an impending “Islamisation” of the 
Netherlands. Fukuyama (2006: 15) writes that cultural diversity in Europe, the United States and Canada 
was initially conceived as something that would operate within the private realm, ensuring that the 
practice and pursuit of cultural diversity would not result in conflict with other individual freedoms or 
with the overarching liberal social milieu. It is considered the responsibility of the secular state to ensure 
that all citizens are presented with the same range of choices, to the extent that these do not restrict the 
scope of choice of any other citizen (Sivanandan in Fekete, 2008: 70). In Europe, the “intrusion” of 
cultural diversity into the public space has been interpreted as a fundamental threat to liberal democracy, 
and the liberal principle of religious toleration refers to the idea that religious objectives cannot be 
pursued in the public realm insofar as they impinge on the religious freedom of others. Prior to Muslim 
immigration to the Netherlands, those legacies of pillarisation that did persist were “quite harmless” in 
secular Dutch society; as Muslim numbers in the country grew however, the enduring religious 
infrastructure set a precedent for this new religious identity (Fukuyama, 2006: 16). The legacy of 
providing space in Dutch society for community organisation is therefore expected to continue to 
challenge efforts at separating church and state. Like the blurred boundaries of tolerance, so the extent to 
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which the freedom of individual religious expression can acceptably encroach upon the rights of those 
belonging to a particular religious grouping has been left unaddressed (Fukuyama, 2006: 7). Western 
liberalism has therefore traditionally been conceptualised as freedom at the individual-level: the freedom 
of particular cultural communities to defend their own group identities is only now increasingly being 
recognised as a central issue (Fukuyama, 2006: 7).  
 
6.2.4 Freedom of Expression vs. Anti-Discrimination 
To what extent does the cause for freedom of expression, advanced by the Dutch radical right, undermine 
the anti-discrimination pledge in the Dutch constitution?  
 
Van Gogh‟s outrageous and derogatory provocations about religion walked a fine line between exercising 
freedom of speech and causing undue incensement – the same goes for the discourse employed by 
Fortuyn and Wilders. The extreme offense that van Gogh‟s statements caused Muslims in particular, 
though acceptable from a liberal perspective in the name of free speech and the freedom to criticise, is an 
example of liberty pushed to the brink – the consequences of which, as seen, can be fatal. Mahajan (2007: 
334) writes that European democracies tend to overlook the “feelings and sentiments” of individuals in 
society as well as the potential for confrontation that can be injurious to relations between individuals and 
societal groups when the freedom to express is taken too far. Failure to take into consideration the 
sensitivity surrounding specific topics for specific groups has the potential to be seriously harmful to 
social harmony. This was seen, for instance, in several European contexts after the publication of the 
cartoons of the Prophet (Mahajan, 2007: 334). The extreme to which Wilders has chosen to exercise his 
own right to speak his mind has come at the expense of his personal liberty. Though clearly a sacrifice 
Wilders has chosen to make in the name of his particular conception of the “good life”, this raises 
questions about the costs of pushing liberalism to the limits. Perhaps the important question is not so 
much whether the freedom to express undermines anti-discrimination efforts, but what the implications of 
unfettered free speech are for social harmony. Wilders‟ recent trial for hate speech went ahead as it was 
deemed in society‟s interest for there to be greater clarification about free speech laws, given general 
public confusion surrounding the topic. Wilders‟ subsequent acquittal has however only widened the 
parameters of acceptable debate in the Netherlands: the boundaries between free speech, offence and 
disrespect – if not quite “hate” speech – have been blurred even further.   
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6.3 PROSPECTS FOR DUTCH LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 
  
6.3.1 The Paradoxes and Limitations of (Dutch) Liberal Democracy 
This thesis has highlighted a number of inherent contradictions within liberal democracy. Legitimate 
debates surrounding the nature of democracy (direct democracy versus representative and pluralist types), 
the position of religion within society, and the preponderance of the rule of law over the will of the 
majority, are all contentions that the Dutch national debate on immigration and integration has brought to 
the fore. Furthermore, certain “core principles” of liberal democratic ideology seem to contradict other 
similarly central precepts, prompting debate over which tenet should be prioritised in circumstances when 
they appear to “clash”. This is evident regarding the tension surrounding the right to express freely and to 
criticise, versus concerted measures to combat the incidence of discrimination. It would seem, therefore, 
that problems arise with a lack of conceptual clarity and common understanding of what it means to be 
“tolerant” or to foster “equality”, for example. It also appears that these principles have boundaries and 
that it is important that the limits of tolerance and limits to which religious affiliation may be expressed 
publicly are defined and more importantly, are collectively understood and respected. The development of 
a coherent political culture is important in this regard, seeing as these limits cannot in reality be enforced 
or formally restricted without compromising the very freedoms that liberal democracy seeks to promote. 
The emergence of the populist radical right is very much a reflection of these contradictions. Peripheral 
parties have been able to capitalise upon and exploit these inconsistencies to their electoral advantage, by 
advancing a selective agenda that amounts to a partial pursuit of liberal democracy.  
 
An important paradox of liberal societies relates to the tension between endorsing autonomy and personal 
choice, and the reluctance to endorse preferences to participate in a way of life centred on the community 
(Mahajan, 2007: 332). Fukuyama (2006: 6) similarly talks about that “hole” in liberal democratic political 
theory that is the liberal conception of political freedom in terms of the state versus the individual, as 
opposed to the state versus particular societal groups. The accommodation of different lifestyles is thus 
considered more difficult in liberal societies than in contexts where individual liberty is not preponderant 
and where the expression of community and group identity is not regarded as threatening. In liberal 
societies, the “social contract” exists between individual citizens and the state as a means to curb the 
relentless pursuit of individual self-interest. Societies in which individual freedom is left unfettered will 
dissolve into a “state of nature” characterised by perpetual civil war (Heywood, 2007: 36, 37). Many of 
the central paradoxes within liberal democracy stem from this tension between individuals‟ “inner and 
outer selves” and the disjuncture between individual freedoms and the ideals of the group or community 
(Fukuyama, 2006: 8). It is not enough then, in the contemporary age, to recognise rights to dignity, 
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respect and equality at the level of the individual only: modern identity politics increasingly demands 
recognition at the group level. Immigrant groups in the Netherlands, and Muslims especially as the most 
marginalised out-group vis-à-vis the Dutch majority, need to be incorporated into Dutch society on an 
equal footing not only as individuals, but also as a cultural community deserving of the same respect and 
rights to recognition as the Dutch majority. We therefore witness groups in liberal societies demanding 
the same rights to recognition as those rights that are accorded to the individual.  
 
Though the Netherlands perhaps needs to rethink the role of the group in integration, liberalism cannot 
ultimately be centred on group rights, as not all groups subscribe to liberal precepts. It is impossible for 
liberal democracy to be culturally neutral as liberal societies espouse their own set of values which are 
centred on the equality and dignity of all individuals (Fukuyama, 2006: 15). Indeed, it has become 
apparent within the last two decades that the liberal state does not advance a wholly neutral, or universal, 
conception of the ideal society (Mahajan, 2007: 317). For all the claims of liberalism‟s “universalism”, 
and the fact that this ideology has so permeated Western societies and lifestyles that it has assumed an 
almost “given” rank as the “natural” state of affairs, increasing challenges to the liberal state have 
necessitated more critical and questioning perspectives towards this ideology. Global terrorism, the 
relentless advancement of globalisation bringing into contact different cultures and ideological systems, 
and greater cultural diversity, are some of the challenges to this notion of liberal “neutrality”. It has thus 
become increasingly apparent that the liberal state does indeed peddle its own, very much situated, 
conception of the “good life” – a conception that is not necessarily universally applicable, or one to which 
different groups commonly aspire. In this light, Fukuyama (2006: 15) maintains that basic liberal 
principles should be regarded as the condition for all cultures seeking participation and protection in 
modern liberal democracies and that all deserve equal treatment as individuals, not as members of cultural 
groups. This harkens back to the idea of needing to define and set the limits of inclusion and acceptable 
behaviour in liberal democracies. This is especially important for an ideology which is very much about 
being “anti-extremist”, for it is within delineated boundaries that the maximum extent of tolerance, 
equality and freedom can be realised. 
 
6.3.2 Liberal Democratic Political Culture in the Age of Cultural Diversity 
The challenges to liberal democracy have become more apparent in the twenty-first century. 
Multiculturalism in Western liberal democracies has come “under siege” from global terrorism, which has 
cast doubt on the desirability and appropriateness of the multicultural logic of acknowledging and 
accommodating cultural diversity (Mahajan, 2007: 317). Radical Islamism has given rise to more 
prevalent “othering” processes and to the “demonisation” of cultural difference in societies where a 
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“cultural fault-line” has become more apparent, particularly post-9/11 (Mahajan, 2007: 317, 318, 323). 
Aside from the security threat this phenomenon poses in the contemporary “age of terror”, the 
fundamentally anti-liberal ideology of radical Islamism is problematic for liberal democratic states. These 
circumstances have seen the cultural sphere emerge as the new “arena of conflict in liberal democracies”, 
which has important implications for the survivability of multiculturalism and indeed the whole question 
about whether liberal democracies should strive towards the accommodation and fostering of cultural 
diversity in the first place (Mahajan, 2007: 318). Terrorism is seen to strike at the very heart of democracy 
and multiculturalism: a so-called “culture of silence” reduces citizens and politicians to agency-less 
“spectators” in the public sphere where leaders‟ agenda-setting powers are undermined along with their 
capacity to determine the conditions of debate and discourse (Mahajan, 2007: 321). Global terror also 
fans stereotypes and provides justification for the demonisation of the “other”, further weakening the 
prospects for fostering a multicultural society (Mahajan, 2007: 321).  
 
Whilst acknowledging the considerable ideological and security threats posed by fundamental Islamism, 
Fukuyama (2006: 5) asserts that a more critical and long-term concern confronting liberal democracies in 
the twenty-first century is the challenge of integrating immigrant minority groups – especially Muslims – 
into European societies. European democracies are considered to have become both the “breeding 
ground” and “battlefront” in the clash between radical Islamism and liberal democracy – a struggle not 
resulting from tensions between traditional culture and the forces of modernity, but instead stemming 
from the fact of radical Islam being a thoroughly modern expression of identity politics and very much a 
consequence of the modernisation process (Fukuyama, 2006: 6, 10). For all the talk of a “cultural clash” 
between radical Islamism and Western liberal democracy, the former does not stem from inherent 
“cultural” traits within Islam, but is a product of a “deterritorialised” Islam in the modern age of 
globalised migration (Fukuyama, 2006: 10). In Western societies, Islamic identity is not supported by the 
external environment and pressures to conform to dominant cultural norms result in a dislocation between 
Muslims‟ “inner” identities and “outer” behaviour in society. Radical Islamism is therefore rooted in the 
“quest for identity” that this cultural dislocation and alienation induces: jihadism, with its universalist 
ideology, is thus considered attractive to many second- and third-generation European Muslims 
(Fukuyama, 2006: 10, 11).  
 
The Dutch public accords huge priority to questions of integration, though dissatisfaction with integration 
efforts is manifested more in hostility towards the government in failing to manage this issue, than in 
negative sentiments towards immigrants themselves. Though the nature of public debate, patterns of 
voting behaviour and integration strategies in the Netherlands all point towards more public support for 
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restricting immigration and emphasising the cultural assimilation of immigrants, there seems to be general 
acceptance of the fact that immigrant and foreign communities are a permanent feature of Dutch society. 
The LPF and PVV have both firmly rejected the option of expelling immigrants and the content of their 
political demands focus, or did focus, on integration topics. The central debate in the Netherlands thus 
seems to be how to manage and respond to a distinctively Islamic presence in particular – especially in 
light of perceptions that many Muslims are “unwilling” to integrate. This salient immigrant integration 
issue in the Netherlands has strong cultural overtones, particularly since the shift towards assimilation 
accords less focus to the socio-economic integration of immigrants and more attention to incorporating 
foreigners into society on a cultural level, as discussed in Chapter Two. Indeed, as shown in Chapter Five, 
the pervasiveness of symbolic and cultural concerns among the Dutch public towards immigration and 
integration over the course of the last two decades – and in the last 10 years especially – has meant that 
despite considerably less favourable economic conditions in the Netherlands in the context of the global 
financial crisis, perceptions of immigrant out-groups and immigration appear to be dominated by a 
cultural logic. 
 
As evidenced by the Dutch context, the inadequate integration of its Muslim population has already 
erupted in violence, as well as a considerable backlash from the populist right (Fukuyama, 2006: 15). 
However, it is not only the root causes of these outbursts stemming from unsuccessful integration 
strategies that require addressing, but also their provocations, which have drawn far less research interest. 
Behavioural changes from both sides – Muslim groups as well as the dominant Dutch population – are 
necessary to resolve the question of how better to integrate Muslims in the Netherlands. Fukuyama (2006: 
15) proposes more active efforts to integrate non-Western groups into a common liberal culture which 
accords less emphasis to group recognition and rights – unlike the style of the multicultural model which 
allowed cultural groups excessive authority to set their own guidelines for members‟ behaviour, out of a 
“misplaced sense of respect” for cultural diversity. The increasing fragmentation of the Dutch electorate, 
discussed in Chapter Four, implies that coalition governments in the Netherlands will increasingly come 
to depend upon the support of smaller parties, which appeal to more specific voter concerns. This 
suggests that minority interests may come to assume greater electoral salience, and that future coalition 
governments will be obliged to pay greater heed to minority concerns. Minorities may then come to wield 
greater control over politics in the Netherlands, demonstrating the way in which the process of democratic 
politics may serve to “bring minorities within the main fold” (Mahajan, 2007: 326).  
 
Europe‟s lack of a distinctive, cohesive identity has spurred claims that Europeans are “afraid” and unsure 
of their own identity and as a result perceive Islam as a threat: the somewhat “remarkable” reaffirmation 
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of Europe‟s Christian heritage has been one response to the growing demographic reality of Islam in 
Europe (Fekete, 2008: 16; Schori Liang, 2007: 21). Popular culture has traditionally been subject to 
criticism by liberals, as it is seen as a source of conformism which undermines individual autonomy 
(Heywood, 2007: 317). Despite liberal societies generally being recognised as having weak identities, and 
some argue that this is in fact a source of strength, a sense of national identity does nevertheless prevail in 
the majority of modern liberal democracies (Fukuyama, 2006: 12). In a comparison of American and 
European identity, Cremona (2010) maintains that American culture is a “political culture” in the sense 
that it is both shaped and constrained by political institutions, thereby keeping “forces of cultural 
intolerance” in check. Despite attempts to forge a continental and coherent “European” identity founded 
upon tolerance and political pluralism, this is in reality “much more confused” than the American version, 
and is described by Fukuyama (2006: 13) as something that “comes from the head rather than the heart”. 
The lack of a comparably robust and coherent political culture in Europe, shared by all European citizens, 
has allowed mobilisation of national populations along anti-immigration lines. This has to a large degree 
been the result of perceptions of threat that have materialised in the aftermath of expansion and increasing 
levels of immigration (Cremona, 2010). Although European cultures are by no means inherently 
intolerant, the mutual exclusivity of politics and culture prevents cultural orientations from being reigned 
in and indirectly enables a culture of intolerance and political extremism. The inseparability of American 
politics and culture and the combination of political and civic values accessible to all Americans, has 
served to unite a vastly heterogeneous population by their politics, meaning that political extremism is 
simply anathema to the “American way” (Cremona, 2010; Fukuyama, 2006: 12). Wolin (2011: 65) 
similarly emphasises the role of European political culture in nurturing these universal norms to act as a 
counterweight against the “seductions and temptations of the new illiberalism”. Political culture is 
therefore just as important as a normative guideline for behaviour as it is in serving a “constraining” 
function. 
 
The recent resurgence of parties endorsing national identity sentiments is evidence of deeper engagement 
on the topic of what constitutes “Dutch” or “European” identity. This is indeed a necessary discussion in 
the context of increasing cultural diversity. The achievement of consensus around core liberal values is 
desirable in order to persuade populations of particular principles to secure social harmony and 
accommodate public preferences – democracy is not about dodging the will of citizens, as has commonly 
been the case in efforts to balance liberalism and democracy in Europe (Cremona, 2010). Evidence of 
more frank and honest discussion in the Netherlands is a positive development and the degree of public 
engagement in the immigration and integration debates is considerable. Despite the “valuelessness” of 
contemporary postmodernism, societal values and norms appear to have assumed heightened importance 
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in the context of mounting cultural diversity in the Netherlands and further afield (Fukuyama, 2006: 18). 
This enables populations to affirm common values and to construct and advance shared conceptions about 
the content of the “good life”. In increasingly pluralistic societies, a more robust sense of identity is 
necessary in order that populations do not, in Fukuyama‟s (2006: 19) words, become “overwhelmed by 
people who are more sure about who they are”. 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The intention of this concluding chapter has been, primarily, to answer the research questions posed at the 
outset of this thesis, in light of the discussions and conclusions presented in the preceding chapters. 
Whilst observation of the Dutch context does not lead to the conclusion that a fundamental re-evaluation 
of essential societal values has taken place, it has been emphasised that greater definition, and 
delimitation, of core liberal democratic values is needed. This chapter has additionally situated this 
discussion of immigration, integration and liberal democracy in the Netherlands within a wider present-
day context that reflects upon the implications of cultural diversity for modern identities in contemporary 
liberal societies. 
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